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“One must take into account a definite cushioning effect exercised both by the law, and by the 
moral sense which constitutes a self-imposed law; for a country is considered the more civilized 
the more the wisdom and efficiency of its laws hinder a weak man from becoming too weak or a 
powerful man from becoming too powerful” 
-Primo Levi, If This is a Man 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Running head: AVERSIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 1 
Abstract 
Although juries exist within the American justice system to guard against “the corrupt or overzealous 
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge” (United States, 1968), 
psychological researchers have been divided over whether mock jurors do indeed demonstrate biased 
decision making due to the mixed results of past meta-analyses (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mazzella 
et al., 1994; Mitchell et al., 2005). In order to address what has caused these variable results, 
researchers must begin to explore complex paradigms for juror decision making. As such, these 
present studies sought to test the theoretical mechanisms of one of these possible paradigms, the 
aversive racism paradigm, which proposes that mock jurors feel better able to act in biased ways 
when their defendant has a negative secondary characteristic (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pearson, 
2007; Minero & Espinoza, 2016). If the mechanisms of this paradigm could be experimentally 
related to a defendant’s secondary characteristics, then the aversive racism paradigm could be used to 
explain the variable results of past meta-analyses. In result, Study 1 supported the mechanistic 
validity of aversive racism paradigms. Further, it clarified that certain theoretical mechanisms of 
aversive racism, including mock jurors’ preferencing of normative decision making modes and 
increased willingness to communicate explicit biases, actually preceded any influence of a 
defendant’s race, suggesting that this paradigm might even begin to explain the biases of mock jurors 
in studies that are unrelated to race. However, mock jurors in Study 2 failed to operate under an 
aversive racism paradigm, instead reflecting the decision making processes of an incredibly unusual 
population. Overall, both of these studies provide a unique mechanistic exploration into possible 
reasons why different juror decision making studies might arrive at incredibly variable results. In 
turn, the findings of these studies provide information about the biased decision making processes of 
a variety of mock jurors that should be considered for future research or for future juridical reforms.   
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 In 1543, sculptor Hans Gieng completed the fountain “Gerechtigkeitsbrunnen,” or “The 
Fountain of Justice.” Although this fountain is regarded as the pinnacle of Gieng’s career, it is 
remembered for more than just its artistic merit. Instead, this statue is remembered as the first 
known artifact to depict “Lady Justice” blindfolded, or literally unable to see inequality before 
the law. Through time, Western society has made Gieng’s symbolic blindfold a prototypical 
feature, as nearly every humanized depiction of Justice now incorporates this blindfold. 
Furthermore, this symbolism has grown to shape the way we speak about justice and legal 
equality, as those who critique the egalitarianism of the justice system use this language of 
“blindness” to do so. For example, Lyndon B. Johnson famously referenced Lady Justice’s 
blindness when he argued that “Until justice is blind to color … emancipation will be a 
proclamation but not a fact.” In fact, many questions about whether or not class, race, sex, or any 
other extralegal factor has the power to change the way we interact with the justice system have 
largely grown to rely on this language of blindness. As a result, we tend to ask ourselves: Is 
Justice really blind, or does Justice see us and judge us based on our personal characteristics? 
 While the visual perceptual abilities of a humanized government institution are obviously 
not the actual source of legal bias, our focus on this symbolism has managed to articulate that 
many justice systems, such as those in the United States, fail to uphold the egalitarian principles 
Gieng’s Lady Justice hopes to depict. Through this lens, we can see that our justice system does 
in fact see our extralegal characteristics. For example, in the most recent report by the Human 
Rights Watch, the United States was once again criticized for demonstrating legal discrimination 
toward racial minorities like Black men (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In particular, this report 
cited that the United States police disproportionality use excessive force when apprehending 
Black people. Further, this report also noted that, although Black individuals use drugs at similar 
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or even lower rates than White individuals, Black adults are almost three times more likely to be 
arrested for drug possession. Moreover, the United States Department of Justice Bureau of 
Justice Statistics most recently reported that in 2016, Black individuals accounted for 41.3 
percent of the prison population, whereas White individuals accounted for only 39 percent 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018). Taking into account each groups’ proportional representation 
in American society, this report identified that young Black men are 11.8 times more likely to be 
imprisoned than young White men. Overall, this indicates that 2.5% of Black men in the United 
States were imprisoned at the time of the report. Although a humanized Lady Justice herself 
cannot “see” race, it is clear that actors within the justice system not only fail to uphold her 
egalitarian principles but actively demonstrate bias toward certain individuals based on the color 
of their skin.   
 
A General Overview of Bias in the Justice System 
Despite these statistics, it has been hard to determine which specific facet of the justice 
system has failed each of these individuals. In fact, most recent legal analyses have agreed that 
each facet of the justice system, or more frequently a combination of multiple facets, contributes 
to this discrimination in a variety of cases (Wu, 2016). As such, the role of each branch of the 
justice system needs to be directly investigated. However, while many researchers focusing on 
the legal biases of a specific facet make broad assertions like “Racial prejudice in the courtroom 
is examined through a historical sketch of racism in the legal system” (Sommers & Ellsworth, 
2001), they then immediately transition to their critique of one specific facet without thoroughly 
justifying why they have chosen to single out it out. If anything, these researchers reference 
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incredibly brief and unsubstantiated claims to justify their decisions. For example, one set of 
researchers (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001) claimed: 
Whereas in previous eras the prejudicial treatment of Black defendants was 
attributable to a multitude of factors, including statutory inequality and the racist 
attitudes of trial and appellate judges, bias in contemporary criminal trials persists 
in the absence of overt legislative or judicial discrimination. (pp. 201) 
 
Here, it becomes apparent that researchers focusing on legal discrimination have relied on the 
general delegitimization of other facets’ roles in perpetuating bias in order to argue for the 
importance of their chosen facet of the justice system.  
In an attempt to avoid replicating these generalized, unsubstantiated claims, this section 
will provide a thorough overview of the discriminatory aspects of each facet of the justice 
system. In doing so, the focus on juror decision making that will prevail in later sections will not 
rely on the outright dismissal of the discriminatory actions of these other facets. Instead, these 
present studies will recognize the multifaceted, systemic nature of legal biases and will provide a 
unique justification for juror decision making research that acknowledges the complexities of the 
entire justice system.  
The first facet of the justice system that should be considered is law enforcement, as 
members of law enforcement most directly interact with the general public. Possibly as a result, 
the public sphere, or the popular media, has primarily chosen to focus on the systemic 
discriminatory actions of this facet of the justice system. In fact, due to the attention created by 
widely publicized trials like the Rodney King trial and more recently by the Black Lives Matter 
movement, many Americans are at least tangentially aware of members of law enforcement’s 
discriminatory behaviors. For example, these trials and movements have highlighted to public 
audiences that young Black men are nine times more likely than any other Americans to be killed 
by a member of law enforcement, with a reported total of 1093 Black men killed by the police in 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
5 
2016 alone (The Counted, 2017). While these statistics themselves are tragically illuminating in 
regard to the racial biases of the police, other more widely applicable examples might also be 
cited. Generally speaking, most Americans primarily interact with police officers as the result of 
a traffic violation. However, Black drivers are 31 percent more likely to be pulled over for these 
violations than White drivers, and Black individuals are also more likely to have their cars 
searched and are less likely to receive a reason for being pulled over during these interactions 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013). Although some individuals could argue that these statistics 
merely indicate that Black people might simply be committing more traffic violations overall, 
potentially due to the fact that Black individuals are more likely to come from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Reeves et al., 2016) and are therefore less able to, for example, 
quickly fix a broken brake light, the fact that the police disproportionately fail to provide their 
probable cause for pulling over Black individuals is itself a violation of this group’s legal rights. 
In turn, there is at least some evidence, including both extreme and commonplace examples, that 
members of law enforcement are not operating under egalitarian principles in an incredibly 
damaging way.  
Psychological explanations for this behavior have also been explored through a series of 
law enforcement decision making studies (Correll et al., 2002, 2007). In one such study, the 
authors demonstrated that, to some degree, these biases are the result of a person’s particular 
beliefs about Black men as well as their overall beliefs or attitudes about the world (Miller et al., 
2012). In other words, participants were indeed more likely to shoot unarmed suspects when 
these suspects were Black men. However, participants were also more likely to shoot any 
unarmed suspect when these participants indicated that they believed the world was a dangerous 
place or when the suspects were members of an experimentally constructed outgroup, even 
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though that constructed outgroup was not characterized as stereotypically dangerous in any way. 
In conclusion, these authors posited that the culture of fear that may be created within law 
enforcement, our basic tendency to react more quickly to members of our outgroups, and specific 
societal beliefs that label Black men as particularly threatening might all interact to cause police 
officers to disproportionately shoot Black men. As such, these analyses revealed that in order to 
overcome these biases demonstrated by members of law enforcement, individual officers would 
not only need to combat their own biases about Black people, but they would also need to 
combat the structural factors that create these cultures of fear and lead them to react more 
quickly to members of their outgroups.  
Further, while these examples of discrimination do reflect widespread and tragic points 
within the justice system wherein some legal actors fail to be “blind” to race and as a result 
directly cause the premature deaths of thousands of people, biases in policing do not fully 
account for the previously mentioned variations in incarceration rates faced by racial minorities. 
For someone to be incarcerated, they must first be charged with a crime. In the media, the ability 
to charge someone with a crime is commonly attributed to members of law enforcement such as 
police officers or detectives, but, in reality, only prosecutors have this ability. In fact, the power 
of prosecutors is commonly ignored within the public sphere. And yet, if a decision in a case is 
rendered without a trial, then nearly all of the defendant’s interactions with the justice system are 
mediated through their prosecutors. Further, even in jury trials, prosecutors have a considerable 
amount of power during juror selection and the case itself (Morrison et al., 2016). This is to say 
that, if it were the case that prosecutors selected and handled defendants’ fates in a biased way, 
then many individuals would almost exclusively interact with a facet of the justice system that 
fails to uphold egalitarian principles.  
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Moreover, potentially due to the public’s lack of awareness of prosecutorial power, fewer 
studies have focused specifically on the nature of prosecutorial discrimination (Wu, 2016). While 
some reports suggest that Black men are over 10 times more likely than other Americans to be 
charged with a crime (Heath, 2014), many of these reports are conducted outside of the realm of 
controlled academic research. To address this problem, one researcher attempted to identify 
whether past studies have collected substantial evidence to suggest that prosecutorial 
discrimination is indeed prevalent by conducting a meta-analysis that considered the 
methodological rigor of its samples (Wu, 2016). Nevertheless, even when only the most rigorous 
studies were considered this analysis ultimately did support the assertion that prosecutors act in 
discriminatory ways toward racial minorities.  
Some, however, might point out that the justice system in the United States was designed 
to protect defendants from the effects of prosecutorial discrimination. For example, the 14th 
Amendment, which clarifies citizens’ rights to equal protection of the law, led to the creation of 
the “selective prosecution” defense. This defense would allow defendants to claim, in court, that 
they were “selectively” prosecuted because of biases based on their age, race, gender, etc. 
However, following a 1995 supreme court decision based on a case brought forward by a group 
of Black men who had attempted to utilize this defense, it has since been specified that, when 
claiming selective prosecution, defendants must prove that no other group was prosecuted for a 
similar charge in their district (United States, 1995). Essentially, in order to fully access the 
selective prosecution defense, prosecutorial discrimination must be so extreme that only one age, 
race, gender, etc. was recently charged for that crime. As a result, this clarification eradicated 
any effectiveness the selective prosecution defense might have had at combatting the 
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disproportionate rate at which charges are brought against certain groups and prevented any 
individuals from using this defense to combat the prosecutorial biases they face. 
The other main failsafe that might protect against prosecutorial biases relies on the power 
of democracy itself. Many prosecutors in the United States are elected to their position, meaning 
that, ideally, we as citizens have the power to replace prosecutors who diverge from the 
egalitarian principles of a “blind” justice system. However, given that many of the effects of 
prosecutorial discrimination are only faced by numerical minorities and that individuals affected 
by these biases may be taken less seriously by the general population due to the stigmatization of 
people with criminal histories, this democratic ideal is rarely realized. In fact, in a recent report 
conducted by the Reflective Democracy Campaign, it was identified that 95 percent of elected 
prosecutors in the United States are in fact White, that 14 states exclusively have White elected 
prosecutors, and that 85 percent of prosecutors that run for election run unopposed (Reflective 
Democracy Campaign, 2015). These statistics might reflect a structural inability for certain racial 
minorities to utilize the power of representative democracy as a means to combat prosecutorial 
discrimination. 
Similar criticisms have been applied to judges. As judges also have many roles within the 
justice system, including the power to preside over the proceedings of jury trials and determine 
the length of defendants’ sentences in most cases, they are commonly considered when 
addressing sources of legal discrimination (Cohn et al., 2012). Recent statistical analyses, for 
example, have determined that young Black men receive significantly longer sentences from 
judges than any other group (Steffensmeier, 2016). This evidence directly supports the long-
recognized notion that judicial discrimination is still present in the justice system. Moreover, the 
majority of judges, unique to the United States, are also elected to their positions. Nevertheless, 
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similar to prosecutorial demographics, White people, especially White men, occupy a 
disproportionate number of these elected judicial seats (Torres-Spelliscy, 2010). Furthermore, 
Black men are actually less likely to be elected to a judicial career than they are to be appointed 
(Reddick et al., 2009). This would suggest that, despite the fact that sentences are given to Black 
men by judges in clearly biased ways, democracy has yet again failed to address the structural 
racism of this facet of the justice system through increased representation. Additionally, the 
nature of these election cycles may even inhibit the effectiveness other programs like the 
Sentencing Project, which requires a considerable time commitment in order to train judges to 
mitigate their biases, or the effectiveness of sentencing guidelines, as electoral pressures might 
lead judges to disregard these guidelines in order to seem tough on crime to their voting base 
(Hester & Hartman, 2017).  
And so, from these findings, it is possible to say that many facets of the justice system 
fail to uphold the symbolic egalitarian principles of Gieng’s Lady Justice. Instead, members of 
law enforcement, prosecutors, and even judges discriminate against racial minorities like Black 
people. Further, it is clear that any attempt to undo the biases present in these facets of the justice 
system would require major structural changes. However, there is one other facet of the justice 
system, juries, that might provide some protection from the biases of these otherwise structurally 
impenetrable facets. In fact, juries exist to check and combat the biases of these other facets. 
While juries are commonly called upon to make decisions about indictments, convictions in 
criminal cases, or general outcomes in civil cases, their functional ability to subvert the 
discriminatory actions of powerful actors within the justice system has been recognized as 
necessary since the foundation of American democracy. Indeed, from the point of the 
Declaration of Independence, lack of access to trials by jury was noted as one of the key reasons 
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for independence. As such, multiple articles in the United States Constitution ensure one’s right 
to a trial by jury in order to prevent the justice system from becoming an unreformable 
discriminatory powerhouse. Even in recent decades, especially following a supreme court case 
involving a Black man who was denied access to a trial by jury when charged with misdemeanor 
battery (United States, 1968), the court has clarified:  
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was 
necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate 
enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The 
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted 
upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the 
right trial by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.  
 
As is outlined by this ruling, the right to a trial by jury idealistically provides a check against the 
potentially unreformable power of these other legal professionals by instead calling on a group of 
“impartial” community representatives to determine a verdict. Even if one of these professional 
actors was guided by their own previously mentioned biases, we, as average citizens, can be 
brought forward to subvert their structural discriminatory power and protect defendants from 
unjust convictions.  
 As a result, the present studies have not chosen to focus on juries because of an 
unsubstantiated or frankly incorrect assertion that other facets of the justice system are no longer 
discriminatory. Instead, these studies focus on juror decision making specifically because of the 
widespread, structural, and potentially unreformable biases of these other facets. Only juries 
allow regular people to participate in the justice system, and so if we could realistically begin to 
breakdown and analyze the biases of these regular people, we could actually utilize juries as they 
were meant to be utilized and act as advocates for those who may otherwise be discriminated 
against by these professional actors and structures.  
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Identifying Bias in Juror Decision Making 
 However, in order to begin the process of rehabilitating ourselves as jurors, we must ask 
ourselves: Are we really fit for this task? Can average citizens truly manage to act in impartial, 
nondiscriminatory ways, especially when all of these other facets of the justice system seem to 
fail? And, if we do indeed demonstrate these biases, what, if anything, can we do to overcome 
them and instead uphold the egalitarian principles we would expect from our justice system?  
Those who have previously attempted to address these questions, however, have barely 
advanced beyond the question of whether or not jurors are in fact biased (Devine & Caughlin, 
2014; Mazzella et al., 1994; Mitchell et al., 2005). To an outsider with any awareness of the 
massive amount of studies that investigate the prevalence of racial bias in the general population, 
it would seem easy to suggest that juries, like every other facet of the justice system, will act in 
discriminatory ways. Additionally, much of the media attention that critiques the abuses of law 
enforcement officials has also considered juries complicit in the structural failure to indict police 
officers. For example, juries were blamed for their failure to indict the police officers who killed 
Michael Brown and Eric Garner. In fact, grand juries have been found to only indict 0.72% of 
police officers per 1,000 officers that have been investigated (Stinson, 2014), whereas grand 
juries usually indict about 99.99% of defendants in any other case (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2013). This would suggest that, at least in cases where members of law enforcement are 
themselves the defendants in indictment cases, juries operate in favor of the police, even when 
their decisions prevent an egalitarian justice by supporting these higher authorities.  
Conversely, others would argue that this is not an example of jury discrimination, but an 
example of how indictment hearings themselves are structured to protect the police. For 
example, many grand juries are faced with the reality that it is legal for police officers to use 
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lethal or near-lethal force, making it exceptionally challenging to criminally charge them for 
their behavior, no matter how terrible. Moreover, while there are ways to charge a police officer 
for violating an individual’s amendment rights through their actions, the proper way to apply 
these charges in criminal settings has been hotly debated for decades. As a result, a substantial 
amount of scholarship has focused on attempting to dissect ways that members of law 
enforcement are able to manipulate these court proceedings in their favor (Feldman, 2002; 
Ronell, 1994). On the other hand, many juries are able to overcome these barriers and instead 
hold the police accountable in civil court cases, as was the case with the civil trial that followed 
the Rodney King criminal trial. All of this suggests that these statistical differences in indictment 
rates are in part unique to the structure of criminal indictment hearings involving members of 
law enforcement, rather than outright indicative of biases originating within the jurors 
themselves. Overall, the power these examples might have had to serve as evidence that jurors 
themselves act in discriminatory ways becomes a wash. 
Furthermore, when conducting real-world analyses of more generalizable juror decision 
making trends, it is equally challenging to separate the influence of prosecutorial or judicial 
biases from juror bias itself. Many studies that focus on juror decision making bias, for example, 
justify the existence of these biases by analyzing differences in conviction rates across groups 
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). However, unlike the data that reflects differences in arrest rates 
or sentence lengths, conviction rates are in fact influenced by the actions of a number of actors 
within the justice system, such as the prosecutorial team, the judge overseeing the case, and the 
defense attorney. This suggests that, when looking at real-world data that might indicate 
widespread juror biases, it can be difficult to identify the direct influence the discriminatory 
actors or jurors had on these outcomes.  
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Finally, psychological studies that focus directly on juror decision making in otherwise 
controlled circumstances have found mixed results, with some studies reporting that jurors are 
biased toward disadvantaged groups (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Pearson et al., 2007), others 
finding no differences in how jurors treat different groups (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991), and some 
finding that jurors might preferentially support disadvantaged groups (Poulson, 1990). These 
findings, considered in isolation, seem to indicate that juror decisions are not systemically 
discriminatory toward certain groups, but are instead highly variable. In fact, some of the earliest 
meta-analyses even concluded that juror decision making studies have not provided substantial 
evidence to suggest that juries act in discriminatory ways (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). 
Nevertheless, despite these past results, more recent meta-analyses have alternatively indicated 
that mock jurors are indeed more likely to act in discriminatory ways based on their defendants’ 
extralegal characteristics (Devine & Caughlin, 2014) and, more specifically, have found that 
mock jurors in controlled psychological studies do, more often than not, demonstrate biases 
toward members of minority groups (Mitchell et al., 2005). However, given that both of these 
meta-analyses identified a variety of moderators that influenced the variable outcomes of mock 
juror studies, their findings do also suggest that the mechanisms of juror decision making are 
exceptionally complex, as mock jurors’ decisions can be influenced by a variety of potential 
factors like the crime’s geographical location, the severity of the crime, and the education level 
of jurors, just to name a few examples. This would suggest that if we accept these more recent 
meta-analyses as evidence that juridical bias is prevalent, then our process of overcoming these 
biases would first necessitate a complex understanding of how these variables influence juror 
decision making. As such, our path toward combating these biases has only just begun.  
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Race and juror decision making. Most researchers that have begun to identify and 
interrogate the precise mechanisms of juridical biases have focused on how jurors arrive at 
biased decisions because of a defendant’s race (Hunt, 2015, 2017). In fact, this particular field of 
juror decision making research has spanned over multiple decades, with many early studies 
affirming that mock jurors were indeed overwhelmingly more likely to find Black defendants 
guilty and advocate for longer sentences in cases of burglary, rape, and manslaughter than they 
would for White defendants (Gordon et al., 1988; Gray & Ashmore, 1976; Klein & Creech, 
1982). Furthermore, following the 1994 meta-analysis that demonstrated that this previous 
research had failed to show a generalizable trend of racial bias in juror decision making 
(Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), these researchers did indeed adapt and begin to explore why some 
studies could find clear, statistically significant results while others could not. This initiated this 
field’s interrogation of the precise mechanisms of juridical bias. 
One popular explanation for the variable findings of juror decision making research has 
been spearheaded by researchers Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth (2000, 2001, 2009). In 
an attempt to unpack the mechanisms of juridical bias, these researchers identified that race is 
uniquely able to influence juror decision making when the race of the defendant is particularly 
salient. In other words, the conscious stereotypes or implicit beliefs that jurors might have about 
a Black defendant may only be able to influence their decisions when race is directly identified 
as a core reason for the crime. For example, Sommers and Ellsworth point to the influence racial 
saliency might have had on mock jurors’ disproportional conviction rates of Black men who 
were charged with burglary by explaining that societal narratives frame robbery as a crime more 
stereotypically committed by Black men led to these biases (Gordon et al., 1988; Sommers & 
Ellsworth, 2001). They also apply these analyses in order to explain why Black men who were 
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charged with assaulting a White woman were more likely to be convicted by citing the historical 
legal tendency to characterize Black men as particularly threatening to the safety of White 
women (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).   
However, these researchers also caveat that multiple mock juror studies have failed to 
support this hypothesis when they attempt to construct racial saliency, especially when this 
construction is generated without an awareness of the historical narratives that reinforce racial 
biases (Skolnick and Shaw, 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). In other words, these 
researchers acknowledge that it can be incredibly challenging for psychological researchers to 
mimic racial saliency in an experimental setting, as mock jurors might become hyper-aware of 
the racial narratives represented in the study and attempt to moderate their decisions as a result. 
As such, Sommers and Ellsworth conducted a series of studies that found that, when racial 
salience was constructed in an experimental setting, White jurors actually demonstrated less 
racial biases, even when the crime itself was based within historical stereotypes (2001). In turn, 
these researchers conclude that, in modern settings, “playing the race card” might actually limit 
the influence of racial biases, as mock jurors might become aware of the experimenters’ desire to 
trigger these biases and in response they will actually act less biased overall. In conclusion, while 
these researchers started to unpack the mechanisms of the juridical biases that target Black men, 
they ultimately admit that controlled psychological research may not be able to replicate the 
dynamics that might be employed by real-world jurors.  
However, this conclusion does not explain why more recent meta-analyses have in fact 
found that modern research does seem to demonstrate the prevalence of racial biases, even in 
studies that clearly construct salient racial conditions (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mitchell et al., 
2005). Further, their own analyses fail to explore the fact that even in their own study, Sommers 
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and Ellsworth did find that in less racially-salient conditions, their participants were indeed more 
willing to convict the Black defendant (2001). While they frame the bulk of their conclusions 
around a critique of modern juror decision making study methodologies, they fail to explore 
other potential reasons why they themselves found evidence that mock juries can act in 
discriminatory ways toward Black defendants.  
 Aversive racism. Considering the work of Sommers and Ellsworth, it seems particularly 
necessary to seek out other, more complex explanations for the variable racial biases that have 
been found by psychological juror decision making studies. Instead of merely caveating that 
aspects of a study’s methodological designs make White jurors become uncomfortable acting in 
biased ways, some studies that focus on the mechanisms of juror decision making alternatively 
choose to explore how even jurors who hope to act in non-discriminatory ways or who hope to 
make decisions that are not focused on the race of their defendant also have the capacity to 
proliferate racial biases. In short, these other researchers conversely see the fact that many jurors 
do not consider themselves biased or the fact that jurors may even actively seek to adjust their 
decisions in order to appear less biased as providing more opportunities to explore the 
mechanisms of complex juror decision making processes.  
For instance, one study conducted by Adam Pearson, John Dovidio, and Felicia Pratto 
started to explore these complex mechanisms (2007). More specifically, these researchers 
interrogated the effect a mock juror’s willingness to be explicitly biased had on their decision 
making. This study found that, although those who were willing to report that they disliked 
Black people showed stronger racial biases than participants who did not explicitly report such 
beliefs, most mock jurors showed some degree of racial bias in their final juridical decisions. 
These findings demonstrated that, while it may seem logical to attribute juridical bias to the 
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observable, unmoderated racism of certain jurors and claim that the discrepancies in juror 
decision making are caused by methodological aspects that may trigger this moderation, mock 
jurors still had the capacity to act in discriminatory ways even when they intended to support 
Black defendants. As such, Sommers and Ellsworth’s simplistic suggestion that the discrepancies 
in juror decision making studies are attributable to otherwise biased White jurors who have been 
led to moderate their own biases does not hold, as this study provides evidence that some jurors 
cannot fully moderate their biases even when they report that they want to. 
In line with other research on juridical bias (Huggon, 2012), Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto 
deemed these biases “subtle biases.” This particular label was chosen because these researchers 
neither viewed these biases as entirely implicit, or the result of biases that were so deeply 
engrained in these mock jurors that they were not aware that they were operating in biased ways, 
nor did they view these biases as entirely explicit, or the result of mock jurors’ consciously 
available or communicable biases. More specifically, these researchers clarify that the nature of 
juror decision making, or the fact that jurors are required to think about their decisions in 
complex ways and justify how they arrived at their decisions to a group, prohibits entirely 
implicit decisions, as it would be difficult for a juror to consciously identify and explain why 
they made their decisions in the absence of explicit rationalizations. Moreover, they note that the 
less explicitly biased mock jurors in their study who were unwilling to communicate hateful 
beliefs about Black people in particular were in fact rationalizing their decisions by citing the 
defendant’s other characteristics, such as whether the defendant’s actions were described as 
“unprovoked.” However, given that these rationalizations were disproportionately applied to 
Black defendants, these authors note that these other explicit beliefs were still related to 
potentially implicit racist feelings.  
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As such, this identification of “subtle biases” allowed these researchers to relate their 
findings to another general decision making paradigm, the aversive racism paradigm (see 
Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004 for full review). Like participants in Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto’s 
2007 study, people operating under an aversive racism paradigm would not report any explicit 
biases about Black people solely because of that person’s race. Instead, aversive racists would 
report that they want to make decisions in racially egalitarian ways. However, aversive racists, 
like Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto’s mock jurors, would still inevitably make decisions that were 
disproportionately harsh toward Black people. Nevertheless, these aversive racists would not cite 
race as a reason for their decision, but would instead cite their more rationalizable, socially 
acceptable biases about that person’s other secondary characteristics, such as that person’s lack 
of provocation. Ultimately, aversive racists are in fact able to make racists decisions when they 
can identify other secondary characteristics about a person in order to justify their negative 
feelings about them without implicating themselves as racist.   
The adoption of an aversive racism paradigm is especially relevant for juror decision 
making research, as aversive racism paradigms have been shown to be overwhelmingly 
observable in even the most generalized methodological settings, unlike Sommer and Ellsworth’s 
theories of racial salience. In fact, this theory could be applied to any circumstance wherein 
explicitly nonracist individuals use another person’s secondary characteristics in order to justify 
their discomfort and make racially biased decisions about them. For example, one of the 
foundational studies of aversive racism paradigms found that, when people were asked to judge 
potential job candidates, they did choose to hire equally strong Black and White job candidates at 
the same rate (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). However, this same study found that when these job 
candidates had less strong applications, people were more willing to critique Black candidates 
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for the flaws in their applications and as a result were less likely to choose to hire Black 
candidates. In this case, people were once again only able to act in racist ways when they were 
able to reference this job candidate’s negative secondary characteristics in order to justify their 
decisions.  
Further, some studies have even specified that people still feel able to reference these 
negative secondary characteristics even when those characteristics historically or structurally 
insect with issues of race. For example, one study that investigated how mock jurors might 
operate under aversive racism paradigms explored how some mock jurors might even reference 
secondary characteristics that imply race in order to justify their decisions (Minero & Espinoza, 
2016). More specifically, these researchers had mock jurors review and judge a case involving 
immigrants from either Canada or Mexico. In this study, the defendant differed based on their 
race (White or Latino), their immigration status (documented or undocumented), and their 
country of origin (Canada or Mexico). Ultimately, mock jurors were uniquely harsh toward 
undocumented Latino immigrants from Mexico, even when compared to undocumented Latino 
immigrants from Canada. The authors of this study use this finding to propose that even if the 
secondary characteristic an aversively racist mock juror cites is closely related to their race, such 
as their country of origin, these mock jurors might still use these characteristics to justify their 
decisions as they are still able to provide a less racially politicized justification for their negative 
feelings.  
This particular clarification could even allow aversive racism paradigms to explain some 
of Sommers and Ellsworth’s findings. For example, an aversive racism paradigm would explain 
that mock jurors were more likely to convict Black men because they saw certain secondary 
characteristics such as the defendant’s use of force in a robbery case or the defendant’s sexual 
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perversion in a rape case as possible justifications for their negative feelings, not necessarily 
because they were operating under the guidance of historical or social narratives that related 
these crimes to race. This would allow Sommers and Ellsworth’s findings to be explained 
without having to rely on the unsubstantiated claim that all mock jurors who made these biased 
decisions were aware of the stereotypes that linked Black men to these crimes.   
In fact, Sommers and Ellsworth have both acknowledged that aversive racism paradigms 
have to potential to explain variations in the findings of juror decision making research (Cohn et 
al., 2012; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). However, these researchers rightly critique the aversive 
racism paradigm for its lack of mechanistic backing (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001) and inability 
to prove its theoretical assumptions in precise experiments (Cohn et al., 2012). Indeed, many of 
the studies about mock jurors’ decisions about Black people in particular tend to have only had 
aversive racism paradigms applied to them retroactively (Hodson et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 
1995; Pearson et al., 2007). As such, Sommers and Ellsworth tend to treat aversive racism 
paradigms as one possible theory that might fit within their own mechanistic explanations rather 
than its own decision making paradigm with its own specific mechanisms. However, if one were 
to begin to explore the theoretical assumptions of aversive racism paradigms in a clearly 
mechanistic way, this paradigm for biased juridical decision making could stand alone as a 
possible explanation for the variations in past juror decision making research that more directly 
considers the complexities of these juridical decisions (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mitchell et al., 
2005). As a result, specific research into how mock jurors use a defendant’s secondary 
characteristics in order to become more or less willing to communicate biased opinions should be 
pursued.      
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Potential aversive racism factors. Nevertheless, these sorts of endeavors would first 
need to identify which secondary characteristics have the capacity to operate as negative factors 
under aversive racism paradigms. In fact, due in part to the scarcity of research into exactly how 
aversive racism paradigms operate in juror decision making studies involving Black defendants, 
very few potential factors for aversive racism in these cases have been identified. And while 
meta-analyses have indeed recognized that certain factors such as a defendant’s prior criminal 
history have the capacity to influence juridical biases (Mitchell et al., 2005), Pearson, Dovidio, 
and Pratto have identified that a defendant’s described provocation can lead mock jurors to act in 
more aversively racist ways (2007), and other studies have also have also noted that the inclusion 
of incriminating inadmissible evidence also seems to lead mock jurors to make biased decision 
about Black men (Hodson et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 1995), these factors do not necessarily 
relate to some of the most egregious examples of racial bias in the justice system. As a result, it 
is perhaps best to begin a mechanistic exploration into aversive racism paradigms by instead 
focusing on potentially negative secondary characteristics that not only allow mock jurors to 
reference their defendant’s legal characteristics in order to justify their biased juridical decisions 
about Black people, but that further allow mock jurors to reference their defendant’s extralegal 
characteristics in order to justify their decisions about Black people who also represent other 
disadvantaged groups.  
For example, Black defendants who also have a history of drug use seem especially 
vulnerable to legal discrimination. However, despite the fact that many of the popular statistics 
surrounding racial inequalities in the courtroom focus on the disproportional arrest, conviction, 
and sentencing rates of Black drug users (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018), very few studies 
have focused on the direct influence juror decision making might have on these points of 
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discrimination. While one recent archival analysis did examine the discrimination faced by 
racially diverse defendants in drug-related cases and ultimately found that racial minorities with 
a history of drug use received harsher treatment than any other group on both the prosecutorial 
and judicial level, even this study did not consider how an awareness of a defendant’s history of 
drug use might influence a juror’s decision making (Ward et al., 2016). This study also did not 
consider whether the knowledge of a defendant’s history of drug use might impact the 
proceedings of other, non-drug-related charges. However, in line with an aversive racism 
paradigm, one might hypothesize that the knowledge that a defendant suffers from drug 
addiction, even if that drug use is not the direct reason for their crime, might allow mock jurors 
to rationalize their biases about Black defendants in these cases, as jurors might see this 
extralegal characteristic as a potential justification for differential, harsher treatment.  
Alternatively, other factors, although they have been explored by juror decision making 
researchers, have not been considered within this aversive racism paradigm. More specifically, in 
some of the meta-analyses focusing on racial discrimination by mock jurors (Mitchell et al., 
2005), studies that considered the mental illness of the defendant accounted for some of the data 
that suggested Black defendants actually receive preferential treatment by mock jurors. For 
example, juror decision making researcher Ronald Poulson addressed mock jurors’ likelihood to 
find a defendant guilty when an alternative verdict, not guilty for reasons of insanity, was also 
available (1990). Ultimately, Poulson concluded that Black defendants were significantly more 
likely to receive the verdict of not guilty for reasons of insanity, suggesting that mock jurors in 
this study were actually more likely to protect these defendants because of their mental illness. 
Although Poulson began to explain that these results might suggest that mock jurors in 
his study were moderating their decisions in order to appear more socially desirable, reflecting 
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the conclusions made by Sommers and Ellsworth, he more directly concluded that these results 
suggest that mock jurors may be more ready to believe that a Black defendant is suffering from 
schizophrenia. While this conclusion does reflect a diagnostic trend, wherein Black people are 
almost twice as likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia than White people (Snowden, 2001), it 
does not consider the fact that this trend has not been shown in the general public and may not 
reflect the decision making processes of average people. In fact, it is reasonably uncompelling 
that all of this study’s mock jurors had, within their immediately available stereotype of Black 
individuals, the belief that Black people are more likely to have schizophrenia given the well 
documented societal tendency to delegitimize mental illness in Black communities (Sue et al., 
2007; Suite et al., 2007; Thompson et al., 2004). Even more damning to these conclusions, 
however, was Poulson and colleague’s finding that mock jurors showed no racial biases when 
offered the possible verdict “guilty but mentally ill,” further indicating that the differential 
application of mental illness-related verdicts was not driven by a belief that Black people are 
more likely to have a mental illness, but by some specific feature of the “not guilty for reasons of 
insanity” verdict. Overall, Poulson, much like Sommers and Ellsworth, attempted to explain his 
results through unsubstantiated references to societal stereotypes that may not have been 
available to his mock jurors.  
Without allowing this author’s confusing and potentially incorrect conclusions to weigh 
down these results, this study, as well as its more recent replication (Savoy, 2018), clearly 
provides powerful evidence to suggest that, when a Black defendant is also suffering from a 
mental illness such as schizophrenia, mock jurors do show positive biases in that they are more 
willing to find that defendant not guilty than they would a White defendant. While these authors 
have been perplexed by these findings, let us instead consider them through an aversive racism 
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paradigm. Like race, topics of mental illness have grown increasingly politicized following 
widespread campaigns for mental health reform. If a mock juror is looking for a reason to act 
aversively toward a Black defendant, but instead finds that they also represent a second 
disadvantaged group that they are societally pressured to protect, then an aversive racism 
paradigm would theoretically suggest that this mock juror might either attempt to treat this 
defendant as equal to a White, mentally healthy defendant, or would, given the interaction 
between two disadvantaged groups, treat this defendant with greater leniency than they would a 
less disadvantaged individual. As such, the mechanisms of aversive racism could possibly be 
applied to mental illness as well.  
Nevertheless, neither of these factors have been directly considered within aversive 
racism paradigms, and so they would need to be directly studied under such paradigms in order 
for these sorts of conclusions to stand. Moreover, it would be interesting to observe how these 
two factors, drug use and mental illness, interact with one another. Clinically, drug addiction or 
substance abuse is recognized as a mental illness (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
addictive use of both soft and hard drugs can additionally exacerbate symptoms similar to those 
experienced by people with schizophrenia, such as hallucinations, feelings of apathy, feelings of 
loss of control, disconnections from pleasurable experiences, and mental dysfunction, leading to 
similar behavioral outcomes even comorbid psychological diagnoses (Arndt et al., 1992; 
Compton et al, 2009; Nunn et al., 2001; Sussman et al., 2003). In fact, this interaction has even 
been recently legitimized within the justice system, as “settled insanity,” or insanity caused by 
drug-related mental illness, can be cited as a basis for possible insanity defenses (Feix & Wolber, 
2007). However, if it is the case that legal actors consider drug use a potentially negative factor 
but consider other mental illnesses a potentially positive factor, then conflating drug use with 
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mental illness may not help Black defendants. As a result, the interaction between these two 
extralegal factors, then, would be interesting to test under an aversive racism paradigm, where 
one factor might work to justify jurors’ negative feelings and the other might work to further 
hinder them. In turn, the aversive racism paradigm would not only provide mechanistic 
explanations as to why Black defendants are treated differently because of these extralegal 
characteristics, but would also comment on how these biases might persevere even when drug 
use is framed as a mental health issue.   
 The role of social motivations. Finally, it is important to note that an adoption of an 
aversive paradigm may not be mutually exclusive from an acceptance of Sommers and 
Ellsworths’ primary findings that mock jurors can be led to moderate their decisions when race is 
particularly salient. In fact, researchers that study aversive racism are willing to consider the 
relationship between aversive racism paradigms and more generalized social motivations like 
social desirability biases, especially as these motivations might explain why people fail to act 
aversively in the absence of negative secondary factors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).  
However, as Sommers and Ellsworth acknowledge (2001), the social motivations present 
in studies that make race particularly salient may indeed be different from those present during 
an actual jury deliberation. Whereas participants in their study sought to disprove the conclusions 
they suspected the researchers were trying to find and real-world jurors have replicated these 
processes in an attempt to react to overtly prejudiced attorneys (Fein et al., 1997), jurors, in 
reality, must also consider the social motivations promoted by their fellow jurors. In fact, jurors’ 
unique social motivations are not only attuned to their individual desire to react to a single 
person with clear expectations, but are perhaps more closely attuned to the influences of their 
jury’s majority group opinion (Davis et al., 1989, Kassin et al., 1990, Nemeth & Goncalo, 2005). 
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One study, for example, found that certain structural attributes of juries, such as the fact that 
juries are composed of strangers, shifts a juror’s social motivations so that they are less focused 
on responding to one person or even to their own values, but are instead focused on the values 
that seem to be established by their fellow jury members (Baddeley & Parkinson, 2012). This 
suggests that jurors may be particularly vulnerable to the more variable social pressures 
established by those around them rather than to social desirability biases that are established 
within isolated experimental contexts. 
 Normally, the social pressures faced by participants like mock jurors are discussed a 
positive way in these more experimental settings. For example, a participant in a study might 
change their final answers on a questionnaire in order to seem less biased toward a 
disadvantaged group, or mock jurors in Sommers and Ellsworth’s study might make less racially 
biased decisions in order to seem less biased to their researcher. However, there is evidence that 
the social pressures involved in jury settings do not always lead jurors toward these positive 
egalitarian outcomes. In a recent experiment, for example, it was found that, when assigning 
punishments to a third-party, participants were more likely to assign harsher punishments when 
they knew that another individual had already advocated for these harsh punishments (Fabbri & 
Carbonara, 2017). The authors of this study even note that participants were additionally more 
likely to revise their previously assigned lenient punishments following these realizations. 
Further, studies have shown that, when jurors are reminded that they must reach a final 
consensus decision, a common process in juridical scenarios, those who believed that they were 
in the minority reported that they felt a need to change their votes and conform to the majority 
opinion even when they strongly supported these less popular beliefs (Kassin et al., 1990). 
Finally, in a review of decision making in small groups, juries were also implicated as a primary 
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scenario wherein those who believe their opinions are “different” from those of the majority may 
be more readily pressured to conform despite their personal values or intentions (Nemeth & 
Goncalo, 2005). To some degree, all of these studies suggest that, when faced with the reality of 
other jurors’ decisions, a mock juror is less likely to try to act in more lenient, nondiscriminatory 
ways but is instead more likely to shed their own egalitarian beliefs in order to conform to a 
more prejudiced group decision. In these cases, motivations caused by social pressures actually 
lead mock jurors to adjust their decisions such that they reinforce the biases that are supported by 
their fellow jurors.  
Under an aversive racism paradigm, the role of these jury-specific social motivations 
might theoretically explain how a group of individuals, even if those individuals all consider 
themselves egalitarian, could come to agree that a Black defendant is particularly guilty. In fact, 
one core theoretical aspect of aversive racism paradigms supposes that aversive racists are 
already considering these sorts of social pressures, as they are attempting to construct 
justifications for their decisions that could appeal to those around them (Dovidio & Gaertner, 
2004). While it may be the case that a group of jurors can never come to agree that their 
decisions should be based in racial biases (Cohn et al., 2012), aversive racism paradigms along 
with the findings of these other group decision making studies would alternatively posit that 
juries are entirely capable of agreeing on harsh decisions when those decisions are based in other 
rationalizable biases. As a result, this would suggest that the aversive racism paradigm, unlike 
Sommers and Ellsworth’s conclusions that are based in self-centered social desirability biases, 
would uniquely explain both the final decisions of an individual as well as the final decisions of 
a jury as a whole, for this paradigm directly takes into account the role of these potentially 
negative external social motivations. Nevertheless, past aversive racism studies have also not 
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attempted to mechanistically test these theoretical assumptions within more overt group decision 
making contexts. As such, research into the mechanisms of mock juror’s awareness of social 
motivations when operating under aversive racism paradigms is also necessary. 
 
Foundations for Aversive Racism 
Additionally, other key aspects of aversive racism paradigms also seem built on a rather 
vague set of theoretical assumptions. In a recent series of studies, one researcher indirectly 
identified some of these assumptions when attempting to explore the ways juror decision making 
researchers frame their findings (Howard, 2009). This researcher asked one key question: Are 
juridical biases more likely to be conscious or unconscious? While these questions are 
increasingly common in juror decision making research (Cohn et al., 2012), theoretical aversive 
racism paradigms seem to sidestep them by proposing that a person could be basing their 
decisions on any combination of implicit or explicit biases. In order to be acting under an 
aversive racism paradigm, mock jurors merely need to reference the defendant’s other negative 
secondary characteristics in order to justify their decisions to others. Further, the aversive racism 
paradigm does not assume that mock jurors are necessarily justifying explicit or implicit biases 
or even that mock jurors are aware that their resulting decisions do in fact reflect these biases. In 
other words, aversive racism paradigms do not theoretically focus on explanations as to why 
mock jurors adopt this paradigm, but instead theoretically focuses on the outcomes of a mock 
juror’s decisions.  
Although this theoretical distancing from conscious or unconscious language uniquely 
allows the aversive racism paradigm to address the complexities of juror decision making, it may 
also prevent any related juror decision making research from producing thorough suggestions for 
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juridical reforms. For example, if jurors are in fact operating under aversive racism paradigms, 
one could propose reforms designed to make jurors more aware of the way they seek out 
secondary characteristics about their defendant in order to justify their decisions. However, given 
that this paradigm does not directly provide more tangible language as to why jurors might have 
sought out these secondary characteristics, some jurors may disregard this advice as not 
applicable to them. As such, other paradigms should also be explored in order explain what leads 
mock jurors to adopt aversive racism paradigms during their decision making.  
 Normative decision making. In an attempt to identify this foundational explanation, one 
might turn to the two possible modes of juror decision making that were outlined by Martin 
Kaplan (1984). Directly applying longstanding psychological theories of normative decision 
making to juror decision making for the first time (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), Kaplan outlines 
that jurors can operate through either normative decision making modes or informational 
decision making modes. Further, Kaplan clarifies that when an individual bases their decisions 
on normative influences, such as influences like stereotypes, general social norms, or social 
motivations like social desirability, then they are more likely to make decisions that conform to 
group opinions. Alternatively, when an individual bases their decisions on informational 
influences, such as influences like the specific arguments or legal facts presented during 
discussion, then they are more likely to make decisions that are based on their own, 
individualized perspectives.  
Overall, aversive racism paradigms more cleanly fit into this normative decision making 
mode, as even if aversive racists choose to focus on informational aspects in order to justify their 
decisions, this focus is necessitated by their underlying reaction to the race of their defendant and 
is mediated by their awareness of social motivations relating to which of their defendant’s 
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secondary factors they would feel able to critique. Additionally, the relationship between these 
paradigms is further supported by past research that has found that mock jurors’ awareness of 
normative influences like social pressures does in fact lead them to prioritize later factors like the 
defendant’s extralegal characteristics over other informational factors in their decision making 
(Baddeley & Parkinson, 2012). Moreover, identifying that a preference for normative decision 
making modes might be foundational for the later adoption of aversive racism paradigms would 
allow aversive racism paradigms to exist alongside other research that has indeed found that 
jurors are more likely to rely on unconscious biases even through aversive racism is not entirely 
unconscious (Howard, 2009), as it would clarify that less conscious biases do in fact underlie a 
mock juror’s adoption of this paradigm. In the end, the preferencing of normative decision 
making modes could be used to explain how jurors, driven by social motivations and hindered by 
the frequent scarcity of clear, immediately compelling facts, might be more predisposed to adopt 
aversive racism paradigms during their decision making.  
Ultimately, Kaplan concludes from his analysis that attorneys should be aware of which 
decision making mode they are instigating in their jurors. And yet, if we are in fact putting the 
onus of juridical reforms on the jurors themselves rather than on these legal professionals, then it 
might be important to consider what aspects of a juror’s individualized experience could lead 
them to preference normative decision making modes and later adopt aversive racism paradigms 
when making their final juridical decisions. For example, some studies have shown that certain 
jurors are more likely, based on their own personality characteristics, to prioritize normative 
decision making modes over informational ones (Gunnell & Ceci, 2010). This would imply that 
juridical reforms should specifically target people with these personality characteristics.  
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However, given that aversive racism paradigms theoretically posit that most people will 
attempt to seek out secondary characteristics in order to justify their decisions, it would actually 
be more important to experimentally show that all mock jurors that go on to adopt an aversive 
racism paradigm in their decision making were in fact preferencing this normative mode. In 
short, in order for normative decision making to be seen as foundational for aversive racism, then 
it is perhaps most important to investigate whether all jurors operating under aversive racism 
paradigms have preferenced this mode. Only through this investigation could this mode be 
mechanistically linked to the later adoption of aversive racism paradigms.  
Again, theorists outside the realm of controlled psychological research have begun to 
question whether or not the majority of jurors do in fact preference normative decision making 
modes. For example, a considerable amount of discourse surrounding the trials of socially 
relevant cases has focused on how the normative pressures established within legal settings can 
influence a jury’s final verdict (Butler, 1993; Feldman, 2002; Ronell, 1994). This discourse 
proposes that, although certain facts presented during a case might clearly necessitate specific 
informational conclusions about a defendant’s culpability, jurors tend to disregard these facts due 
to the influence of their defendant’s or their prosecutors’ social power. These authors conclude 
that social narratives, imbued with the power these actors possess or do not possess, drive jurors’ 
decisions rather than the facts themselves. In turn, these theorists ultimately conclude that most 
jurors were preferencing normative decision making modes in these cases. And while some 
psychological researchers like Sommers and Ellsworth do also begin to consider these theories in 
their analyses (2001), their observations are, as previously critiqued, still based in these 
theoretical assumptions rather than clear experimental data. As a result, this theoretical discourse 
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has failed to provide tangible evidence that the majority of jurors do in fact preference normative 
decision making modes.  
As a result, it is extremely necessary for any research that wants to explore the full 
mechanisms of juror decision making to not only mechanistically test the aversive racism 
paradigm itself, but to also begin to pursue explanations as to how mock jurors come to adopt 
this paradigm. If one is to assume that a preference for normative decision making modes is 
foundational for aversive racism or that it predisposes mock jurors to adopt this later paradigm, 
then it is incredibly necessary to seek evidence for this paradigmatic relationship. Moreover, if 
we are to assume that aversive racism is in fact a predominant paradigm for juror decision 
making, then this evidence would need to be able to relate mock jurors’ preference for normative 
decision making modes to some of the most common psychological processes experienced by 
jurors.  
Visual perceptual behaviors. And so, let us perhaps return to the symbolic ways that 
legal discrimination is discussed, as the language of Lady Justice’s “blindness” may in fact 
implicate one such normatively influenced psychological process: visual perception. For 
example, one juror decision making researcher Kenneth Findley referenced this very same 
language in order to explain how visual perceptual behaviors might be capable of predisposing 
any juror to act in discriminatory ways (2012). More specifically, Findley suggests that a juror’s 
“tunnel vision,” or selective processing of the facts of a case, might predispose them to biased 
decision making modes. For instance, if a juror prioritizes evidence that might reaffirm their own 
social beliefs about a defendant during this review, then they will be less able to overcome these 
biases at a later point because they never considered or attempted to remember evidence that 
would disprove these potentially normative biases (see also: Norris, 2015). As such, Findley, by 
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deeming this process “tunnel vision,” begins to implicate visual perceptual processes as a 
possible psychological mechanism that might predispose jurors to make biased decisions.   
Furthermore, since visual perception is one of our most important psychological 
processes, then it could explain how the majority of mock jurors come to operate in normative 
ways if it can be shown to be dominated by certain normative influences. In fact, while we can 
consciously prioritize the information gathered by our eyes, much of what we perceive is indeed 
moderated by nonconscious, potentially normative processes. From the most basic processes like 
constructing stable visual scenes (Melcher & Morrone, 2007) to more socially relevant processes 
like making eye contact (Rothkirch et al., 2015), we are unaware of the ways that the actions of 
our eyes occur without our conscious, or even our reactively unconscious, control. Given this 
nonconscious nature, research has shown that it is easy for certain social biases to manipulate our 
visual perceptual experiences without our direct control or awareness. For example, researchers 
famously found that individuals from impoverished backgrounds perceive money as larger than 
individuals who are economically privileged (Bruner & Goodman, 1947). More recent studies 
have even found that our perceptions of the skin tones of political candidates vary depending on 
our own political beliefs as well as our beliefs about the present stability of government 
structures (Stern et al., 2016) or that our current moods can change the way we view stimuli 
(Isaacowitz et al., 2008). Furthermore, other studies have found that visual perceptual biases can 
indeed change the way people interact with images of a person despite the fact that we are not 
even aware of these gaze behaviors. For example, studies have found that, when viewing an 
image of a person with socially stigmatized characteristics, participants spend significantly less 
time fixating on that image’s eyes and mouth than they would if their image depicted a person 
with desirable social characteristics (Risko et al., 2016, Gobel et al., 2015). These socially 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
34 
mediated visual perceptual behaviors suggest that, once a person has categorized a target, their 
gaze is controlled by normative influences. Overall, all of this evidence suggests that the 
nonconscious processes of the visual perceptual system can become and do become controlled 
by our normative beliefs and social motivations.  
 Some studies have even directly found that these nonconscious processes can impact the 
way we make later complex, seemingly explicit decisions. One such study focused on how the 
way that participants visually processed information influenced their complex moral decisions 
(Pärnamets et al., 2015). As was theorized within Findley’s “tunnel vision,” these researchers 
found that when individuals viewed information that was relevant for their later moral decisions, 
participants would visually seek out information that supported their final decisions despite the 
fact that they reported no conscious awareness that they were doing so. More importantly, these 
researchers found that when they manipulated participants’ visual perceptual behaviors the 
information participants were led to prioritize still closely related to their final moral decisions, 
suggesting that the way that visual information was collected directly influenced participants’ 
moral decision making, not the other way around. These findings suggest that, even though 
certain complex decisions like moral decisions or juridical decisions are societally framed as 
based on informational factors or logically seem to rely on more elevated decision making 
processes, a person’s nonconscious visual perceptual processes still predispose them to make 
certain decisions.  
 Crucially, other evidence has even directly identified that jurors’ visual perceptual 
patterns can not only change their final juridical decisions, but are indeed controlled by 
normative influences. Specifically, one set of experiments found that mock jurors were more 
likely to focus on people they would socially support when viewing video evidence of a physical 
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altercation involving two actors (Granot et al., 2014). In this study, mock jurors reported that 
they were consciously unaware of the fact that their attention was seemingly biased toward one 
actor and were unable to overcome this preferential fixation even when they were instructed to 
do so, further suggesting that they were operating within a normative decision making mode on a 
nonconscious level. Furthermore, one study included in this very same report had participants 
fixate on one actor when both actors did not have any identifiable characteristics that might 
appeal to these participants. In this case, mock jurors still ended up supporting the actor they 
were instructed to watch. This particular finding once more suggests that the influence of these 
nonconscious visual perceptual behaviors led participants to their final decisions. Overall, these 
findings suggest that, even in legal settings where participants are explicitly told to focus on all 
involved actors, participants operate within a normative decision making mode by visually 
prioritizing the actor they would later support. Further, when manipulated to focus on one actor, 
participants supported that actor despite having no other reason to do so. This identifies that 
visual perceptual processes do in fact have the power to predispose mock jurors to rely on biased 
decision making paradigms.   
 Nevertheless, this particular intersection between juror decision making and visual 
perceptual biases is an incredibly understudied field. As such, no studies have directly linked 
these visual perceptual manifestations of normative decision making modes to the later adoption 
of aversive racism paradigms. However, if this connection could be made, then any juridical 
reforms related to aversive racism could be designed such that they make all jurors aware of the 
fact that even some of our most deeply engrained nonconscious processes put them at risk for 
these biased decision making paradigms. As a result, it is especially necessary to begin to test 
whether or not this mechanistic link between potentially nonconscious preferences for normative 
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decision making and the adoption of aversive racism paradigms can be made in order to fully 
conclude that these normative decision making modes are foundational for aversive racism.  
 
The Present Studies. 
Let us review the key points that have been raised throughout this introduction. First, the 
necessity of research into juror decision making was thoroughly justified, as juries uniquely 
represent a powerful point within the justice system wherein the discriminatory actions of each 
branch of the justice system may be addressed without the need for major structural reforms. By 
identifying the ways jurors arrive at racist or otherwise discriminatory decisions, we might be 
able to begin to combat these biases by making more idealistically egalitarian jurors aware of 
how their behaviors are in fact reinforcing discrimination. In turn, more egalitarian juries might 
be able to utilize their constitutionally granted powers to subvert the structurally reinforced 
discriminatory actions of professional actors like members of law enforcement, prosecutors, or 
judges.  
Second, the aversive racism paradigm was identified as a possible theory that might be 
able to explain the variable results of past juror decision making studies (Figure 1A). Only the 
aversive racism paradigm begins to contextualize certain mediators within mock jurors’ decision 
making processes, as it identifies that jurors turn to their defendant’s secondary, potentially 
extralegal, characteristics in order to justify their aversively racist feelings about that defendant. 
Additionally, potential positive and negative factors for aversive racism were identified, as the 
mental health of a defendant was analyzed as a potential positive characteristic that might lead 
jurors to further moderate their biases whereas the drug use of a defendant was analyzed as a 
potential negative characteristic that might lead jurors to feel more willing to act on their biases. 
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Moreover, the theoretical dynamics of social motivations within jury-specific aversive racism 
paradigms were explored. In turn, it was clarified that jurors, unlike people in controlled, isolated 
decision making settings, are more likely to consider the social pressures of their fellow jurors 
than they are to consider the specific social pressures put on them by a given individual or to 
consider their own internal motivations to act in egalitarian ways. As such, it was noted that the 
aversive racism paradigm is perhaps the best way to describe the incredibly complex processes 
involved in juridical decisions. Nonetheless, it was clarified that the particular mechanisms that 
are theorized under this paradigm need to be more directly explored in juror decisions making 
settings if this paradigm is to stand alone as its own explanation for variations in juridical 
decisions.  
Finally, other more foundational theories that might explain how jurors come to adopt 
aversive racism paradigms were also explored. As a result, normative decision making was 
identified as this foundational paradigm that could make jurors particularly vulnerable to 
aversive racism. In order to justify the selection of this secondary paradigm, evidence that shows 
that people are in fact more likely to nonconsciously operate in normative, socially motivated 
ways was discussed. In turn, visual perceptual processes, closely related to the language of a 
“blind” egalitarian justice system that has dominated the way we frame our critiques of legal 
discrimination, were identified as one possible way that jurors’ nonconscious normative 
influences might predispose jurors to rely on other biased decision making paradigms like 
aversive racism.  
Hypotheses. In conclusion, the present studies seek to test the mechanisms of the 
aversive racism paradigm as they apply to juror decision making (Figure 1B). First, it hopes to 
apply the aversive racism hypothesis to an specific criminal court case that would not be 
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influenced by racial biases under other potential paradigms like those proposed by Sommers and 
Ellsworth. In doing so, the present studies might be able to identify how potentially positive or 
negative aversive racism factors lead mock jurors to feel more or less willing to communicate 
their explicit biases, feel more or less attuned to external social pressures, or make more or less 
biased juridical decisions. Additionally, these studies will be able to provide evidence for drug 
use and mental illness as negative or positive factors for aversive racism respectively, even when 
these factors are closely related to one another. Finally, these studies will also attempt to 
consider whether or not a mock juror’s adoption of normative decision making modes might 
predispose them to make these aversively racist decisions.  
As such, the hypotheses of these studies are complex and take place on multiple levels. 
First, in an attempt to explore how these aversive racism factors might lead jurors to feel more or 
less willing to communicate their explicit biases, these studies hypothesize that, when mock 
jurors operating under aversive racism view a defendant that possesses negative secondary 
characteristics like a history of drug-related mental illness, mock jurors will feel more willing to 
communicate their explicit biases. However, when mock jurors operating under aversive racism 
view a defendant that possesses positive secondary characteristics like a history of non-drug-
related mental illness or when mock jurors view a defendant that does not possess any positive or 
negative secondary characteristics, mock jurors will feel less willing to communicate their 
explicit biases.  
Second, in an attempt to explore how aversive racism is related to an awareness of social 
motivations, these studies hypothesize that mock jurors operating under an aversive racism 
paradigm will overall feel more externally motivated to respond without prejudice to Black 
people or people with mental illnesses because their current attempts to hide their biases about 
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these groups will heighten their awareness of social pressures to protect these groups. 
Alternatively, if someone cannot operate under an aversive racism paradigm due to their 
defendant’s positive or neutral secondary characteristics, then they will be less attuned to these 
social pressures, as they would have relied on more internal motivations during their decision 
making.   
Third, in an attempt to relate these mechanisms of aversive racism to juridical decision 
making, these studies hypothesize that, when mock jurors operating under aversive racism view 
a Black defendant that has secondary characteristics they are not pressured to protect, such as a 
history of drug-related mental illness, mock jurors will maker harsher juridical decisions. 
Alternatively, when mock jurors view a defendant that has no secondary legal characteristics that 
they are pressured to protect, such as a defendant with a history of non-drug-related mental 
illness or a Black defendant with no history of mental illness, then they will make more lenient 
juridical decisions.  
Finally, in an attempt to more directly argue that mock jurors’ preference normative 
decision making modes could be linked to their adoption of aversive racism paradigms, the 
present studies hypothesize that, when mock jurors read about their defendant, they will seek out 
normative factors. In Study 1, it is merely hypothesized that mock jurors, especially mock jurors 
who view a Black defendant with negative secondary characteristics will better remember 
normative factors about their defendant than they will remember informational factors about that 
defendant’s case. In Study 2, it is also hypothesized that mock jurors who view a defendant with 
these very same extralegal characteristics will also spend more time visually fixated on these 
normative factors when reading about the defendant.      
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Each of these hypotheses will allow the present study to explore these mechanisms of 
aversive racism in synthesis as they relate to defendants with complex, often intersecting 
extralegal characteristics (Figure 1B). Ultimately, the findings of these studies will provide a 
unique contextualization of theoretical mechanisms of aversive racism paradigms as they relate 
to these extralegal characteristics in order to comment on exactly how jurors themselves 
contribute to especially harmful, biased legal outcomes for Black people. Fundamentally, these 
findings will provide necessary data for potential legal reforms that attempt to lead jurors to 
more egalitarian decisions.  
 
Methods 
 These studies both employed a 2 (race of defendant: Black or White) by 3 (mental health 
of defendant: no history of mental illness/NMI, history of non-drug-related mental illness/MI, 
history of drug-related mental illness/MID) between-subjects design. This was designed to test 
whether the defendant’s race, mental health, or a combination of multiple factors might lead 
participants to preference normative factors, feel more or less willing to communicate their 
explicit biases, feel more or less attuned to different social motivations, make different juridical 
decisions about the defendant’s culpability or sentencing, or, in Study 2, differentiate their visual 
perceptual behaviors when reviewing the case. 
 
Materials 
 Both Study 1 and Study 2 utilized a variety of materials, some of which simulated a 
juror’s real-world experiences and some of which measured participants’ memory of normative 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
41 
and informational factors, willingness to communicate explicit biases, awareness of social 
motivations, final juridical decisions, and visual perceptual behaviors.  
 Legal materials. In an attempt to simulate a juror’s experience of reviewing the facts of a 
case, both studies utilized written legal materials as well as visual stimuli. Participants were 
instructed to pay close attention to all of the information presented within these legal materials, 
as they were informed that their ability to remember them would be tested at a later point in the 
experiment.  
First, the written legal materials were designed to resemble a common legal brief, which 
would, in real-world settings, summarize a defendant’s background and arrest report information 
primarily for attorney use. Past studies have utilized similarly designed legal briefs in order to 
quickly provide participants with personal and legal information about a defendant (Gunnell & 
Ceci, 2010). However, these past studies have not adequately considered how the normative and 
informational factors included within these briefs might interact with one another or how they 
might compete for a participants’ attention (Garcia, 2016). In fact, in more naturalistic settings, it 
is true that both normative and informational factors would be presented by attorneys 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, this synthesized presentation makes it difficult to determine 
whether jurors have chosen to preference some factors or neglect others. As such, the legal brief 
included in the present study was designed to separate potential normative influences such as the 
defendant’s extralegal characteristics from potential informational influences such as the 
defendant’s arrest report and relevant legal information (see Appendix A for a sample legal brief 
as it would have been presented to participants). This not only provided a more clear, digestible 
outline of these factors of the case for participants in Study 1, but also allowed for participants’ 
visual perceptual behaviors to be tracked during Study 2.   
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The first section of this legal brief, which provided normative details about the 
defendants’ extralegal characteristics, was designed to include a number of unrelated factors, 
such as the defendants’ name, birth date, education history, etc. as well as the present studies’ 
experimental factors, such as the defendants’ race, mental health history, and drug use history. 
These other unrelated factors were not only included in order to better resemble a more holistic, 
real-world legal brief, but were also included in order to minimize participants’ ability to 
recognize which factors were related to their given experimental condition. Overall, the only 
information in this section of the legal brief that differed across experimental conditions was the 
defendants’ race (described as either “Black” or “White”), mental health history (described as 
either “None,” “Diagnosed with Schizophrenia,” or “Documented Schizotypal Symptoms due to 
Drug Use”), and drug use history (described as either “None” or “Sustained Opioid Use”). 
The second section of this legal brief, which provided informational details about the 
defendant's arrest report, was designed to provide an unbiased overview of relevant facts and 
evidence that might be used in a case either for or against the defendant. Past studies have used 
relatively similar passages in order to describe cases to participants (Gunnell & Ceci, 2010; 
Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). However, while past studies have use real-world case summaries 
(Gunnell & Ceci, 2010) or have written their own experimentally manipulated case summaries 
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), the present study intentionally tried to construct this arrest report-
based case summary in the most unbiased way possible. By presenting only the facts gathered at 
the point of arrest, the present study was uniquely able to control for later courtroom influences 
like a given attorney’s argumentative abilities, emotional appeals, etc.    
Moreover, none of the information included in this section of the legal brief differed 
across conditions. In every condition, the arrest report presented to participants outlined that the 
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defendant had been charged with felony larceny for the theft of 8,000 dollars. It further specified 
that the money was discovered in the defendant’s car, identified that the defendant worked for 
the store from which the money was stolen, and further included the brief testimony of a witness 
that described the defendant as seeming particularly agitated on the day of the arrest. This 
particular crime and its related specifications were chosen because they have not recently been 
linked, statistically, to a willingness to be overly biased toward defendants because of their race 
(Mitchell et al., 2005). By instead describing a more neutral crime, participants’ later behavioral 
differences could be more directly related to the influence of the defendant's extralegal 
characteristics that were also presented within this brief. 
Second, the visual stimuli included in the present studies were designed to resemble real-
world evidence as well as provide a visual representation of the defendant himself. While many 
past studies, as described above, have presented participants with written legal briefs, these 
studies have often failed to also incorporate visual stimuli despite the fact many modern trials 
rely on this sort of evidence (Granot et al., 2014). Further, while some past studies have indeed 
used visual stimuli to track the influence of socially relevant characteristics on participants’ 
visual perceptual behaviors and later decision making, many of these studies do not consider 
how these visual perceptual processes might operate within legal decision making (Gobel et al., 
2015; Risko et al., 2016). Finally, while some legal decision making studies have focused 
directly on how participants process visual evidence, these studies have not fully explored the 
precise dynamics of these fixation patterns (Granot et al., 2014). This is partly due to their use of 
video evidence rather than still images, which makes it exceptionally challenging to break down 
fixation patterns by individual features. As such, the present studies included still visual images 
of relevant evidence as well as an image of the defendant himself so that participants in Study 1 
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could have a more naturalistic juror experience and so that the precise visual perceptual patterns 
of participants in Study 2 could be analyzed (see Appendix B for sample visual stimuli as they 
would have been presented to participants).  
More specifically, the present studies’ visual stimuli included three photographs. The first 
two images were the same across conditions, and served as visual evidence of the scene of the 
crime and the recovered stolen money. The third image differed only based on racial conditions, 
and was described as the defendant’s mugshot. These third photographs were sourced from the 
Chicago face database (Ma, et al., 2015). The two defendant photographs that were chosen for 
these studies were also matched on other potential factors that might have influenced juror 
decision making (Table 1), such as age, attractiveness, trustworthiness, and racial prototypicality 
(Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Gunnell & Ceci, 2010; Korva et al., 2013; Mazzella & Feingold, 
1994; Porter et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2005; Osborne et al., 2016). Finally, it is important to 
note that both of these photographs had the same on-screen orientation, such that the facial 
features of both defendants corresponded to the same regions on participants’ screens. As such, 
these images differed only in their race.  
Behavioral questionnaires. Alongside these legal materials, these studies also provided 
participants with a series of behavioral questionnaires that sought to observe how they had read 
and understood these legal materials, measure their willingness to communicate explicit biases, 
measure their awareness of internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice, and 
record their juridical decisions. These particular questionnaires allowed the present study to 
directly explore the mechanisms of aversive racism paradigms.  
Manipulation check. Given that this study relied on the assumption that aspects of the 
legal brief may be considered both implicitly and explicitly by participants, it is necessary to 
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gauge what information was indeed consciously remembered and understood by participants. In 
order to test participants’ memory of these legal materials, the present study included a series of 
eleven yes or no questions that required participants to recall some of the key characteristics and 
facts that had been presented to them (Appendix C).  
These questions took three forms. The first type of question focused on participants’ 
memory of the basic, less directly related normative factors described in the legal materials, such 
as the defendant’s name, marital status, and education history. The second type of question 
focused on the informational factors described in the legal materials, such as the defendant’s 
charge, arrest history, and employment history. Both of these types of questions were not only 
included to add to the legitimacy of this questionnaire and obscure the main manipulations of 
these studies, but were also included to allow the present studies to analyze whether or not 
conditional factors did indeed lead participants to demonstrate a preferential memory for the 
normative or informational factors presented during the legal materials. The third and final type 
of question focused on the studies’ main manipulations, such as the defendant’s race, mental 
health history, and drug use history. These questions were included as a manipulation check in 
order to ensure that participants were aware that their defendant did or did not possess certain 
characteristics. These questions, notably, were the only questions that were considered as a 
possible exclusion criteria, as they uniquely measured whether participants could remember the 
characteristics related to their respective experimental decisions.  
Explicit bias questionnaires. Under an aversive racism paradigm, this study also sought 
to gauge whether participants felt more or less willing to communicate their explicit biases 
because of their defendant’s characteristics. In order to measure participants’ communicable 
explicit biases, participants were asked to complete a series of explicit bias questionnaires.  
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These questionnaires addressed two major types of bias. The first type, measured by a 
shortened Social Distance Scale (SDS), sought to gauge participants’ willingness to disclose 
their biases about specific groups (Appendix D). SDSs are one of the oldest and most commonly 
used scales that measure explicit bias (Bogardus, 1933). Through this scale, participants are 
directly asked to rate how “coldly” (0) or “warmly” (100) they feel about members of certain 
social groups on a 100-point sliding scale, ultimately indicating how socially distant they feel 
from certain people based on those people’s characteristics. In the present studies, this scale was 
adapted to include questions that directly measured participants’ feelings about relevant social 
groups like White people, Black people, people who use hard drugs, and people with mental 
illnesses. However, many other questions about unrelated groups, such as elderly people, 
wealthy people, women, etc., were also included in order to obscure the present studies’ focus on 
these experimentally relevant groups. In turn, participants’ willingness to admit that they feel 
socially distant from these specific experimental groups, as well as from groups unrelated to the 
experiment, could be measured directly with this scale.  
The second type, measured by a full Social Dominance Orientation questionnaire (or 
SDO), sought to gauge participants’ willingness to disclose more general discriminatory beliefs 
(Appendix E). Unlike SDSs, SDO questionnaires do not measure participants’ explicit beliefs 
about specific groups, but instead measure participants’ willingness to partake in group-based 
discrimination on a personal level (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Through this 
questionnaire, participants in the present studies were asked to consider how much they agree 
with or disagree with a series of statements that reflect concepts like meritocracy, intergroup 
relationships, and hierarchical structures. This SDO was included because, unlike the SDS, this 
measure may be more generalizable and may also be less directly hindered by social desirability 
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biases, as the questions are not directed at a single group. Further, past studies have specifically 
related higher SDO scores to harsher juridical decisions, suggesting that any relationship 
between a defendant’s secondary characteristics and participants’ responses on this questionnaire 
could provide especially powerful evidence for aversive racism paradigms in juror decision 
making (Huggon, 2012).  
Social motivation scales. Also under an aversive racism paradigm, this study sought to 
explore whether an increased awareness of social pressures might influence juror decision 
making. As such, the present studies also sought to measure participants’ respective awareness 
social motivations. Specifically, adapted Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without 
Prejudice Scales (or Internal and External MRWPs) were utilized to measure participants’ 
awareness of motivations to act in nondiscriminatory ways (Appendix F). While these scales 
were originally designed to only measure participants’ motivations to respond without prejudice 
to Black people (Plant & Devine, 1998), the present study also included two variations of these 
scales that were adapted to also measure participants’ motivations to respond without prejudice 
to people with mental illnesses and to people who use hard drugs. Each of these scales asked 
participants to consider how much they agree with or disagree with a series of statements that 
described either external motivations to be unbiased such as “Because of today’s politically 
correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people” or internal motivations to 
be unbiased such as “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is 
personally important to me” and respond on a likert scale. For the present studies, these scales 
were included in order to gauge how a participants’ experimental condition might influence their 
awareness of these motivations as they relate to different extralegal characteristics their 
defendant might have.  
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
48 
Juridical decision questionnaire. Finally, in order to record participants’ juridical 
decisions the present studies included four questions related to the culpability and sentencing of 
their defendant that were modelled after those used in past juror decision making studies 
(Mitchell et al., 2005, Granot et al., 2014, Appendix G). 
Participants were first asked to rate the defendant’s culpability, or deliver a verdict on 
how innocent or guilty they believed the defendant was. In Study 1, this question was asked on 
scale from 1 (innocent) to 6 (guilty), whereas this scale was expanded from 1-6 points to 1-8 
points to increase the complexity of participants’ responses in Study 2. Nevertheless, both of 
these scales included an even number of possible responses so that participants, like real world 
jurors, were not offered a “neutral” option.  
Additionally, after participants answered this self-reported culpability question, they were 
then asked to determine how culpable others might consider the defendant. Past studies have 
included similar questions in order to gauge participants’ sentiments when they no longer feel 
personally responsible for their answers (Granot et al., 2014). This is to say that, according to 
these past analyses, these questions might record participants’ decisions when they are no longer 
directly influenced by their own social desirability biases. However, it is also possible that these 
questions target participants’ true beliefs about what they think others might believe, suggesting 
that these responses reflect a greater awareness of a juror’s real-world social pressures and 
motivations. Regardless of exactly how participants might process this question, this other-rated 
culpability question was included in order to potentially measure how this external framing 
might change participants’ responses.  
Finally, participants were also asked to make self-rated and other-rated sentencing 
decisions, as it is common for juror decision making studies to also include these measures 
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(Mitchel et al., 2005; Sweeny & Haney, 1992). Specifically, they were also asked to suggest a 
sentence for the defendant if he was indeed found guilty on a scale from 1 years to 7 years, as 
well as predict what sentence others would most likely advocate for. Participants were correctly 
informed that this particular range represents the typical sentences received for third degree 
felony larceny. Most importantly, these questions were asked after participants had already made 
their self-rated and other-rated culpability decisions, as asking participants to determine the 
defendant’s sentence before they had determined the defendant’s culpability might have led 
participants to presuppose that the defendant is guilty and as a result might have subsequently 
biased their culpability decisions. Overall, the inclusion of both culpability and sentencing 
questions allowed the present studies to measure multiple ways that participants might process 
and make juridical decisions about their respective defendant.  
Tobii X2-60 compact eye tracker. Finally, as Study 2 hoped to measure participants 
visual fixation patterns while viewing the legal materials, Study 2 collected a considerable 
amount of data using a Tobii X2-60 compact eye tracker. This particular eye tracker records 
participants’ eye movements while they naturally gaze at stimuli that is presented on a computer 
screen. The Tobii X2-60 compact eye tracker links eye movements to precise regions on a 
computer screen by emitting infrared beams toward a participant’s eyes and using a high 
resolution camera to capture the angle of the reflection that is produced when these beams refract 
off of participants’ corneas and pupils.  
As a participant moves their eyes to look at different locations on the screen, these 
measured refraction angles will vary. However, similar refraction angles are produced each time 
a participant looks at the same spot on the screen. Through a short calibration task, which 
requires participants to follow a circle with their eyes as the circle moves around the screen and 
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changes in size, a large number of data points related to these refraction angles are collected. The 
Tobii processing system, Tobii Studios, then uses these data points to map the participants’ eye 
movements onto the screen, as well as check the precision and accuracy of the generated map by 
relating the recorded refraction angles to those that would indicate that participants were indeed 
looking at the circle as it moved around the screen. During later experimental phases, each new 
recorded data point is checked against the data generated during this calibration in order to 
further estimate the validity of the data as it is collected. 
Further, the Tobii X2-60 compact’s data is collected at 60 hz or approximately one data 
point per 3.3-33 ms, resulting in a nearly continuous mapping of a participant's’ visual perceptual 
behaviors. Furthermore, the infrared beam emitted by the Tobii X2-60 is harmless, as both the 
retinal and corneal irradiation it produces are well below the maximum standards for safe use set 
by the United States (which are 10-1W/cm2) as well as the more conservative standards set by 
scientific literature (which are 10-2W/cm2). In terms of bodily comfort, this eye tracker allows 
participants to keep their glasses or contacts on during the procedure, sit at a safe distance from 
the computer screen (24 inches), make free head movements (up to 20 inches to the left or right, 
and up to 14 inches up or down), and blink normally (Tobii, 2014). As a result, this eye tracker 
allows for a viewing experience that is experientially the same as viewing any other computer 
screen.  
Finally, it is important to note that this eye tracker’s data is primarily collected as 
coordinates which relate to areas on the associated screen. When programing eye tracking 
stimuli, or the information that is presented onscreen during eye tracking procedures, 
experimenters can design Areas of Interest (AOIs) so that recorded data points can easily be 
associated to larger areas or images during analyses. In other words, coordinates inside a 
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predetermined area are categorized as “on” that AOI, and coordinates outside a predetermined 
area are recorded as “off” that AOI.  
For this experiment, AOIs were drawn that corresponded with the normative section of 
the legal brief, the informational section of the legal brief, and the eye and mouth regions on the 
photograph of the defendant (See Figure 2). As such, the present study was able to clearly record 
how much participants fixated on each of these AOIs, and, during the legal brief, whether or not 
they preferenced one region over the other. Importantly, the respective AOIs that were drawn on 
the legal brief were the same dimensions for both the normative section and the informational 
section, all of these AOIs were the same dimensions across conditions, and all of these AOIs 
corresponded to the same coordinates on the screen across conditions as well. In turn, the size or 
positioning of these AOIs did not confound eye tracking results. Ultimately, these AOIs allowed 
the present studies to contextualize participants’ visual perceptual patterns while they reviewed 
these legal materials.  
Crucially, it should be noted that for Study 2, fixation was analyzed both directly and 
proportionally. This means that participants’ fixation scores both took into account the raw 
number of fixations participants made, but also the proportional fixations participants made. 
While it is normal to consider raw fixations, it is less common to analyze fixations 
proportionately. However, this measure is uniquely able to control for slight changes in the total 
number of fixations that are recorded for each participant. While raw fixation numbers are 
merely the total number of fixations made for each AOI, the proportional fixation value is 
calculated by averaging the number of fixations participants made per AOI by the total number 
of fixations a participant made per visual stimuli. In other words, if a participant made 1200 
fixations on the normative AOI while viewing the legal brief and made a total of 3600 fixations 
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while viewing the legal brief, then their raw fixation number score for the normative factors on 
the legal brief would be 1200 and their proportional fixation score would be 0.33. Nevertheless, 
even though this measure is less common, it is in fact common to analyze participants’ fixation 
patterns in a number of ways (Granot et al., 2014). 
 
Procedure 
 Study 1. The first experiment was launched on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
first completed a consent form, and then, if they met the eligibility criteria and agreed to 
participate, proceeded to the experiment. At this point, participants were given a brief 
explanation of the basic duties of a juror, which highlighted the need to remember key facts. 
Participants then read the legal brief and viewed the visual stimuli, with a short instructional 
page separating the legal brief from the visual stimuli. The legal brief, this short instructional 
page, and each visual stimulus were all displayed on different pages in a set order, and only the 
legal brief and the image of the defendant were varied by condition. Given that this was an 
online experiment, no eye tracking data was collected during this phase, and participants were 
able to spend as much or as little time as they wanted on each page. However, participants were 
unable to return to previous pages once they had advanced.  
 Once participants had completed this phase, they then proceeded to the behavioral phase. 
Participants first completed the manipulation check questionnaire. Each manipulation check 
question was presented on the same page, and the order of each question was randomized to 
avoid ordering effects. After completing the manipulation check, participants advanced to the 
juridical decision questionnaire. Before this phase, participants were reminded that they would 
need to keep the opinions of other jurors in mind on certain questions. Both the self-rated and 
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other-rated culpability questions were then presented to them on the first page of this 
questionnaire, in that order. Then, following a short explanation of the role of a juror in 
sentencing decisions, participants answered the self-rated and other-rated sentencing questions. 
Again, participants were unable to return to previous pages of this questionnaire once they had 
advanced.  
 Finally, after completing the juridical decision questionnaire, participants advanced to 
complete the explicit bias and social motivation questionnaires. These questionnaires were not 
directly linked to juror decision making, and were instead framed as a series of general questions 
that investigated participants’ opinions and beliefs. The first page of this questionnaire included 
the SDS, and the ordering of this scale’s questions were randomized in order to avoid ordering 
effects. The next few pages of this questionnaire included the SDO questionnaire and the MRWP 
questionnaires. Each of the questions included within the SDO and the MRWPs, as they are 
measured on the same Likert scale, were mixed together and the order of these questions was 
randomized for each participant. Participants answered ten of these questions per page, and were 
unable to return to previous pages once they had advanced.  
 Finally, participants answered a brief exit questionnaire. This questionnaire asked 
participants for their demographic information including their age, gender, and race. It also 
included, on a separate page, questions that asked participants to report the estimated time it took 
them to complete this study, what they believed was the main purpose of the study, and if they 
noticed anything strange or uncomfortable during the study. Once participants had completed 
this exit questionnaire, they were then debriefed, asked if they still consented to the use of their 
data in this experiment, and concluded the study.  
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 Study 2. The second experiment was run in-person in Bard College’s psychology 
building Preston Hall. Participants first completed the consent process. Once they had completed 
this process, they were introduced to the computer where the experiment would take place. 
Participants then began the eye tracking phase of the experiment, starting first with the short 
calibration task. During this task, participants watched a grey dot as it moved around the 
otherwise blank white screen while the eye tracker collected data necessary for calibration. After 
completing this calibration task, participants then began the main eye tracking task. During this 
phase, eye tracking data was collected continuously and participants were unable to return to 
previous pages after they had advanced. Participants first read a brief explanation of their role as 
a juror, which highlighted the need to remember key facts and that participants would have a set 
amount of time to study the legal brief. After reading this explanation, participants then read the 
legal brief. Participants were required to remain on the legal brief screen for exactly 60 seconds. 
Once this time had passed, they were immediately advanced to an instruction page that explained 
the purpose of visual evidence and outlined that participants would have a set time to study each 
piece of visual evidence. For each visual stimulus, participants were required to remain on the 
screen for exactly 10 seconds and were, again, immediately advanced to the next screen when 
this time had passed. After viewing every visual stimulus, participants were instructed to let their 
experimenter know that they had completed the eye tracking phase. Which legal brief and image 
of the defendant participants viewed were the only aspect of this phase that varied by condition.  
  Participants were then directed to the behavioral phase of this experiment. This phase 
closely resembled the behavioral phase of Study 1. The only differences between this phase and 
the behavioral phase of the previous study related to the juridical decision questionnaire and the 
exit questionnaire. During this experiment, participants read the same instructions advising them 
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that they would be asked to determine what other jurors might think on some questions. 
However, instead of presenting self-rated and other-rated culpability questions together and self-
rated and other-rated sentencing questions together on two separate pages, each question in this 
questionnaire was presented to participants on their own page. Additionally, the scale for each 
culpability question was expanded to range from 1 (Innocent) to 8 (Guilty) instead of from 1 
(Innocent) to 6 (Guilty). Finally, participants in this experiment were not required during the exit 
questionnaire to estimate how long they took to complete this experiment or report any strange 
or uncomfortable experiences. Instead, participants were verbally asked to describe any strange 
or uncomfortable experiences they might have had during their participation during the 
debriefing process.  
 
Study 1 
Participants. 
For this study, behavioral data was collected from 150 online participants through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Each participant was paid one dollar as compensation for 
participating in this experiment. As five participants did not consent and one was not eligible to 
participate due to their age, data was available for a total of 144 usable participants. These 
participants were 56.9% White and 6.3% Black, were 61.1% male, and had a mean age of 33. 
However, after considering manipulation check exclusion criteria, data from only 93 participants 
was analyzed. These participants were 63.4% White and 8.6% Black, were 52.7 % male, and had 
a mean age of 33. 
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Data Preparation  
Manipulation check exclusions. In order to observe the influence of extralegal 
characteristics on juridical behaviors under a proposed mechanistic aversive racism paradigm 
(Figure 1B), only participants who were able to consciously recall the specific extralegal 
characteristics of their respective condition were considered in this study’s main analyses. This 
was necessary, as even theoretical aversive racism paradigms posit that a substantial amount of a 
person’s aversively racist decision making process is based on conscious rationalizations about 
these characteristics. If a participant could not remember these characteristics, then they likely 
could not have considered them when making later decisions. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that this led to the exclusion of 35% of the study’s usable participants (n = 51). 
Again, this conservative exclusion criteria was necessary to ensure that the final sample reflected 
six distinct conditions whose responses might have been influenced by both explicit and implicit 
considerations of their respective defendant’s extralegal characteristics.  
While it may be interesting for another study to investigate the exact reasons for these 
recall inaccuracies or more directly take into account the role of more implicit responses to a 
defendant’s characteristics within aversive racism paradigms, the nature of MTurk as an 
experimental platform prevents this present study from differentiating participants whose recall 
accuracy was due to these more complex factors from participants who were merely not 
participating to the best of their ability. In fact, participants who were excluded due to this 
measure were on average only 64.01% likely to answer each of the 11 questions included in the 
manipulation check correctly, whereas participants who were not excluded were 94.43% likely to 
answer each of the manipulation check questions correctly. Given that these questions were yes 
or no questions, a 64.01% average accuracy rate is dangerously close to random responses. And 
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so, along with the fact that there were no significant differences between conditions on recall 
accuracy for the questions considered as manipulation check criteria, this would suggest that 
these participants’ inabilities to remember their conditional factors were more likely due to an 
overall lack of attention rather than any of these other more complex explanations. Nevertheless, 
in the interest of full transparency, the results for statistical tests that did not take into account 
these manipulation check exclusions can be found in the appendix (Appendix H).  
Reliability analyses.  Finally, for each of the scales utilized in this analysis, cronbach’s 
alpha was analyzed in order to insure reliability. Both the SDO (16 items; α = 0.95) and SDS (12 
items; α = 0.86) measures were found to be highly reliable. The compiled External MRWP scale 
was also highly reliable (15 items; α = 0.96), as were the broken down External MRWP to Black 
people (5 items; α = 0.91), External MRWP to people with mental illnesses (5 items; α = 0.89), 
and External MRWP to people who use hard drugs scales (5 items; α = 0.93). Finally, the 
compiled Internal MRWP scale was also highly reliable (15 items; α = 0.91), as were the broken 
down Internal MRWP to Black people (5 items; α = 0.87), Internal MRWP to people with mental 
illnesses (5 items; α = 0.85), and Internal MRWP to people who use hard drugs scales (5 items; α 
= 0.89).   
 
Results  
As this study was interested in identifying potential extralegal factors for aversive racism 
as well as exploring how these extralegal characteristics might relate to mock jurors’ differential 
focus on normative or informational factors, differential willingness to communicate explicit 
biases, differential awarenesses of various social motivations, and differential juridical decisions 
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under a mechanistic aversive racism paradigm (Figure 1B), a variety of statistical tests were run 
to in order to analyze the influence of a mock juror’s condition on these outcomes.  
Focus on normative factors. The first major goal of this study was to begin to explore 
the foundational mechanisms of aversive racism. Overall, it was proposed that a mock juror’s 
reliance on normative influences might predispose them to adopt aversive racism paradigms 
during their decision making. If this were in fact the case, then it should be shown that mock 
jurors may begin to seek out potentially normative factors before they even begin making 
juridical decisions. In order to test this hypothesis, the present study considered mock jurors’ 
preferential memory for their defendant’s normative or informational factors (Normative Recall 
minus Informational Recall) on the manipulation check questionnaire. If this study’s mock jurors 
were preferencing normative influences from the point that they were reading about their 
defendant in the legal materials, it would be hypothesized that mock jurors who might later adopt 
an aversive racism paradigm for decision making should show this preferential memory for their 
defendant’s normative factors. Hence, if this process could be linked to the later adoption of 
aversive racism paradigms, then mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had potentially 
positive or negative secondary extralegal characteristics should have the most preferential 
memory for the normative factors described in their defendant’s legal brief when compared to 
mock jurors in any other conditions.  
While there were no significant differences across condition in mock jurors’ ability to 
remember the complete set of questions included in the manipulation check or in mock jurors’ 
ability to remember the factors specifically related to their condition even before manipulation 
check exclusions (Appendix H), there were in fact significant differences in mock jurors’ 
preferential memory for the normative factors included in the legal brief across conditions. 
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However, these differences complicated normative decision making modes’ foundational role 
within the proposed mechanistic model of aversive racism. Although all mock jurors showed a 
better memory for informational factors, a 2 (Race: Black or White) X 3 (Mental Health: NMI, 
MI, MID) factorial ANOVA actually found no significant main effect of race F(1,87) = 0.61, p = 
0.44 or any significant interactions F(2,87) = 0.28, p = 0.76. Instead, only a significant main 
effect of mental health was found F(2,87) = 6.47, p < 0.01 and LSD post hoc tests revealed that 
mock jurors in the NMI condition (M = -0.15) were significantly less likely to show a 
preferential memory for normative influences than mock jurors in the MI conditions (M = -0.03, 
p = 0.01) or mock jurors in the MID conditions (M = -0.01, p < 0.01). Further, mock jurors in the 
MI condition showed no significant differences from mock jurors in the MID conditions (p = 
0.66).   
Overall, these results suggest that mock jurors who viewed a defendant with no history of 
mental illness were in fact less likely to preference normative factors than mock jurors whose 
defendant had potentially positive or negative secondary characteristics. This finding supports 
the hypothesis that these mock jurors, most likely due to the fact that their defendant had no 
relevant secondary extralegal characteristics, were operating under less of a normative decision 
making mode. Alternatively, other mock jurors whose defendant did have relevant secondary 
extralegal characteristics, seemed to be operating under more of a normative decision making 
mode. However, the fact that there was no main effect of race or any interactions complicates 
this finding’s place as a clear foundation for the adoption of aversive racism paradigms, as it 
suggests that these secondary characteristics themselves were leading mock jurors to act in more 
normative ways rather than the race of the defendant. In conclusion, these findings instead 
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propose that all mock jurors whose defendant had some history of mental illness were likely to 
preference normative decision making modes. 
Nonetheless, the aversive racism paradigm does not directly consider the role of 
normative influences. Although this decision making mode may predispose mock jurors to act in 
aversively racist ways, their decisions would only begin to fit directly within a mechanistic 
aversive racism paradigm if they do indeed harness this normative mode in order to make harsh 
decisions about Black defendants. In fact, mock jurors in a variety of settings, including jurors 
not directly operating under an aversive racism paradigm, could be operating under a more 
normative decision making mode. These findings merely suggest that mock jurors whose 
defendant does not have potentially positive or negative secondary characteristics may be more 
likely to preference normative influences. As such, these findings can support the idea that an 
adoption of this mode can be foundational for aversive racism, although later mechanisms would 
need to explain what leads to particularly racist decisions.       
 Willingness to communicate explicit biases. As such, the present study also sought to 
explore how the influence of defendants’ extralegal characteristics might also be related to 
mechanisms that are directly considered under a mechanistic model of aversive racism. For 
example, the preferencing of normative influences might lead someone to adopt any number of 
biased decision making paradigms, but only under the aversive racism paradigm would mock 
jurors feel more or less willing to be explicitly biased because of their defendant’s 
characteristics.  
In order to explore this particular mechanism, this study hypothesized that mock jurors 
operating under an aversive racism paradigm would feel more willing to communicate their 
aversive feelings. More specifically, mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had potentially 
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negative secondary characteristics should be more willing to communicate their explicit biases, 
for these mock jurors would have successfully identified a characteristic that could justify these 
aversive feelings. Conversely, mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had potentially 
positive secondary characteristics should be less willing to communicate their explicit biases, for 
these mock jurors alternatively identified positive characteristics that further led them to want to 
mask their aversive feelings. Finally, any mock jurors whose defendant was White or whose 
defendant was Black and had no potentially positive or negative secondary characteristics should 
have a more neutral willingness to communicate their explicit biases. 
Like the findings for preferential normative decision making, however, the results of this 
study yet again complicated these hypotheses (Figure 3). First, a 2 (race: Black or White) X 3 
(mental health: NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ responses to the 
SDO questionnaire (Figure 3A) only found a significant main effect of mental health F(2,87) = 
4.07, p = 0.02, such that LSD post hoc tests showed that mock jurors in the MID conditions 
(M=53.94) were more willing to explicitly advocate for social dominance than mock jurors in the 
NMI conditions (M = 40.58, p = 0.01) or mock jurors in the MI conditions (M = 41.03, p = 
0.02), whereas no significant differences between the NMI and MI conditions were found (p = 
0.93). This test did not find any main effects of race F(1,87) = 0.62, p = 0.43 or any interactions 
F(2,87) = 0.74, p = 0.48. Instead of supporting the proposed mechanistic aversive racism 
paradigm, this finding actually indicates that all mock jurors whose defendant had a history of 
drug-related mental illness felt more willing to advocate for general concepts of social 
dominance. 
Second, another 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ responses to the 
compiled SDS that also took into account groups not directly considered within this study’s 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
62 
experimental conditions additionally found this significant main effect of mental health F(2,86) 
= 66.33, p < 0.01 (Figure 3B). LSD post hoc tests yet again determined that although there were 
no significant differences between mock jurors in NMI (M = 759.16) and MI conditions (M = 
717.7, p = 0.37), mock jurors in the MID conditions (M = 589.96) were more willing to 
communicate that they felt socially distant from groups based on those groups’ extralegal 
characteristics than mock jurors in either the NMI (p < 0.01) or the MI conditions (p = 0.01). 
This test also did not find any main effects of race F(1,86) = 0.75, p = 0.39 or any interactions 
F(2,86) = 0.07, p = 0.94. These findings further deviate from the proposed mechanistic aversive 
racism paradigm and instead suggests that seeing this potentially negative secondary 
characteristic would influence mock jurors, regardless of their defendant’s race, to feel more 
willing to communicate their feelings of social distance from specific and potentially protected 
groups. 
This particular finding becomes even more interesting when it is broken down to focus on 
individual SDS questions (Table 2). Most SDS questions reflected the results of the compiled 
SDS, as ANOVAs that focused on mock jurors’ communicated feelings of social distance from 
elderly people, teenagers, poor people, wealthy people, men, and women all only found 
significant or near significant main effects of mental health. Further, the SDS questions that 
directly measured mock jurors’ communicated feelings about Black people, White people, and 
people with schizophrenia all followed these same trends, as ANOVAs still found significant or 
near significant effects of mental health (Figure 3 C-E). Moreover, in each of these cases, LSD 
post hoc tests revealed that these effects were caused by mock jurors in the MID conditions who 
were more willing to report that they felt socially distant from these groups than mock jurors in 
either the NMI or MI conditions. As such, it is clear that even mock jurors’ responses to these 
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isolated SDS questions indicate that any mock juror who encountered the potentially negative 
secondary characteristic of drug-related mental illness felt more willing to communicate their 
explicit biases.  
Nevertheless, a few SDS questions did not find these particular results. In fact, an 
ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ communicated feelings of social distance from Latinx people 
uniquely found both a near significant main effect of mental health and a significant main effect 
of race. While LSD post hoc tests showed that this effect of mental health reflected those found 
by other SDS questions as it was driven by mock jurors in the MID conditions, mock jurors were 
additionally more willing to communicate their explicit biases about this group when their 
defendant was Black (M = 51.65) when compared to mock jurors whose defendant was White 
(M = 65.15). Although the present study did not directly consider how viewing a Black 
defendant or a defendant with a history of drug-related mental illness might influence mock 
jurors’ willingness to communicate their biases about Latinx people specifically, this finding 
could highlight a potential area for future study. For instance, this finding may perhaps suggest 
an area through which these mock jurors felt more comfortable communicating their racial biases 
without specifically implicating their social distance from Black people or it may suggest that the 
intersection between these biases itself might be a factor for aversive racism in other cases. 
Nevertheless, in the context of this study, it does not directly implicate mock jurors as more 
willing to be explicitly biased because of their defendant’s race because it this finding is only 
related to mock jurors’ responses to one isolated group and other indirect measures of explicit 
bias such as the SDO failed to find any effect of race. In turn, this finding likely does not 
demonstrate that mock jurors used this question to communicate their more general biases about 
Black people.  
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Finally, the only other SDS questions to diverge from the general results of these 
analyses were those related to drug users. Notably, the SDS question related to people who use 
soft drugs such as marijuana was the only question to show no main effects or interactions. Even 
more crucial to the present study, an ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ feelings of social 
distance from people who use hard drugs also uniquely failed to find a main effect of mental 
health (Figure 3F). It did, however, find a near significant main effect of race such that mock 
jurors in the Black conditions (M = 23.52) were marginally more willing to communicate their 
explicit biases about hard drug users than mock jurors in the White conditions (M = 32.28).  
While this finding is not as statistically significant under traditional conservative 
measures as some of the other explicit bias findings were, it does suggest that there might be a 
relationship between seeing a Black defendant and feeling more willing to communicate biases 
about people who use hard drugs. Moreover, these comparatively less statistically significant 
results may in part be due to the fact that mock jurors’ responses to this SDS question were lower 
than any other individual SDS question (Figure 4). This might suggest that there may have been 
a floor effect in mock jurors’ responses that inhibited the variation necessary to find as clear a 
significant difference as was found in the analyses of mock jurors’ responses to other SDS 
questions. However, given the scarcity of undeniable statistical backing for this particular 
finding, the fact that it uniquely seems to suggest that the race of a mock jurors’ defendant has 
the ability to influence their willingness to communicate their explicit biases about hard drug 
users cannot stand against these other findings as evidence that the mechanisms of explicit bias 
within an aversive racism paradigm follow the proposed mechanistic model. As a result, the true 
mechanisms of explicit bias seem to, like the mechanisms of more foundational normative 
making modes, rely more on the secondary factors of a defendant than the race of that defendant.   
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Awareness of social motivations. The other mechanism of the proposed mechanistic 
aversive racism paradigm explored by this study focuses on the influence a defendants’ 
secondary extralegal characteristics might have on mock jurors’ awareness of social motivations. 
When considering the mechanisms of aversive racism in juror decision making settings, it is 
especially important to explore the mechanistic role of social motivations, as a juror’s decision 
making is closely attuned to the social pressures placed on them by their fellow jurors. As such, 
real-world jurors operating under aversive racism would be particularly aware of how others 
might critique them for their biased responses toward certain groups.  
Similar to a willingness to communicate explicit biases, the proposed mechanistic model 
of aversive racism would hypothesize that only mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had 
potentially positive or negative secondary characteristics should show differences in their 
awareness of social pressures, as only these mock jurors would have made their decisions under 
an aversive racism paradigm.   
Unlike the past analyses related to normative decision making or a willingness to 
communicate explicit biases, the present study overall supported these hypotheses. When 
looking at a 2 (Race: Black or White) X 3 (Mental Health: NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA 
that focused on mock jurors’ compiled responses to each external MRWP scales, mock jurors did 
show a near significant main effect of mental health F(2,85) = 2.55, p = 0.08 and a significant 
interaction F(2,85) = 3.5, p = 0.04. An LSD post hoc test showed that this near main effect of 
mental health was driven by a significant difference between mock jurors’ awareness of external 
motivations in the MID conditions (M = 59.6) when compared to mock jurors in the MI 
conditions (M = 47.52, p = 0.03) and a near significant difference between mock jurors’ 
awareness of external motivations in the MID conditions when compared to mock jurors in the 
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NMI conditions (M = 50.55, p = 0.099), although there were no significant differences between 
the NMI and MI conditions (p = 0.55). Furthermore, the significant interaction that was found by 
these analyses clarifies that the bulk of this effect was due to mock jurors in the Black MID 
condition (M = 67.58), as mock jurors in the White MID condition actually reported that they felt 
much less aware of social pressure in comparison (M = 51.62).  
As no main effect of race was found F(1,85) = 0.05, p = 0.83, this interaction further 
suggests that only mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had a history of non-drug related 
mental illness showed this increased awareness of social pressures. While the potentially positive 
characteristic of non-drug-related mental illness failed to show any effects, this could merely 
indicate that mock jurors in this subject pool failed to see it as a potentially positive factor. As a 
result, this finding specifically supports the hypotheses of mechanistic aversive racism 
paradigms, for mock jurors who saw a Black defendant with potentially negative secondary 
characteristics were indeed more aware of social pressures to respond without prejudice. This 
indicates that these mock jurors were in fact more attuned to these pressures during their decision 
making.   
After breaking these results down to focus on each individual External MRWP scale 
(Figure 5), these findings become even more illuminating to the mechanisms of social 
motivations under a mechanistic aversive racism paradigm. For example, an ANOVA focusing 
on mock jurors’ external motivations to respond without prejudice to Black people in particular 
only found a marginally significant main effect of mental health and a marginally significant 
interaction (Table 3). These results resembled those of the compiled External MRWP analyses, 
as LSD post hoc tests revealed that mock jurors in MID conditions (M = 21.232) were 
significantly more likely to report that they felt external pressure to respond without prejudice to 
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Black people than mock jurors in the MI conditions (M = 16.59, p = 0.03), although there were 
no significant difference between mock jurors in the MID and NMI conditions (M = 18.92, p = 
0.26) or between mock jurors in the NMI and MI conditions (p = 0.23). Further, the near 
significant interaction that was found yet again indicates that much of this effect was due to the 
unusually high awareness of external social pressure reported by mock jurors in the Black MID 
condition (Figure 5A).  
These basic results were also demonstrated by an ANOVA that focused on mock jurors’ 
external motivations to respond without prejudice to people with mental illnesses. While these 
analyses found no significant main effects of race or mental health (Table 3), a significant 
interaction caused by the unusually high social motivations of mock jurors in the Black MID 
condition (M = 22.17) was once again found. Both of these analyses clarify that mock jurors who 
saw a Black defendant with a history of drug-related mental illness did indeed feel greater social 
motivations to respond without prejudice and protected groups like Black people and potentially 
protected groups like people with mental illnesses. This further indicates that these mock jurors 
had in fact put greater consideration into the social pressures to respond without prejudice to 
these groups during their decision making. 
Moreover, and perhaps most interestingly, the External MRWP to people who use hard 
drugs scale further supported this trend. While this scale also found no main effect of race, it did 
find a significant main effect of mental health (Table 3), such that LSD post hoc tests showed 
that mock jurors in the MID conditions (M = 19.08) were significantly more likely to feel 
external social pressure than mock jurors in the MI conditions (M = 14.18, p = 0.01) or mock 
jurors in the NMI conditions (M = 15.1, p = 0.04), whereas there was no difference between 
mock jurors in the MI and NMI conditions (p = 0.61). Further, another near significant 
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interaction indicates that this significant difference was mainly influenced by mock jurors in the 
Black MID condition (M = 21.17).  
It is important to note, though, that unlike mock jurors’ responses to the external MRWP 
to Black people or people with schizophrenia scales, it is interesting that mock jurors whose 
defendant was Black and had a history of drug-related mental illness were also more attuned to 
the social motivations to protect hard drug users than mock jurors in other conditions. This might 
suggest that, under an aversive racism paradigm, mock jurors whose defendant had a history of 
drug-related mental illness were still aware of social pressures to protect drug users, this 
awareness just might have factored less into their final juridical decisions.  
 Finally, though, it is important to also note that, as internal motivations are not 
theoretically considered under an aversive racism paradigm, there is no evidence that these 
motivations should change as a result of seeing any particular defendant. This was, in fact, what 
was demonstrated by this study, as a 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ compiled 
Internal MRWP scores found no main effect of race F(1,85) = 0.69, p = 0.41, no main effect of 
mental health F(2,85) = 1.9, p = 0.16, and no interactions F(2,85) = 0.54, p = 0.59. Even when 
these results were broken down by individual Internal MRWP scales, no effects or interactions 
were found (Table 3). This supports the idea that mock jurors’ internal motivations to protect a 
defendant based on that defendant’s extralegal characteristics are not changed by the positive or 
negative factors they encounter. As a result, the theoretical exclusion of internal motivations as a 
mechanism with a mechanistic aversive racism paradigm is supported by these analyses and the 
results of this study can be distanced from the theoretical assumptions of researchers like 
Sommers and Ellsworth, who instead attribute differences in mock jurors’ responses to their 
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internal motivations to seem nonbiased. As such, solely external social motivations should be 
considered as mechanistically related to aversive racism paradigms.   
 Juridical decisions.  Another goal of this study was to contextualize these mechanisms 
alongside mock jurors’ final juridical decisions. In line with other juror decision making studies 
(Minero & Espinoza, 2016), this study considered the influence of a defendant’s extralegal 
characteristics on mock jurors’ ultimate decisions about their defendant’s culpability and 
sentencing. In this study, mock jurors made these decisions both from their own perspectives 
(self-rated) as well as from the assumed perspectives of others (other-rated). As self-rated 
decisions may be more attuned to social desirability biases or internal motivations, past studies 
have regarded this secondary perspective as able to allow mock jurors to more free to 
communicate their biases (Granot et al., 2014). Moreover, in the context of this study, this 
secondary perspective might allow mock jurors to begin to imagine what it might be like to make 
decisions in the context of a group. 
Self-rated decisions. For self-rated decisions, it was hypothesized under an aversive 
racism paradigm that mock jurors might attempt to hide their biases about their defendant when 
that defendant was Black or had a history on non-drug-related mental illness, but would feel 
more free to act in biased ways toward their defendant if their defendant had a history of drug-
related mental illness.  
However, the results of this present study only complicated these hypotheses (Figure 6 A-
B). Although 2 (race: Black or White) X 3 (mental health: NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA 
focusing on mock jurors’ self-rated culpability decisions found a near main effect of race F(1,87) 
= 3.39, p = 0.07 such that mock jurors who saw a White defendant (M = 4.6) rated their 
defendant as slightly more culpable than mock jurors who saw a Black defendant (M = 4.36), it 
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is perplexing that this trend suggests that these mock jurors acted to protect most Black 
defendants. Less confusingly, this test did find a significant main effect of mental health F(2,87) 
= 3.36, p = 0.04, and an LSD post hoc test revealed that mock jurors in both MID conditions (M 
= 4.98) rated their defendants as significantly more culpable than mock jurors in both NMI 
conditions (M = 4.21, p = 0.01), whereas no significant differences were found between mock 
jurors’ culpability ratings in the MID conditions and MI conditions (M = 4.54, p = 0.15) or in the 
NMI and MI conditions (p = 0.24). However, this main effect of mental health was not related to 
the near significant interaction that was found in any expected way F(2,87) = 2.45, p = 0.09, as 
this interaction only indicated that mock jurors in the White MI condition uniquely rated their 
defendant as slightly less culpable than mock jurors in other White conditions and that mock 
jurors in the Black NMI condition seemed to drive the main effect of mental health.  
Ultimately, this finding deviates significantly from an aversive racism paradigm. By 
making biased decisions that favored Black defendants, making biased decisions that punished 
all defendants with a history of drug-related mental illness, and only making decisions that 
uniquely seemed to protect White defendants with a history of non-drug-related mental illness, 
mock jurors seemed to forgo aversively racist decision making altogether. However, this may be 
due to the fact that these decisions were framed through their own perspectives, making mock 
jurors feel the need to over-report their desire to protect Black defendants and White defendants 
with potentially positive secondary characteristics, but still allowing them to continue to report 
their negative feelings about people with a history of drug-related mental illness.   
Perhaps more interesting is that fact that a similar factorial ANOVA focusing on mock 
jurors’ self-rated sentencing decisions found no main effect of mental health F(2,87) = 1.36, p = 
0.26 or any interactions F(2,87) = 2.18, p = 0.12. These analyses only found a near main effect 
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of race F(1,87) = 2.99, p = 0.09, as mock jurors in the White conditions (M=3.31) yet again 
advocated for slightly longer sentences for their defendants than mock jurors in the Black 
conditions (M = 2.72). This further suggests that, for this self-rated question, mock jurors were 
also not operating under an aversive racism paradigm at all, and were only demonstrating a slight 
desire to protect Black defendants. 
Other-rated decisions. It would still stand, then, that when not responding from their own 
perspectives, mock jurors should feel better able to act within an aversive racism paradigm, as 
they would either feel less personally responsible for their decisions or would be more directly 
considering the social motivations of their imagined fellow jurors.  
In fact, mock jurors’ responses to questions that were framed through the perspectives of 
their fellow jurors did more directly indicate that this study’s mock jurors were operating under 
an aversive racism paradigm (Figure 6 C-D). For other-rated sentencing decisions, a 2 X 3 
factorial ANOVA found no main effects of race F(1,87) = 0.5, p = 0.48 or mental health F(2,87) 
= 1.42, p = 0.25, but did find a significant interaction F(2,87) = 5.32, p < 0.01 such that mock 
jurors in the Black MID condition (M = 4.92) overwhelmingly reported that others would 
suggest much longer sentences for their defendant, even when compared to other mock jurors in 
Black conditions (M = 3.86) or mock jurors in the White MID condition (M = 3.21). This 
supports the hypothesis that, when asked to frame their decisions through the decisions other 
jurors would also support, mock jurors uniquely made harsh decisions about Black defendants 
with a history of drug-related mental illness.  
However, it is still important to clarify that no similar results were found for other-rated 
culpability decisions, as a 2 X 3 factorial ANOVA found no significant main effect of race 
F(1,87) = 2, p = 0.16, no main effect of mental health F(2,87) = 1.79, p = 0.17, and no 
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interactions F(2,87) = 0.3, p = 0.69. In turn, mock jurors yet again did not seem to be acting 
under an aversive racism paradigm when answering this particular question.  
Identifying factors for aversive racism. The final major goal of this study was to begin 
to identify whether or not mental health could operate as either a positive factor for aversive 
racism if it were unrelated to drug use or as a negative factor for aversive racism if it were 
related to drug use. While all of the analyses that took into account the effect these secondary 
characteristics had on the proposed mechanisms of aversive racism found multiple points of 
evidence to support the idea that drug use can be a negative factor for aversive racism, no 
evidence was provided to the idea that support mental illness without drug use can be a positive 
factor. In fact, no evidence was found to suggest that mock jurors treat Black defendants with a 
history of non-drug related mental illness differently than defendants with no history of mental 
illness.  
However, it is also necessary to explore this study’s mock jurors’ overall feelings about 
groups with these extralegal characteristics outside of these conditional effects, as these analyses 
could demonstrate that these other findings could hold up even if mock jurors had viewed a 
different defendant. As such, the present study considered how all mock jurors responded to 
mental health factors, both in terms of how willing they were to communicate their biases about 
Black people, people with schizophrenia, or people who use hard drugs, as well as how aware 
they were of social pressures that might inhibit their prejudicial responses to these groups.  
In turn, it hypothesized that mock jurors would report that they have much higher explicit 
biases about people who use hard drugs than people who have schizophrenia or Black people, 
further indicating that this factor can be a negative factor. Further, it was also hypothesized that 
mock jurors would report that they have a much lower awareness of motivations to respond 
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without prejudice to hard drug users than they have to respond without prejudice to people who 
have mental illnesses or to Black people. This would additionally provide isolated evidence that 
this factor has the capacity to be a negative factor for aversive racism. Finally, despite the fact 
that all other analyses found that non-drug-related mental illness had no effects on the 
mechanisms of aversive racism, there could still be some evidence that, at least in other cases, 
this factor could operate as a positive factor if mock jurors did indeed indicate that they had 
similar levels of explicit biases or awarenesses of social motivations to respond without 
prejudice to this group as they did to Black people. 
The hypothesis that drug use can be a negative factor was supported by the present 
analyses (Figure 7). When considering all mock jurors’ reported willingness to communicate 
their explicit biases, paired samples t-tests comparing mock jurors’ feelings of explicit bias about 
hard drug users to their feelings of explicit bias about people with schizophrenia t(92) = 7.21, p < 
0.01 as well as about Black people t(92) = 11.95, p < 0.01 both found that this study’s mock 
jurors overwhelmingly reported that they felt more socially distant from hard drug users than 
they did from people with schizophrenia or from Black people (Figure 7A). These same findings 
were replicated by analyses that considered this study’s mock jurors’ relative awarenesses of 
social motivations to respond without prejudice to each of these groups (Figure 7B). Paired 
samples t-tests comparing the differences between mock jurors’ awareness of social pressures 
related to hard drug users and related to people with mental illness t(92) = 3.2, p < 0.01 and 
between hard drug users and Black people t(92) = 4.32, p < 0.01 yet again demonstrated that all 
mock jurors in this study reported that they did indeed feel significantly less external motivation 
to respond without prejudice to people who use hard drugs than they did to respond without 
prejudice to people with mental illnesses or to Black people. All of this isolated evidence 
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supports the idea that even for mock jurors in other conditions, drug use was viewed as a 
potentially negative factor that they could be more explicitly biased about or that others would 
show less social pressure to protect.  
Alternatively, a paired sample t-test comparing this study’s mock jurors’ reported 
feelings of explicit bias about people with schizophrenia to their reported feelings of explicit bias 
about Black people t(92) = 5.794, p < 0.01 also found that mock jurors were much more willing 
to report that they felt socially distant from people with schizophrenia than they did from Black 
people (Figure 7A). Further, similar analyses also found that this study’s mock jurors once more 
reported that they felt significantly less externally motivated to respond without prejudice to 
people with a history of mental illness when compared to Black people t(92) = 2.671, p = 0.01 
(Fugure 7B). Like the conditionally-influenced findings, these analyses also demonstrate that all 
mock jurors failed to view non-drug-related mental illness as possible a positive factor.  
Interestingly, these findings were even supported by paired sample t-tests that took into 
account this study’s mock jurors’ levels of internal motivation to respond without prejudice to 
these groups (Figure 7C). These analyses showed that mock jurors also reported that they felt 
less internally motivated to respond without prejudice to people who use hard drugs than they 
did to Black people t(92) = 8.08, p < 0.01 or than they did to people with a history of mental 
illness t(92) = 7.88, p < 0.01. Further, these analyses also indicated that this study’s mock jurors 
felt less internally motivated to respond without prejudice to people with a history of mental 
illness than they did to Black people t(92) = 2.08, p = 0.04. This specifies that these internal 
motivations to respond without prejudice to people based on their mental health also suggest that 
this study’s mock jurors also viewed drug use as a negative factor and non-drug-related mental 
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illness as more of a neutral factor, although these motivations did not shift based on which 
defendant these mock jurors saw during this study. 
 In conclusion, these analyses only seem to support the idea that drug use can operate as a 
negative factor for aversive racism. Nevertheless, these analyses may not be entirely accurate, as 
they are based in measures that were influenced by mock jurors’ experimental conditions, 
leading some mock jurors’ data to potentially bias these outcomes. As such, while these analyses 
begin to provide some additional data that could comment on whether or not people generally 
feel willing to communicate their biases about these groups or whether people feel overall more 
or less aware of social pressures about these groups, future analyses would be necessary to 
consider these trends in populations that have not already been contaminated by the present 
study’s experimental conditions.  
 
Discussion 
As a result, the findings of this study provide a wealth of information in regard to the 
mechanisms of aversive racism. In part, these findings recommend a few key changes to the 
proposed mechanistic aversive racism paradigm that has been outlined by past researchers (Cohn 
et al., 2012; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pearson et al., 2007). More specifically, the findings of 
this study seem to suggest that certain aspects of proposed mechanistic aversive racism 
paradigms, such as a mock juror’s increased likelihood to preferentially focus on normative 
factors or a mock juror’s increased willingness to communicate their explicit biases, are not 
related to the race of a defendant, but are more directly influenced by the potentially negative 
secondary characteristics of a defendant. Alternatively, while these findings did indicate that 
mock jurors whose defendant was Black and had potentially negative secondary characteristics 
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like a history of drug-related mental illness are in fact more likely to demonstrate an awareness 
of social motivations, the present study only managed to contextualize these findings within 
mock jurors’ final other-rated sentencing decisions.  
A new mechanistic aversive racism paradigm. Considering these findings, it may be 
necessary to revise the proposed mechanistic aversive racism paradigm (Figure 8A). In fact, 
these findings provide overwhelming evidence that a preferential focus on normative influences, 
the selection of potentially negative characteristics, and an increased willingness to communicate 
explicit biases about otherwise protected groups may all actually be foundational for the later 
adoption of an aversive racism paradigm (Figure 8B-C). In turn, adapted mechanistic aversive 
racism paradigms should view this recognition of negative factors as well as these other related 
mechanisms as capable of predisposing mock jurors to later become influenced by the race of 
their defendant and adopt an aversive racism paradigm.  
If anything, this adapted paradigm would only further allow aspects of aversive racism 
paradigms, or perhaps more foundationally aversive paradigms, to begin to apply to the 
psychological mechanisms of any case where decision making might be influenced by a 
preference for normative decision making modes, an awareness of negative factors, or an 
increased willingness to communicate explicit biases. Further, this might explain why certain 
researchers have in fact found that a mock juror’s personality characteristics which might inhibit 
their adoption of normative decision making modes can prevent them from making biased 
juridical decisions (Gunnell & Ceci, 2010; Huggon, 2012). If it is the case that each of these 
mechanisms are necessary in order to predispose someone adopt aversive racism paradigms at a 
later point, then anything that might inhibit a mock juror from operating within these 
mechanisms would prevent them from making any aversively racist decisions. As such, any 
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future research into the mechanisms of aversive racism paradigms specifically should consider 
whether or not their mock jurors are in fact predisposed to aversive racism. 
Nevertheless, this present study’s mock jurors did in fact overwhelmingly operate within 
these mechanisms. As a result, it is possible to suggest from the results of this study that a 
defendant’s negative secondary characteristics can lead the majority of people to differentially 
preference normative influences and feel more willing to communicate their explicit biases. In 
turn, the present study did not only identify that these mechanisms might predispose a mock 
juror to act in aversively racist ways, but this study also provides tangible evidence that most 
mock jurors shared a foundational reaction to their defendant’s characteristics.  
However, although this study did also find clear evidence that a defendant’s negative 
secondary characteristics uniquely lead mock jurors who saw a Black defendant to report a 
heightened awareness of social motivations to respond without prejudice, this awareness only 
managed to relate to these mock jurors’ final juridical decisions when those decisions were made 
through the perspectives of others (Figure 8B). As such, it is possible to argue that new 
mechanistic aversive racism paradigms, especially those related to juridical decisions, should 
explicitly focus on these juridical decisions that are, like real-world decisions, framed through 
the perspectives of a group.  
Self-rated juridical decisions. Alternatively, other explanations might be needed in 
order to identify the mechanisms involved in mock jurors’ decisions when those decisions are 
made through their own perspectives (Figure 8C). While this study does provide overwhelming 
evidence that all mock jurors whose defendant had a negative secondary characteristic were still 
preferencing normative influences, were more willing to communicate biases about protected 
groups in general, and did in fact make harsher juridical decisions from their own perspectives, 
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these effects did not intersect with race such that these mock jurors were more harsh toward 
Black defendants in their self-rated juridical decisions. Instead, all mock jurors, regardless of 
their increased awareness of social pressure, actually made more harsh decisions about White 
defendants from their own perspectives. This specific finding actually seems to fall more in line 
with the theories proposed by Sommer and Ellsworth, as they propose that mock jurors, even 
those attuned to social motivations, might still attempt to overcorrect for their racial biases in 
their final juridical decisions (2001, 2009).  
However, it is not entirely necessary for the aversive racism paradigm to directly relate to 
self-rated juridical decisions, as these sorts of isolated decisions are not common in naturalistic 
juror decision making (Baddeley & Parkinson, 2012; Nemeth & Goncalo, 2005). Instead, a 
juror’s decisions are naturalistically made with a consideration of the decisions of others, as was 
the case in this study’s other-rated juridical decisions. As such, the complicated findings of this 
study’s self-rated juridical decisions do not only reflect Sommers and Ellsworth’s conclusions 
that mock jurors might attempt to moderate their responses, but they further support Sommers 
and Ellsworth’s ultimate conclusion that juror decision making studies need to begin to frame 
their juridical decisions within group decision making contexts if they hope to be at all 
generalizable (2001). By failing to provide any possible link between mock jurors’ mechanistic 
behaviors and their defendants’ characteristics to their final juridical decisions, this study begins 
to indicate that isolated, individualized decisions simply might not reflect the psychological 
processes involved in real-world juridical decisions.  
Nonetheless, this shift toward juridical decisions that are exclusively made through the 
perspectives of others may prevent the aversive racism paradigm from explaining the results of 
all past juror decision making research (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2005), as it is 
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unknown whether these past studies framed their juridical decision questions in this other-rated 
way. However, if it is the case that aversive racism does indeed reflect a juror’s decision making 
in more naturalistic settings, than this paradigm might be especially crucial for any future 
research that does attempt to frame juridical decisions within real-world group decision making 
contexts.  
A negative extralegal factor for aversive racism. Moreover, it is important to note that 
this present study only managed to identify a potentially negative factor for aversive racism. 
Mock jurors within this study not only reported on the whole that they felt more socially distant 
from people with schizophrenia than they did Black people and that they felt less social 
motivation to respond without prejudice to people with mental illnesses than they did to Black 
people, but almost every analysis in this study failed to demonstrate any unique influence of the 
non-drug-related mental illness manipulation. Only through mock jurors’ self-rated culpability 
decisions did any desire to protect people with non-drug-related mental illnesses even begin to 
emerge, and this desire to protect these defendants was only marginally applied to White 
defendants. As a result, the present study cannot comment on the role positive factors might play 
in mechanistic aversive racism paradigms.  
However, this measure should still be included in future studies like Study 2, as it allows 
analyses to consider the effect of drug use as a negative factor even when that drug use is framed 
as directly related to this overall more neutral factor of mental illness. One of the most important 
findings of this present study was that, even when drug use was described at a mental illness and 
was not related to the crime a defendant was being charged for, mock jurors still acted in 
aversive ways. This finding directly implicates this extralegal characteristic as not only capable 
of acting as a factor under an aversive racism paradigm, but it also begins to explain why jurors 
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may even act in particularly discriminatory ways toward Black drug users when legal structures 
make the effort to frame drug use in this way (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2018; Feix & Wolber, 
2007; Ward et al., 2016).  
Limitations. Considering the novelty of these findings, is necessary to caveat the 
limitations of this study. First, it is challenging for this study to make any claims about the 
predominance of aversive racism paradigms in juror decision making due to the large number of 
participants who needed to be excluded due to their failure to remember their defendant’s 
extralegal characteristics. Indeed, this trend could imply that these participants were making 
decisions under another paradigm. However, it is perhaps more likely that these participants 
were simply not acting as mock jurors at all, as the nature of their responses suggests that they 
were randomly answering questions without any regard to their defendant’s characteristics or 
even to the facts of their defendant’s case. Nonetheless, it is only possible to state from the 
results of this present study that, when mock jurors did indeed remember the facts of their 
defendant’s case, then they were overwhelmingly likely to act in certain aversively racist ways.  
Second, it is potentially problematic that the findings related to aversive racism 
paradigms’ influence on mock jurors’ final juridical decisions were not replicated by mock 
juror’s other-rated culpability decisions. Nevertheless, this trend may be due to methodological 
aspects of this study’s culpability questions. For example, mock jurors in this study answered 
their self-rated and other-rated culpability questions on the same page. Due to the fact that mock 
jurors’ culpability decisions were measured using a discrete scale rather than a sliding scale like 
mock jurors’ sentencing decisions, it is possible that mock jurors may have been more aware of 
how they were changing their decisions and may have moderated their responses as a result. 
Further, this study’s mock jurors were offered fewer possible responses to the culpability 
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questions, suggesting that their responses may have lacked the variability necessary to observe 
minute psychological changes when these questions were asked from the perspectives of others. 
As such, these self-rated and other-rated questions should be asked on different pages and should 
expand the range of possible responses for culpability decisions in Study 2 in order to gauge 
whether these methodological limitations did indeed prevent this study’s other-rated culpability 
question from finding evidence for aversive racism paradigms. 
Moreover, the findings of this study may not directly relate to the precise mechanisms of 
all aversive racism paradigms. For example, many past studies have only tested the ways legally 
relevant characteristics may lead mock jurors to act in aversively racist ways (Hodson et al., 
2005; Johnson et al., 1995; Pearson et al., 2007). In fact, these other characteristics may not 
require an awareness of social motivations to respond without prejudice in order to influence 
self-rated decisions, as mock jurors in these cases may never even begin to consider how acting 
in aversive ways toward these non-social characteristics may be perceived as biased. As such, 
these factors may, in other cases, even manage to influence juridical decisions that are framed in 
an isolated way, for mock jurors may never begin to moderate their responses in order to appear 
less biased.  
Nevertheless, even if this particular mechanistic aversive racism paradigm can only 
directly apply to the ways a defendant’s extralegal characteristics can influence a juror’s decision 
making, this paradigm is still extremely necessary if the field hopes to also explain how Black 
people with intersecting identities may also be particularly vulnerable to legal discrimination. 
Additionally, these findings allow this present study’s adapted mechanistic paradigms to explain 
the psychological mechanisms employed by mock jurors in past studies that also referenced 
extralegal characteristics when making aversively racist decisions (Minero & Espinoza, 2016).   
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Finally, it is crucial to note that this study only attempted to test each of these 
mechanisms in isolation. Methodologically, this prohibits this particular study from fully 
concluding that any of these mechanisms cause the next, as they were asked out of order during 
the behavioral phase of this experiment. As such, these findings can only comment on what 
seemed foundational or what seemed related, and in turn can only theoretically propose an 
adapted aversive racism paradigm that might explain what mechanisms come into play at 
different stages in a juror’s decision making process. Given that no past studies have even begun 
to test these mechanisms of aversive racism in this way, this proposed mechanistic aversive 
racism paradigm is in and of itself necessary for any future research that hopes to apply this 
paradigm to juror decision making or explain what foundationally leads mock jurors to adopt this 
paradigm. However, future research is necessary in order to causally test how these mechanisms 
relate to one another. At the very least, this present study provides evidence that a defendant’s 
extralegal characteristics can cause a mock juror to adopt these particular mechanisms of 
aversive racism.  
Future directions. In the end, it is important to recognize one last time that, despite these 
methodological concerns and limitations, this present study did, unlike past studies on juror 
decision making, manage to provide clear evidence as to how the theoretical mechanisms of 
aversive racism paradigms can be influenced by the extralegal characteristics of a mock juror’s 
defendant. These mechanistic findings are extremely necessary in order to design studies that 
explore the ways aversive racism paradigms specifically explain certain variable outcomes in 
juror decision making settings. However, as this experiment is the first experiment to test these 
mechanisms in a tangible way, future research should attempt to replicate these findings, as well 
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as begin to seek more concrete evidence that certain mechanisms are indeed foundational for 
others.  
 
Study 2 
Participants  
For this study, data was collected from 49 participants. The participants were recruited 
from the Bard College campus and surrounding areas and were entered for a chance to win one 
of two 50-dollar Amazon gift cards for their participation. These participants were 75.5% White 
and 4.1% Black, were 26.5% male, and had a mean age of 20. After considering manipulation 
check and eye tracking exclusion criteria, eight participants were excluded, and so only data 
from the remaining 41 participants was analyzed. These participants were 73.2% White and 
2.4% Black, 26.8% male, and had a mean age of 20.  
All of these participants went through a multi-stage recruitment process that repeatedly 
reminded each potential participant that this experiment specifically used an eye tracker and was 
interested in participants’ attention and memory behaviors. As such, every participant was made 
aware both before their participation and during the consent process that participants should not 
have any diagnosed attention deficit disorders or related learning disabilities and should have 
normal or corrected to normal vision in order to be eligible to participate. This exclusion criteria 
was included in order to reduce the influence attention-related confounding variables might have 
on participants’ data during the eye tracking phase. However, it is important to note that this 
exclusion criteria was only measured by participants’ own discretion during the recruitment 
process (Appendix I).  
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Data Preparation 
 Manipulation check exclusions. As was the case in Study 1, participants were only 
included in these analyses if they were indeed able to remember the race, mental health history, 
and drug use history of their defendant during the manipulation check. This was done in order to 
ensure that the final data pool would only reflect participants that could have consciously 
considered these factors during deliberation. Unlike Study 1, however, this criteria only led to 
the exclusion of a small number of participants (n = 5). This comparatively lower exclusion rate 
could be due to the in-person nature of this study’s experimental design, as this design allowed 
the experimenter to ensure that participants did in fact have the legal materials available to them 
for a set amount of time.  
Nevertheless, the in-person nature of this experiment also suggests that because these 
specific exclusions were likely not due to someone advancing too quickly through the legal 
materials or outright ignoring that phase of the experiment as was most likely the case in Study 
1, these exclusions could have been caused by some other more complex attention or memory 
component. However, due to the comparatively lower number of participants excluded for this 
reason, this trend had less implications for the predominance of whatever decision making 
paradigm might have led certain participants to forget these factors. In turn, the decision making 
paradigm ultimately used by the remaining participants whose data was analyzed in this study 
could in fact be described as a more predominant decision making paradigm within this 
population.   
 Eye tracking exclusions. As this present study also collected eye tracking data, specific 
exclusion criteria were considered that directly related to these analyses. As a result, an 
additional three participants were excluded because of technical malfunctions during the eye 
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tracking phase. These malfunctions were either due to the complete failure to record eye tracking 
data (n = 1) or to the fact that participants’ average recorded validity scores when viewing the 
legal brief or the defendant photo were greater than 1 (n = 2). Considering these exclusions, the 
remaining participants had an average eye tracking validity of 0.24 when viewing the 
defendant’s legal brief and an average eye tracking validity of 0.26 when viewing the 
defendant’s photograph. Given that these scores were measured on a scale of 0-4 for every single 
collected eye tracking data point, with 0 indicating maximum validity and 4 indicating minimum 
validity, it is possible to conclude that the final average validity of the eye tracking data analysed 
in this experiment is quite high.  
 Reliability analyses. Cronbach's alpha was analyzed in order to insure the reliability for 
each of the scales used in this study. Both the SDO (16 items; α = 0.84) and the SDS (12 items; α 
= 0.88) proved to be highly reliable. Further, the compiled External MRWP scales also had an 
incredibly high level of reliability (15 items; α = 0.92) and maintained this level of reliability 
even when broken down to look specifically at the External MRWP to Black people (5 items; α = 
0.89), the External MRWP to people with mental illnesses (5 items; α = 0.81), and the External 
MRWP to people who use hard drug scales (5 items; α = 0.86). Finally, the compiled Internal 
MRWP scales were also highly reliable (15 items; α = 0.93), as were the isolated Internal 
MRWP to Black people (5 items; α = 0.84), Internal MRWP to people with mental illnesses (5 
items; α = 0.91), and Internal MRWP to people who use hard drugs scales (5 items; α = 0.9.  
 
Results 
 The main goals of this study were to replicate the findings of Study 1 as well as gather 
more precise evidence through eye tracking in order to further explore how mock jurors might be 
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preferencing normative factors when they read about their defendant. This second way of 
measuring mock jurors’ preference for normative influences would allow this study to comment 
on how this foundational aspect of aversive racism paradigms might operate on a nonconscious 
level and could predispose the majority of mock jurors to adopt these biased decision making 
paradigms without their knowledge.  
As such, following the adapted mechanistic aversive racism paradigm outlined in the 
discussion section of Study 1 (Figure 8), it would be hypothesized that all mock jurors whose 
defendant had a history of drug-related mental illnesses would focus more on the normative 
factors outlined in their defendant’s legal brief, focus less on their defendant’s eye-mouth region 
when viewing the image of their defendant, show a preferential memory for their defendant’s 
normative factors, and demonstrate a greater willingness to communicate their explicit biases. 
Further, it would also be hypothesized along the mechanistic paradigm set by Study 1 that mock 
jurors would only show a greater awareness of social pressures to respond without prejudice 
when their defendant was Black and had a history of drug-related mental illness, as only these 
mock jurors would have demonstrated these mechanisms when acting under an aversive racism 
paradigm. Finally, this increased awareness of social motivations should relate to harsher other-
rated juridical decisions. Overall, this study should provide even more evidence that hard drug 
use, even when it is closely related to mental illness, is a negative factor under mechanistic 
aversive racism paradigms.  
 Focus on normative influences. The first set of hypotheses that were tested by this study 
explored mock jurors’ preference for normative decision making modes as a potential foundation 
for the later adoption of aversive racism paradigms in juror decision making settings. In testing 
this hypothesis, this study considered mock jurors’ preferential focus on potentially normative 
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factors when viewing their defendants’ legal brief, differential focus on their defendant’s eye-
mouth region when viewing the defendant’s photograph, and preferential memory for normative 
factors when recalling the details of their defendant’s case during the manipulation check 
questionnaire. If a mock juror was indeed preferencing these normative influences in the same 
way as mock jurors in Study 1, then mock jurors in the NMI conditions should show less of a  
preferential fixation on their defendant’s normative factors in the legal brief, should make more 
fixations on their defendant’s eye-mouth region, and should show the least preferential memory 
for their defendant’s normative factors. This would not only provide even more evidence that 
mock jurors’ preference for normative decision making modes can be influenced by their 
defendant’s secondary characteristics, but would also provide evidence that these normative 
influences have the capacity to change mock jurors’ visual perceptual behaviors in a way that 
might predispose them to adopt aversive racism paradigms during their decision making.  
 However, the present study’s eye tracking analyses failed to support these hypotheses 
(Figure 9). In fact, a 2 (Race: Black or White) X 3 (Mental Health: NMI, MI, MID) factorial 
ANOVA considering mock jurors’ preferential proportional fixations on the normative section of 
the legal brief when compared to their proportional fixations on the informational section of the 
legal brief (normative proportional fixations - informational proportional fixations) found no 
significant main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 1.38, p = 0.27, no significant main effect of 
race F(1,35) = 1.93, p = 0.17, and no significant interactions F(2,35) = 0.12, p = 0.89. Even 
when this preferential fixation on normative factors was analyzed through mock jurors’ 
comparative raw number of fixations, there were still no main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 
0.66, p = 0.53, no main effects of race F(1,35) = 0.14, p = 0.71, or any interactions F(2,35) = 
0.03, p = 0.97. This suggests that the normative factors included in the legal brief did not manage 
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to change mock jurors’ preference for normative decision making modes on a nonconscious 
visual perceptual level.  
Additionally, a similar set of 2 X 3 ANOVAs considering mock jurors’ differences in 
fixations on their defendant’s eye-mouth region also found no significant main effects of mental 
health F(2,35) = 0.14, p = 0.87, no significant main effect of race F(1,35) = 0.76, p = 0.39 and no 
interactions F(2,35) = 0.26, p = 0.77 when considering proportional fixations. Also, when these 
analyses instead considered mock jurors’ raw fixational numbers, they still found no main effects 
of mental health F(2,35) = 0.89, p = 0.42, no main effect of race F(1,35) = 1.16, p = 0.29, and no 
interactions F(2,35) = 0.04, p = 0.96. This yet again shows that, regardless of the potentially 
positive or negative characteristics described in the defendants’ legal brief, mock jurors’ visual 
perceptual behaviors did not vary when they viewed an image of their defendant.  
Even when these results were broken down to focus on mock jurors’ isolated proportional 
fixations and raw number of fixations on each individual AOI (Table 4), almost no significant 
effects were found. The only isolated fixation measure to find any significance was mock jurors’ 
proportional fixation on the section the legal brief that detailed their defendant’s race (Figure 
9C). Here, analyses found a near significant main effect of race such that mock jurors whose 
defendant was Black (M = 0.02) spent slightly more time on average focused on this section of 
the legal brief than mock jurors whose defendant was White (M = 0.01). All of this indicates that 
the only normative visual perceptual behavior mock jurors demonstrated in this study was to 
fixate proportionally longer on the defendant’s race if that defendant was Black.  
While this does provide some evidence that normative factors have the ability to 
influence visual perceptual behaviors, the fact that this effect was caused by the race of a mock 
juror’s defendant rather than the mental health history of their defendant complicated the 
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hypothesized results that would have been expected if these mock jurors were following the 
mechanistic paradigm outlined by Study 1. As a result, it cannot be suggested that the secondary 
extralegal characteristics of a defendant that are related to that defendant’s mental health have 
the ability to differentiate a mock juror’s visual perceptual behavior. Alternatively, it could be 
suggested from these findings that, although these trends were not recorded in Study 1, 
normative factors related to race might have the potential to change certain visual perceptual 
behaviors for factors specifically related to race.  
Nevertheless, when analyzing mock jurors’ preferential memory for normative factors, 
the findings of this study even further deviated from the findings of Study 1. While a 2 X 3 
factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ preferential memory for normative factors found no 
main effects of race F(1,35) = 2.1, p = 0.16 or any interactions F(2,35) = 1.01, p = 0.38, it did 
find a marginally significant main effect of mental health F(2,35) = 2.53, p = 0.08. However, 
LSD post hoc tests clarified that this effect was driven by mock jurors in the MID conditions 
who were not only uniquely shown to have a preferential memory for informational factors (M = 
-0.2), but who were significantly more likely to show this preferential memory for informational 
factors when compared to mock jurors in either the MI conditions (M = 0, p = 0.047) or the NMI 
conditions (M = 0.01, p = 0.047), whereas there were no significant differences between mock 
jurors in the MI and NMI conditions (p = 0.94).  
In turn, this finding that mock jurors whose defendant had a history of drug-related 
mental illness showed a higher preference for informational factors actually indicates that mock 
jurors in these groups were acting in the least normative ways, despite the fact that mock jurors 
whose defendants had no history of mental illness were the only mock jurors to show a 
significantly higher preference for informational factors in Study 1. This is an extremely 
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confusing finding, as it cannot be explained by any of the theoretical, mechanistic, or adapted 
hypotheses of any aversive racism paradigms.  
In conclusion, this study not only failed to find additional evidence to support the 
hypothesis that mock jurors are more likely to operate under normative decision making modes 
when their defendants have a negative secondary characteristic, but also failed to replicate Study 
1’s finding that mock jurors show a preferential memory for normative factors when their 
defendants have secondary extralegal characteristics. The only clear findings this study managed 
to identify were that mock jurors were more likely to fixate on their defendant’s race if their 
defendant was Black and that mock jurors whose defendant had a history of drug-related mental 
illness showed a preferential memory for informational factors when recalling details of the legal 
materials. Again, these findings seem to indicate that mock jurors in this study may not have 
been preferencing normative decision making modes in such a way that would predispose them 
to aversive racism paradigms later on. 
 Willingness to communicate explicit biases. Nevertheless, it is important to 
acknowledge once more that the adoption of a normative decision making mode is only 
tangentially related to aversive racism paradigms. While Study 1 did find some evidence that the 
adoption of this mode could be related to aversively racist decisions, this finding has not been 
supported elsewhere. On the other hand, mechanisms like a willingness to communicate explicit 
biases are more directly seen as crucial to these paradigms on both a theoretical and mechanistic 
level.  
In exploring this mechanism, Study 1 found that mock jurors were more willing to 
communicate their explicit biases when their defendant had a history of drug-related mental 
illness regardless of that defendant’s race. This indicated that it was actually the presence of a 
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negative secondary characteristic that empowered these mock jurors to disclose more of their 
biases and act in generally aversive ways, not the defendant’s race itself. From these findings, it 
could be proposed that this mechanism is also foundational for the later adoption of specifically 
aversively racist paradigms for decision making. In an attempt to replicate these findings from 
Study 1, mock jurors’ willingness to communicate their explicit biases was also explored by this 
experiment. As a result, it was hypothesized that, in line with the findings of Study 1, all mock 
jurors whose defendant had a history of drug-related mental illness should show a greater 
willingness to communicate their explicit biases.  
 However, this study failed to replicate these findings as well. A 2 (Race: Black or White) 
X 3 (NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ overall willingness to 
communicate their feelings of social distance from members of particular groups found no main 
effects of mental health F(2,35) = 0.28, p = 0.76, no main effect of race F(1,35) = 0.08, p = 0.78, 
and no interactions F(3,35) = 1.09, p = 0.35. Even when broken down to consider each 
individual SDS question, no effects or interactions were found (Table 5). This instead shows that 
mock jurors’ willingness to communicate their feelings of social distance from specific groups 
was unrelated to the characteristics of their defendant in this study.  
 Even more detrimental to the mechanistic paradigm proposed in Study 1, a 2 X 3 factorial 
ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ responses to the more general SDO questionnaire also found 
no significant main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 0.72, p = 0.5 or any interactions F(2,35) = 
0.02, p = 0.84. Alternatively, these analyses did find a near significant main effect of race 
F(1,35) = 3.19, p = 0.08, as mock jurors whose defendant was Black (M = 31.3) were slightly 
more willing to support concepts of social dominance than mock jurors whose defendant was 
White (M = 25.46). These results are particularly perplexing, as no theoretical or mechanistic 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
92 
aversive racism paradigm provides an explanation for this difference given that no interactions 
related this effect to the defendant’s secondary characteristics.  
Instead, these findings suggest that mock jurors did not need to encounter any potentially 
negative secondary characteristics in order to feel more willing to communicate their support for 
concepts of social dominance, but that mock jurors only needed to see a Black defendant to show 
this effect. While this could indicate a spillover effect of these mock jurors’ aversive feelings, as 
these questions might have allowed mock jurors to act more aversively without directly 
implicating themselves as racist, it does not indicate that they were operating under a complete 
aversive racism paradigm due to the fact that these results provide no evidence that these mock 
jurors considered the secondary characteristics of their defendant while communicating these 
biases.   
Before moving on, however, it is perhaps important to note that the mock jurors in this 
study provided very different responses to both the SDS and the SDO when compared to the 
responses of mock jurors in Study 1 (Figure 10). In fact, mock jurors in this study overall 
communicated lower feelings of social distance from potentially protected groups (Figure 10A) 
and were overall much less likely to advocate for concepts of social dominance (Figure 10B). 
Even when looking at these mock jurors’ responses to each of the isolated SDS questions that 
focused on this experiment’s conditional factors, the mock jurors in this study showed lower 
feelings of social distance from every group except White people when compared to the mock 
jurors in Study 1 (Figure 10C). As such, it is reasonable to suggest that, in terms of their 
willingness to communicate their explicit biases, the mock jurors of this present study reflect a 
very different population than the population sampled for Study 1.   
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 Awareness of social motivations. In continuing to attempt to replicate the findings of 
Study 1, it is perhaps the most important to consider the mechanistic role of an awareness of 
social motivations to respond without prejudice. Although Study 1 did suggest that normative 
influences and a willingness to communicate explicit biases might be foundation for the later 
adoption of aversive racism paradigms, Study 1 did not explore these mechanisms in a directly 
causal way. As a result, it may be the case that other unknown foundational mechanisms may 
also exist. Overall, the mock jurors in this study may have still been able to adopt aversive 
racism paradigms if they did go on to later consider how their defendant’s extralegal 
characteristics may or may not be protected by others.  
For this mechanism, Study 1 found that mock jurors felt uniquely more aware of social 
pressures to respond without prejudice to Black people, people with mental illnesses, and people 
who use hard drugs when their defendant was Black and had a history of drug-related mental 
illness. This finding clearly supported an aversive racism paradigm, as only mock jurors in the 
condition most likely to operate in aversively racist ways showed this result and indicated that 
they had more closely considered how these motivations might influence their decisions. As 
such, if this study were to replicate Study 1, it would be hypothesized that mock jurors whose 
defendant was Black and had a history of drug related mental illness would yet again 
demonstrate the greatest awareness of these external social motivations.  
 However, the present study once more failed to support this hypothesis. Instead, a 2 
(Race: Black or White) X 3 (Mental Health: NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA focusing on 
mock jurors’ awareness of social motivations to respond without prejudice to each of these 
groups found no significant main effect of mental health F(2,35) = 0.38, p = 0.69 or race F(1,35) 
= 0.77, p = 0.39. Although this ANOVA did find a near significant interaction F(2,35) = 2.82, p 
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= 0.07, this interaction was very different from the one identified in Study 1. Instead, these 
analyses found that, although mock jurors who saw a Black defendant (M = 52.91) seemed to be 
slightly more aware of external pressures to respond without prejudice when compared to mock 
jurors whose defendant was White and had a history of drug-related (M = 40.5) or non-drug-
related mental illness (M = 44.5), mock jurors whose defendant was White and had no history of 
mental illness reported an unusually heightened awareness of social motivations to respond 
without prejudice (M = 59.88). This, yet again, is unexplainable by an aversive racism paradigm, 
as mock jurors whose defendant was White and had no potentially positive or negative secondary 
characteristics should feel the least attuned to social pressures about these groups as they did not 
need to consider these motivations during their decision making.  
 Further, even when these results were broken down to consider each External MRWP 
scale, these results continued to seem perplexing (Table 6). In fact, while no main effects or 
interactions were found for mock jurors’ responses to the External MRWP scale that directly 
measured their feeling of social pressure regarding Black people, the External MRWP to people 
with mental illness scale and the External MRWP to people who use hard drugs scales both 
found near significant and significant interactions respectively. Moreover, the direction of these 
interactions differed. In fact, for the External MRWP to people with mental illnesses scale, all 
mock jurors seemed to report a similar level of awareness of social motivations except for mock 
jurors in the White MID condition, who indicated a much lower awareness. Conversely, the 
External MRWP to people who use hard drugs scale found an interaction which more directly 
resembled that of the compiled scale, as mock jurors in the White NMI condition indicated a 
much higher awareness of social pressures to respond without prejudice to hard drug users, 
especially when compared to other mock jurors whose defendant was White (M = 14.08). Each 
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of these findings sharply diverges from even theoretical aversive racism paradigms, as it suggests 
that mock jurors whose defendant was White were actually more aware of social motivations to 
respond without prejudice to every group except Black people despite the fact that this increased 
awareness should only be felt by mock jurors who acted in aversively racist ways under this 
paradigm.   
 Finally, and also unlike Study 1, this study did indeed find evidence that mock jurors 
were differentially focused on their internal motivations to respond without prejudice because of 
their defendant’s characteristics (Table 6). In fact, each level of these analyses except for the 
specific Internal MRWP to Black people scale all found a significant or near significant effect of 
race. More specifically, mock jurors whose defendant was White (M = 91.8) indicated that they 
were significantly more attuned to these internal motivations to respond without prejudice than 
mock jurors whose defendant was Black (M = 81.38). This finding cleanly deviates from an 
aversive racism paradigm, as these paradigms do not theoretically or mechanistically consider 
these internal motivations. Instead, these internal motivations more directly indicate that mock 
jurors may have been responding to other, more individualized decision making paradigms. 
Furthermore, by suggesting that mock jurors in this study were comparatively more aware of 
these pressures when their defendant was White, this finding also indicates that the variation in 
these motivations was only reported by mock juror that could not have been operating in an 
aversively racist way. All of this suggests that some other decision making paradigm was 
potentially influencing these mock jurors’ responses, especially when these mock jurors viewed 
a White defendant. 
 Juridical decisions. Regardless of whether this study replicated the mechanisms of the 
aversive racism paradigm as they were outlined by Study 1, it was perhaps more important for 
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this study to explore how a defendant’s characteristics might still influence a mock juror’s final 
juridical decisions. In doing so, this study could relate these findings to the past findings of other 
juror decision making research (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2005), and could 
potentially comment on whether those past findings better resemble an aversive racism paradigm 
or some other decision making paradigm.  
Here, Study 1 had two separate findings. First, Study 1 found that mock jurors’ self-rated 
decisions seemed influenced by their defendant’s race, as mock jurors made more lenient 
decisions about Black defendants. These mock jurors’ self-rated culpability decisions also 
seemed influenced by their defendant’s mental health, as mock jurors made more harsh decisions 
about defendants with a history of drug-related mental illness. Second, Study 1 found that mock 
jurors’ other-rated decisions seemed to more closely follow an aversive racism paradigm, as that 
study’s mock jurors made harsher other-rated sentencing decisions when their defendant was 
Black and had a history of drug-related mental illness.  
 For self-rated decisions (Figure 11 A-B), the present study only managed to replicate 
Study 1’s main effect of race. For example, a 2 (Race: Black or White) X 3 (Mental Health: 
NMI, MI, MID) factorial ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ self-rated culpability decisions 
found a significant main effect of race F(1,35) = 8.63, p = 0.01 such that mock jurors whose 
defendant was White (M = 5.83) yet again rated their defendant as more culpable than mock 
jurors whose defendant was Black (M = 4.53). This test did not find any main effects of mental 
health F(2,35) = 0.58, p = 0.57 or any interactions F(2,35) = 0.27, p = 0.76. Alternatively, an 
ANOVA focusing on mock jurors’ self-rated sentencing decisions failed to find any main effect 
of race F(1,35) = 2.08, p = 0.16, any main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 0.19, p = 0.83, or 
any interactions F(2,35) = 0.96, p = 0.39. Overall, these analyses show that these results only 
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differed from the results of Study 1 in that they failed to find any main effect of drug-related 
mental illness, but did reflect the results of Study 1 in that they found that mock jurors’ self-rated 
culpability decisions protected Black defendants.  
 Additionally, like Study 1, this study failed to find any significant main effects of race 
F(1,35) = 0.374, p = 0.55, any main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 0.45, p = 0.64, or any 
interactions F(2,35) = 0.56, p = 0.58 for mock jurors’ other-rated culpability decisions (Figure 
11C). Nevertheless, it also did not find any main effects of race F(1,35) = 0.31, p = 0.58, any 
main effects of mental health F(2,35) = 0.16, p = 0.85, or any interactions F(2,35) = 0.42, p = 
0.66 for mock jurors’ other-rated sentencing decisions (Figure 11D). This completely divorces 
these results from resembling an aversive racism paradigm at all, as it indicates that all mock 
jurors would find their defendants equally culpable and would advocate for similar sentences 
when their decisions were made through the perspectives of other jurors.  
 In turn, although mock jurors’ self-rated decisions demonstrated the same effects of race 
that were found in Study 1, these results still differed from the results of Study 1 in a number of 
ways. First, a defendant’s secondary characteristics never seemed to have an influence of mock 
jurors’ final decisions. Second, the mock jurors in this study showed no significant biases in their 
other-rated decisions. Both of these findings further indicate that the mock jurors in this study 
were not operating in aversively racist ways, as these results clearly demonstrate that they were 
neither considering their defendant’s secondary characteristics as justification for potentially 
biased decisions, nor were they able to act in aversively racist ways when making their decision 
through the perspectives of others. In the end, this study’s mock jurors only acted to protect all 
Black decisions in their self-rated culpability decisions.  
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 Identifying factors for aversive racism. Despite the fact that these analyses failed to 
support an aversive racism paradigm on multiple levels and that mock jurors showed incredibly 
different levels of explicit bias about the groups considered in these analyses when compared to 
the mock jurors in Study 1, it is still interesting to check whether or not these mock jurors were 
overall more or less likely to consider mental illness a positive or negative factor depending on 
its relationship to drug use. As such, the present analyses also compared all mock jurors’ 
responses to the isolated SDS questions relating to Black people, people with schizophrenia, and 
people who use hard drugs as well as all mock jurors’ responses to the External and Internal 
MRWP scales about Black people, people with mental illness, and people who use hard drugs.  
 Like Study 1, this study found that mock jurors not only overwhelmingly reported greater 
feelings of social distance from hard drug users (M = 42.12) when compared to Black people (M 
= 74.22), t(40) = 8.53, p < 0.01, and when compared to people with schizophrenia (M = 62.56), 
t(40) = 7.91, p < 0.01, but that mock jurors also reported greater feelings of social distance from 
people with schizophrenia when compared to Black people, t(40) = 8.53, p < 0.01. However, 
while this study also found that mock jurors reported a lower awareness of social motivations to 
respond without prejudice to hard drug users (M = 14.76) when compared to Black people (M = 
18.8), t(40) = 3.86, p < 0.01, or to people with mental illnesses (M = 14.76), t(40) = 4.13, p < 
0.01, the mock jurors in this study alternatively showed no significant differences in their 
awareness of external motivations to respond without prejudice to people with mental illness 
when compared to their awarenesses of social motivations to protect Black people t(40) = 1.19, p 
= 0.24. This uniquely provides evidence to suggest that, at least within this population, mental 
illness may have been seen as a socially protected factor. Nevertheless, these results were not 
supported by these mock jurors’ awareness of internal motivations. As was the case in Study 1, 
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these mock jurors did indeed demonstrate that they felt less internal motivations to respond 
without prejudice to people who use hard drugs (M = 24.29) when compared to Black people (M 
= 31.8), t(40) = 8.05, p < 0.01, or to people with mental illness (M = 30.1), t(40) = 7.08, p < 0.01, 
but also reported that they felt less internal pressure to respond without prejudice to people with 
mental illness when compared to Black people t(40) = 2.5, p =0.02. 
 While these results seem to reinforce the idea that all mock jurors see drug use as a 
negative factor as well as provide some new evidence that these particular mock jurors felt the 
same social pressure to respond without prejudice to Black people as they did to people with 
mental illness, it is crucial to acknowledge that these trends had no impact on mock jurors’ 
potential aversively racist behavior. In fact, the only influence these factors had regardless of the 
defendant’s race was to lead mock jurors’ whose defendant had a history of drug-related mental 
illness to preferentially remember the informational factors included in the legal brief. All other 
effects observed in this study were due to the defendant’s race, and all observed interactions 
between these secondary characteristics and a defendant’s race were only shown in mock jurors 
whose defendant was White. As a result, any evidence that these factors may or may not be 
positive or negative factors for aversive racism cannot be contextualized in the results of this 
study, as they failed to lead mock jurors to act in mechanistically aversively racist ways at any 
point.  
 
Discussion. 
 In turn, this present study failed to replicate almost every finding from Study 1 and also 
failed to replicate every finding related to aversive racism paradigms. Mock jurors were not more 
likely to preference normative factors based on their defendant’s secondary characteristics, were 
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not more willing to communicate explicit biases when their defendant had a potentially negative 
secondary characteristic, were not uniquely aware of social motivations to respond without 
prejudice when their defendant was Black and had a history of drug-related mental illness, were 
not more likely to be harsh toward these particular defendants in their other-rated sentencing 
decisions, and were not particularly harsh toward defendants with a history of drug-related 
mental illness in their self-rated culpability decisions. Each of these findings, especially those 
that failed to find any influence of the defendant’s secondary characteristics, cleanly separate the 
effects found in this study from a mechanistic aversive racism paradigm on every level.  
The only findings that were replicated from Study 1 were that mock jurors’ self-rated 
culpability decisions seemed to overwhelmingly protect Black defendants and that all mock 
jurors seemed to recognize drug use as a comparatively negative factor according to their explicit 
biases about this group as well as their motivations to protect this group. However, these findings 
still cannot link the results of this study to even theoretical aversive racism paradigms. More 
specifically, theoretical aversive racism paradigms are only interested in the outcomes of 
aversively racist decisions, and the mechanistic paradigm outlined by Study 1 clarifies that these 
decisions are the most likely to be apparent in other-rated juridical decisions. As a result, it is 
unimportant under aversive racism paradigms that the mock jurors in this study reported that 
they saw drug use as a negative factor because that viewpoint never caused any outcomes. 
Further, it is also unimportant under aversive racism paradigms that mock jurors protected Black 
people in juridical decisions that were made from their own perspectives because of a few 
reasons. First, theoretical aversive racism paradigms would take issue with the fact that these 
mock jurors did not also make harsher self-rated juridical decisions about people with negative 
secondary characteristics. Second, mechanistic aversive racism paradigms would primarily want 
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to focus on mock jurors’ other-rated decisions, meaning that any converging results found among 
self-rated juridical decisions would be irrelevant. In short, even the findings of this study that did 
replicate the findings of Study 1 cannot relate these mock jurors’ decision making to an aversive 
racism paradigm. 
A different decision making paradigm. As a result, given that these results failed to 
reflect the mechanisms or theoretical outcomes of aversive racism at any level, a different 
decision making paradigm may be needed in order to explain the mechanisms and outcomes of 
this study. To expand on this claim, it is necessary to take a critical look at the variety of new 
mechanisms that were demonstrated by this study. Through these mechanisms, it may be 
possible to theorize what the specifics of this different decision making paradigm might be.  
The first major mechanistic finding of this study was that, when reading about their 
defendant, these mock jurors already seemed to fixate more on the race of their defendant when 
that defendant was Black. Further, mock jurors whose defendant had a history of drug use 
alternatively seemed to show a preferential memory for informational influences when compared 
to other mock jurors. If we are to continue to assume that normative influences are foundational 
for the later adoption of certain socially biased decision making modes (Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Kaplan, 1984), then it would seem that the mock jurors in this study were more likely to 
begin to operate under normative decision making modes when their defendants were Black, but 
were actually less likely to begin to operate under these modes when their defendant had a 
history of drug-related mental illness.  
Further, this study was only able to find that mock jurors were more willing to 
communicate certain explicit biases when their defendant was Black. More specifically, mock 
jurors who saw a Black defendant made more explicitly biased responses on the general SDO, 
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indicating that they may have been slightly more willing to communicate these non-specific 
feelings of social dominance because of their defendant’s race. If we accept the results of Study 
1 and see this mechanism as also foundational for the later adoption of potentially biased 
decision making modes, then it would seem that only mock jurors whose defendant was Black 
could have been predisposed to these sorts of biased decision making modes. Moreover, given 
that these very same mock jurors were not willing to communicate explicit biases about specific 
groups, it could also be concluded that this increased willingness to communicate explicit biases 
was already attenuated such that it only applied to the most general biases.  
Additionally, mock jurors whose defendant was Black also seemed less aware of internal 
motivations to respond without prejudice to people with mental illness or to people who use hard 
drugs. Most directly, this finding suggests that these mock jurors had, unlike mock jurors whose 
defendant was White, started to take internal motivations to respond without prejudice into 
account during their decision making. Furthermore, the fact that only a handful of mock jurors in 
this study seemed to be more or less aware of social motivations to respond without prejudice 
clarifies that the mock jurors in this study, especially those whose defendant was Black, seemed 
unaffected by the characteristics of their defendant on this particular mechanistic level. In fact, 
only mock jurors who saw a White defendant with no history of mental illness showed an 
increased awareness of social motivations, whereas mock jurors who saw a White defendant with 
a history of drug-related mental illness actually showed a comparatively decreased awareness of 
social motivations.   
Taking all of these motivational trends into account, it is possible to conclude that the 
characteristics of a defendant, or more specifically that defendant’s race, was uniquely able to 
influence the internal motivations of mock jurors. Further, the secondary characteristics of a 
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defendant only seemed to increase a mock juror’s awareness of social motivations when that 
mock juror saw a White defendant who had no secondary characteristics. From this conclusion, 
then, it is possible to suggest that the mock jurors in this study were more likely to focus on 
internal, personal reasons to respond without prejudice when their defendant was Black and were 
only more likely to focus on external, social reasons to respond without prejudice when their 
defendant was White and had no history of mental illness.   
Finally, it is necessary to note that none of these mechanisms that might seem to suggest 
that the mock jurors in this study who saw a Black defendant may be predisposed to biased 
decision making modes managed to lead to traditional racially biased outcomes. Instead, this 
study’s mock jurors were only shown to protect Black defendants despite the fact that these 
earlier mechanisms might have suggested that mock jurors whose defendant was Black were 
more likely to preference normative factors and felt more willing to communicate certain explicit 
biases. From this finding, it is possible to posit that the mock jurors in this study had to have 
somehow overcome these earlier mechanisms in order to arrive as these protective juridical 
decisions.   
 The active moderation of juridical decisions. In response to these complex findings, it 
might be applicable to return to the arguments made by Sommers and Ellsworth (2001, 2009). 
Outlined at the beginning of this project, Sommers and Ellsworth highlight that, when mock 
jurors realize an experiment is about race, such as when they view a Black defendant and 
something about the study makes it obvious that the experimenter is interested in racially salient 
decision making, mock jurors will moderate any negative feelings they have about Black people 
so that their final decisions appear nonracist. This paradigm could explain why mock jurors in 
this study actively made lenient decisions about Black defendants even though these mock jurors 
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also demonstrated that they were operating under normative influences, were more willing to 
communicate their general explicit biases, and were more aware of internal motivations to 
protect other groups. Here, Sommers and Ellsworth would argue that these other possibly racist 
mechanisms ceased to matter when these mock jurors decided to make nonracist juridical 
decisions. In short, Sommers and Ellsworth might explain that the mock jurors in this study who 
encountered a Black defendant actively moderated their final decisions in order to appear less 
racist than they actually were.  
However, similar to the pitfalls of Sommers and Ellsworth’s own analyses (2001), this 
conclusion cannot explain why mock jurors whose defendant was White showed variable 
awarenesses of social motivations, as their paradigm only begins to explain the decision making 
processes of people who are trying to act in these nonracist ways. Their paradigm does not, for 
example, focus on the psychological mechanisms of mock jurors who view a White defendant, 
even if that defendant has other potentially biasing secondary characteristics. Further, given that 
this particular study did not make race salient to mock jurors whose defendant was White at the 
point that they made their juridical decisions, Sommers and Ellsworth’s conclusions also cannot 
explain why these mock jurors made comparatively harsher decisions about their defendant’s 
culpability when they were answering from their own perspective, as they do not outline any 
reason why these mock jurors would have made this decision. In turn, Sommers and Ellsworth 
can only explain the juridical decisions of mock jurors who were actively trying to hide their 
racist beliefs.  
On a more meta-analytic level, these analyses that focus on the effect of a study’s racial 
salience may not be able to explain why the mechanisms and outcomes of the mock jurors in this 
study differed so severely from the mock jurors in Study 1, as the methods of both studies were 
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virtually the same. The only possible methodological aspects of this study that could have made 
race more salient was its in-person nature or the fact that the experimenter was present during the 
study. This could have made any assumed intentions or motivations of the experimenter slightly 
more salient to mock jurors in this present study. However, even Sommers and Ellsworth 
theorize that the mere proximity of an authority figure like professional legal actors or an 
experimenter should not overwhelm a juror’s decision making if mock jurors are in fact focused 
on the decision making of their group rather than on their own internal motivations (2001). 
Furthermore, conducting studies in-person has never been implicated as necessarily preventing 
experiments from finding evidence of racial biases (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mitchell et al., 
2005). Nevertheless, as some mock jurors in this study did show variable internal motivations to 
respond without prejudice and Sommers and Ellsworth do suggest that this may be indicative of 
decision making paradigms that respond to the social motivations of an experimenter in 
particular (2001), it is still important to note that this particular methodological aspect may have 
played some role in the mechanisms and outcomes of some of this study’s mock jurors.   
 Limitations. Nonetheless, it not be particularly necessary to labor over the mechanisms 
or outcomes of these mock jurors’ decision making processes because of this present study’s 
numerous limitations. First and foremost, this study focused on an extremely small sample size, 
even when compared to Study 1’s reduced sample. As a result, each condition only had 7 or 8 
mock jurors, and one condition, the White MID condition, only had 4 mock jurors because two 
were excluded on eye tracking criteria and two others were excluded on manipulation check 
criteria. Overall, these extremely small sample sizes may have led a few mock jurors’ data to 
greatly influence the trends of their condition.  
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 Eye Tracking Limitations. Moreover, while this study uniquely attempted to find 
evidence that would suggest that normative visual perceptual behaviors are foundational for the 
adoption of aversive racism paradigms or other biased decision making paradigms, this present 
study failed to reflect the findings of any of the past studies that have indeed implicated that 
visual perceptual behaviors can be biased by potentially normative influences (Bruner & 
Goodman, 1947; Gobel et al., 2015; Granot et al., 2014; Risko et al., 2016; Rothkirch et al., 
2015; Stern et al., 2016). Indeed, this study only found evidence through one of two possible 
measures relating to a preferential focus on the defendant’s race that mock jurors’ visual 
perceptual behaviors were influenced by the characteristics of their defendant. As a result, this 
present study’s eye tracking data may have been limited in some way when compared to these 
past studies.  
For example, it is possible to argue that this study’s results were limited due to the 
amount time the legal materials were available on the screen. Past studies that have used eye 
tracking methods have recognized that the time a stimulus is presented on the screen might be 
closely related to these how participants preference certain influences (Pärnamets et al., 2015; 
Risko et al., 2016). Although these researchers have been divided on whether participants are 
more likely to act in normative ways immediately and become less normatively influenced with 
time (Pärnamets et al., 2015) or whether participants are less likely to act in normative ways 
immediately and only become normatively influenced as they become accustomed to the eye 
tracker (Risko et al., 2016), it is possible that the particular amount of time this study’s visual 
stimuli were presented on the screen may have inhibited participants’ visual perceptual behaviors 
from becoming normatively influenced.  
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Furthermore, this study’s eye tracking methodologies were slightly unique when 
compared to past complex decision making studies that have found that visual perceptual 
behaviors can become normatively influenced. First, it is important to note that the legal brief 
was presented onscreen for a full minute. If it is the case that normative decision making modes 
happen immediately and people only begin to correct for these biases with time (Pärnamets et al., 
2015), then it is possible that the mock jurors in this study were able to later return to certain 
factors they would have neglected if they had more of a time pressure. Alternatively, if it is the 
case that normative decision making modes are only adopted once participants become 
accustomed to the eye tracker, then it is possible that the mock jurors in this study never started 
to become less aware of the eye tracker’s presence. For instance, it may have been the case that 
past findings that have managed to link normatively influenced visual perceptual processes to 
juror decision making were only able to do so because they utilized constantly updating video 
visual stimuli and because their particular eye tracker was hidden from their participants’ 
awareness (Granot et al., 2014). As such, the findings of this study cannot stand as clear evidence 
that mock jurors do or do not make normatively influenced visual perceptions, but should instead 
stand as evidence that, under some circumstances, methodological aspects may in fact lead mock 
jurors to begin to act in less biased ways on a visual perceptual level. As a result, future research 
that takes these methodological limitations into account would be necessary in order for any of 
this study’s eye tracking analyses to stand.     
 Implications for a unique population. Additionally, this study’s sample reflected a 
potentially unique population. First, this study’s mock jurors much younger than the mock jurors 
in Study 1 and were also from a college population unlike the mock jurors in Study 1. Both of 
these factors have been implicated as factors that may make populations less likely to 
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demonstrate juridical biases (Mitchell et al., 2005). Second, and perhaps more importantly, these 
mock jurors also reported overall much lower explicit biases than were reported by the mock 
juror in Study 1. In fact, the mock jurors in this study not only showed noticeably lower average 
responses to each of the SDO questions (M = 1.78) when compared to mock jurors in Study 1 (M 
= 2.8), but they also showed lower average responses to these questions when compared to the 
published average responses that have been outlined by analyses that considered the responses of 
hundreds of people (M = 2.9, Pratto et al., 1994). This indicates that the mock jurors in this study 
not only differed from the mock jurors sampled in Study 1, but that these mock jurors, unlike 
Study 1’s, also differed from the general population in that they were overall less likely to 
advocate for concepts of social dominance than average people.  
Furthermore, this particular limitation has its own enormous implications for why these 
mock jurors’ decision making processes mechanistically differed from the decision making 
processes of Study 1’s mock jurors. In fact, past studies have acknowledged that a person’s 
reported social dominance orientation can be closely related to how they participate in juridical 
settings (Huggon, 2012). Crucial to this present study’s results, these past studies have concluded 
that mock jurors with particularly low social dominance orientations are actually more likely to 
actively moderate any biases they may feel when making juridical decisions.  
As such, the unusual social dominance orientations of this study’s mock jurors could 
potentially explain some of this experiment’s more perplexing results in a way that could not be 
explained by Sommers and Ellsworth’s conclusions alone. More specifically, this populations’ 
low social dominance orientations could explain why mock jurors whose defendant was White 
and had no history of mental illness showed a heightened awareness of social motivations, as 
these past findings would clarify that these mock jurors were the only mock jurors that never 
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encountered any extralegal characteristics that might have led them to feel the need to moderate 
their responses on that questionnaire. Alternatively, these past findings would explain that mock 
jurors whose defendant was White and did have a history of drug-related mental illness may 
have reported a lower awareness of social motivations to protect people with mental illness or 
may have increased their focus on that defendant’s informational factors in an attempt to 
moderate their own biases about their defendant’s secondary extralegal characteristics. All of 
these explanations are only further supported by the fact that mock jurors in all of the White 
conditions did in fact report an overall lower willingness to advocate for concepts of social 
dominance, as this would indicate that these lower social dominance orientations are what led 
some mock jurors whose defendants were White to seemingly moderate their responses, even 
during their final juridical decisions, despite the fact that there is no other apparent reason why 
they might have done so.  
Ultimately, this study’s findings may reflect the decision making processes of a 
population that has a uniquely powerful desire to moderate all of their biases, including those 
unrelated to race. As such, these mock jurors would not have sought out an aversive racism 
paradigm in order to justify their biases nor would they have relied exclusively on a paradigm 
related to racial salience. Instead, these mock juror’s social dominance orientations would have 
led them to want to moderate all of their biases about each of their defendants’ extralegal 
characteristics. In conclusion, these results do in fact represent an entirely different paradigm for 
juror decision making.  
Future directions. However, this difference may be due to a few unusual participants or, 
even if the trends of this group were to hold up in a similar but larger sample size, may be due to 
the influence of these mock jurors’ exceptionally low social dominance orientations. Moreover, 
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given that this participant pool does reflect such an unusual population, it is perhaps less 
important for future research to investigate the mechanisms of their decision making as they 
likely represent a very small facet of the mock jurors that have been considered or would be 
considered in other studies and they also likely represent a very small facet of people who are 
likely to become real-world jurors and influence naturalistic juror decision making trends. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study can provide interesting insights, especially when put in 
context with the findings of Study 1.  
 
General Discussion 
 Ultimately, these two studies provide a plethora of information that might contribute to 
our understanding of juror decision making. First, Study 1 was able to, for the very first time, 
explore the mechanisms of aversive racism paradigms that have only ever been theoretically 
linked to aversively racist decision making processes. Second, Study 2, despite the fact that it 
was unable to replicate Study 1, did in fact provide interesting data that might complicate our 
understanding of juror decision making even under mechanistic aversive racism paradigms. 
Finally, both of these studies provide complex evidence that might suggest the need for future 
research into the ways a defendant’s history of drug use might influence juror decision making or 
that might even suggest the need for a major shift in the way we pursue juridical reforms.    
 
A Proposed Mechanistic Aversive Racism Paradigm 
In Study 1, the proposed theoretical mechanisms of aversive racism were explored in 
synthesis for the very first time. More specifically, the ways that a defendant’s extralegal 
characteristics either do or do not change these mechanisms was directly tested. For example, it 
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was clarified that the negative secondary characteristics of a defendant alone have the capacity to 
change a mock juror’s preference for normative influences or willingness to communicate 
explicit biases. Further, it was also experimentally shown that mock jurors are in fact more likely 
to demonstrate an awareness of social motivations to respond without prejudice when they see a 
defendant that is both Black and has a negative secondary characteristic. Finally, it was specified 
that these very same mock jurors will only demonstrate juridical biases about a Black defendant 
with negative secondary characteristics when their decisions are framed through the perspectives 
of others.  
 These findings allow for juror decision making researchers to begin to construct a more 
clear mechanistic aversive racism paradigm. For instance, these findings suggest that both a 
preference for normative decision making modes and an increased willingness to communicate 
explicit biases might be foundational for the later adoption of biased paradigms for decision 
making like the aversive racism paradigm. Furthermore, these findings also suggest that aversive 
racism paradigms may in fact be predominant in group-based juridical decisions, as they support 
the idea that a heightened awareness of social motivations may be related to juridical decisions 
when those decisions take these social motivations into account.  
 However, this adapted mechanistic aversive racism paradigm necessitates future research 
if this paradigm hopes to be used to directly comment on larger juror decision making trends. For 
example, each of these mechanisms was explored in isolation. Due to the methodology of this 
study, questions relating to mock jurors’ willingness to communicate explicit biases and 
awareness of motivations to respond without prejudice were only asked after these mock jurors 
had already made their final juridical decisions. As such, it is hard to prove from these analyses 
that any one mechanism causes the outcome of the next. Study 1 can only provide isolated 
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evidence that this mechanistic aversive racism paradigm could be functionally sound. Future 
studies are needed in order to more directly investigate whether, for instance, changes in a mock 
juror’s awareness of social motivations itself could cause a mock juror to alter their juridical 
decisions when those decisions are framed through the perspectives of others. Nonetheless, given 
the results of Study 1, those future studies are more overtly justified.  
 Additionally, other meta-analyses that more directly take into account how juror decision 
making researchers have been framing the language of their culpability or sentencing decisions 
are also necessary if these findings hope to comment on what might have caused the variability 
in past studies. If it is the case that all past studies have actually framed their final juridical 
decisions in such a way that mock jurors are not reminded that they would need to take the 
possible perspectives of others into account, then it would seem to be the case that the results of 
past meta-analyses could not be explained though Study 1’s proposed mechanistic model of 
aversive racism.  
Regardless, the fact that Study 1 did find that mock jurors were more likely to operate in 
aversively racist ways when their decisions were framed through the perspectives of others 
would, without needing to relate to past studies that have had their mock jurors make decision in 
isolation, support the idea that future juror decision making studies that do hope to 
methodologically reflect the real-world thought processes of jurors should consider how aversive 
racism might influence their results. However, as Study 1 only had mock jurors imagine what 
this group decision making process might be like, it is also important for future studies to test 
how this mechanistic aversive racism paradigm might hold up in actual simulated group 
decisions. These particular experiments are necessary in order to more directly relate the findings 
of Study 1 to the lived experiences of real-world jurors.  
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Conversely, it is important to consider how the limitations of this study may prevent it 
from wholeheartedly supporting the idea that jurors will be biased when they make decisions 
from the perspectives of other. For instance, it is presently inexplicable why mock jurors in this 
study only made aversively racist sentencing decisions when asked to frame their decisions 
through the perspectives of others. While Study 2 hoped to explore whether certain 
methodological aspects may have limited a mock juror’s response to the other-rated culpability 
question, the fact that Study 2’s mock jurors operated under a completely different decision 
making paradigm means that these studies cannot assume that these methodological limitations 
caused this confusing outcome. As a result, future studies should consider these possible 
limitations when constructing their experimental designs, but should also begin to explore other 
possible explanations as to why participants may be responding differently on each of these 
juridical questions.  
Further, some may claim that these studies’ results cannot speak to past or future juror 
decision making research because these studies opted to include non-White participants. The 
field of juror decision making research has indeed almost exclusively observed the behaviors of 
solely White mock jurors (Cohn et al., 2012; Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mazzella et al., 1994; 
Mitchell et al., 2005; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). Moreover, recent reports have indicated that 
when Black community members are included in juries, most juridical racial biases disappear 
(Anwar et al., 2012). These sorts of findings do in fact make a field-wide focus on the decision 
making of White jurors particularly compelling. In turn, future research may claim that the 
results of this study speak to a population that is separate from the populations that this field 
seeks to test. 
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However, given that the mock jurors in these present studies were indeed predominantly 
White (64.3 % in Study 1 and 73.2% in Study 2) and that these present studies had very few 
Black participants (8.6% in Study 1 and 2.4% in Study 2), they are still capable of existing 
within this research field, even if that field continues to overwhelmingly focus on all-White 
populations. For instance, the predominance of White participants in these studies suggests that it 
is still possible to conclude that the general trends of these studies do more closely reflect the 
decision making processes of White jurors. Nevertheless, this field may want to acknowledge 
that the results of Study 1 do begin to suggest that these sorts of aversively racist trends are not 
only identifiable within all-White participant pools, but can also be identified when other non-
White participants are included. In the end, this particular limitation does not necessarily 
delegitimize the findings of Study 1, but instead suggests that aversive racism paradigms may 
actually apply to a variety of White and non-White jurors.  
 
Implications of Study 2’s Results 
Alternatively, the most perplexing aspect of these present studies was Study 2’s 
identification of an entirely different paradigm for juror decision making. In this case, mock 
jurors did not act in aversively racist ways. Instead, there is some admittedly statistically suspect 
evidence that Study 2’s mock jurors may have been attempting to moderate their biases about 
any potentially disadvantaged group due to their social dominance orientations, leading even 
mock jurors whose defendant was White to show possibly moderated results in this study.  
While future research into the mechanisms of this process could be considered, as studies 
may want to explore what happens when mock jurors are explicitly told to act like the mock 
jurors in Study 2 and try to be impartial to all defendants by moderating their explicit biases 
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about all of their defendant’s extralegal characteristics, it is unlikely that most juror decision 
making biases are currently the result of these sorts of decision making processes due to the 
specific and uncommon attributes of this population. In turn, it is perhaps more important for the 
field to focus on the decision making processes of populations that more directly represent the 
general population, such as those sampled by Study 1.  
Nevertheless, some of the ways a defendant’s extralegal characteristics did manage to 
influence the responses of Study 2’s mock jurors could have implications for the mechanisms of 
aversive racism paradigms. For example, if we are to assume that the results of Study 2 were due 
to these mock jurors’ desire to moderate their biases about disadvantaged groups, then it is 
incredibly illuminating that mock jurors who saw a Black defendant were still more likely to 
preferentially fixate on their defendant’s race, were slightly more likely to advocate for concepts 
of social dominance, and were uniquely less likely to demonstrate an awareness of internal 
motivations to respond without prejudice to people with mental illnesses or people who use hard 
drugs. These findings might suggest that these responses to a defendant’s race could not have 
been actively moderated. This would implicate these processes as implicit, and would suggest 
that they might make up some of the implicit aspects of other decision making processes like 
those outlined by aversive racism paradigms.  
Further, the aspects of Study 2’s results that diverged from the results of Study 1, such as 
the fact that mock jurors did sometimes show differences in their preferential memory for 
informational factors, did not show differences in their willingness to communicate their feelings 
of social distance from specific groups, and did not show differences in their awareness of 
external social motivations because of their defendant’s race, might represent aspects of these 
mock jurors’ decision making that could be actively moderated. As such, these findings might 
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suggest that these responses to a defendant’s extralegal characteristics could be actively 
moderated. This would implicate these processes as more explicit, and would suggest that they 
might make up the explicit aspects of aversive racism paradigms. Nevertheless, future research is 
necessary in order to investigate whether this is in fact the case in more general populations, or 
even whether mock jurors could also manage to moderate these other processes in the absence of 
personality factors like a low social dominance orientation. 
 
Normative Decision Making Modes 
Additionally, it is especially important to directly acknowledge where the findings of 
these two very different studies did begin to converge. First, both of these studies did find that 
mock jurors’ likelihood to preference normative factors could change depending on some of their 
defendant’s extralegal characteristics. While these normative decision making modes were 
adopted by very different groups for apparently different reasons, both of these studies support 
the idea that even if mock jurors represent very different populations, they still tend to seek out 
normative influences under some conditions and not seek out normative influences under other 
conditions.  
As such, these present studies indicate that it is unlikely that normative decision making 
is a foundation for all juror decision making, or even that there is a uniform way that potential 
jurors come to adopt and use this decision making mode. However, if we are to focus on the 
most likely way that mock jurors seek out these normative decision making modes in order to 
inform future research or inform widely applicable juridical reforms, then it is perhaps best to 
consider the ways these normative modes operated within Study 1’s population. As a result, it is 
crucial for the sorts of endeavors that hope to make juror decision making more egalitarian to 
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consider how secondary extralegal characteristics are discussed in legal settings, as they may 
begin to lead some jurors down a path that ends in more biased decisions.  
Further, given that these secondary characteristics also began to influence mock jurors 
even when their defendants were White, it is may be necessary to begin to apply the language of 
normative decision making modes and a consideration of how normative influences can be 
associated with a variety of extralegal characteristics to cases that are not likely to be directly 
influenced by the race of a defendant. Nevertheless, the fact that the interaction between race and 
these secondary extralegal characteristics uniquely led to particularly harsh decisions when 
juridical decisions were framed in a more naturalistic way might suggest that it is more important 
to continue to base our discussion of normative influences around the ways these influences go 
on to empower paradigms like the aversive racism paradigm. However, future research is still 
needed in order to fully claim that normative influences will predispose the vast majority of 
people to these particular normative decision making modes that cause them to adopt aversive 
racism paradigms during their decision making, as Study 1 can only provide evidence that 
merely demonstrates that normative influences might be linked to aversively racist decision 
making when mock jurors are actually able to remember their defendant’s characteristics.  
 
A Defendant’s History of Drug Use 
Moreover, both of these studies managed to provide evidence that all of the mock jurors 
included in these analyses considered drug use a potentially negative secondary characteristic. 
Although only mock jurors in Study 1 acted on these sorts of biases, the fact that even the mock 
jurors in Study 2 who may have moderated the ways they made decisions about defendants with 
this characteristic demonstrated this bias does have implications for how all jurors may treat 
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defendants with a history of hard drug use, even when that hard drug use is both explained using 
mental health-related language and when that drug use is not directly related to the crime a 
defendant is being charged for.  
For example, it is possible that, although the mock jurors in Study 2 were able to 
moderate their biases about hard drug users when making their decisions in isolation, they may 
still be at risk for other conformity influences that would exist in real-world group decision 
making settings. This suggestion becomes more compelling when one considers past findings 
that have shown that mock jurors will revise lenient decisions when they realize that other people 
have made more harsh decisions than they have (Fabbri & Carbonara, 2017) or the findings that 
show that mock jurors that realize they are in the minority are likely to change their decisions in 
order to appeal to the majority opinion of their fellow jurors despite their own value systems 
(Nemeth & Goncalo, 2005). Since the mock jurors in Study 2 already did seem to indicate that 
they felt more socially distant from hard drug users and since many of Study 2’s decision making 
processes can be related to the sorts of paradigms that primarily exist in isolated experimental 
settings (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), they may in fact stop moderating their biases about 
members of this group if they were to face these direct group-based pressures to do so. 
Nevertheless, future, more overtly group-based studies would be needed in order to fully draw 
these sorts of conclusions.  
 
Juridical Reforms and the Construction of a New Racial Bias  
Finally, it is interesting that, when all mock jurors were asked to determine their 
defendant’s culpability from their own perspectives, mock jurors in both Study 1 and Study 2 
seemed to punish White defendants. Again, while current juries do not make decisions within 
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this isolated decision making context, many of the potential juridical reforms that may be 
implicated by the results of this study involve the devaluation of external pressures and an 
adoption of more individualized, albeit informational, decision making modes. For example, 
Kaplan suggested that if normative decision making modes are found to lead jurors to make 
biased decisions, as was the case in Study 1, then courtroom actors should overtly attempt to 
remind jurors that they should not care about how their decisions relate to the social motivations 
of their fellow jurors (1984). As a result, it may be the case that these reforms that attempt to fix 
problems caused by aversive racism paradigms actually lead jurors to act in more discriminatory 
ways toward White defendants.  
Ethically, this is an extremely important problem that any research into juror decision 
making needs to consider. The commonly unspoken goal underlying most juror decision making 
research, including this specific research project, is to identify ways to make juror decisions 
more egalitarian in order to uphold the symbolic “blindness” we would idealistically want in our 
justice system. If it is the case that these experimentally-informed reforms are in fact creating 
new biases in order to correct for old biases, then this would fundamentally shift the way juror 
decision making researchers need to view the outcomes of their findings. In turn, we may need to 
embrace the idea that this egalitarian blindness is merely a symbol that we strive for that can 
never be a true reality.  
For instance, legal theorist Shoshana Feldman considered, among many other things, 
what happens when juries attempt to fix past societal traumas or legal disenfranchisements 
within a courtroom (1997). More specifically, she analyzed the O.J. Simpson trial as evidentiary 
of a case that attempted to overcome a lack of legal egalitarianism on a number of levels. On one 
level, this case was responding to the historical legal disenfranchisement of Black men, but, on 
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another level, this case was responding to the historical lack of legal reciprocity for domestic 
violence. Ultimately, Feldman concludes that although the verdict of this trial represented a 
unique point within the justice system that managed to correct for the historical 
disenfranchisement of Black men, it only furthered the historical disenfranchisement of domestic 
abuse victims. Overall, Feldman’s analyses highlight that any attempts to make juridical 
decisions that are more egalitarian on certain levels have the capacity to reinforce 
disenfranchisement on other levels. 
And while the present studies’ mock jurors were not reinforcing past biases but were 
instead constructing new biases about White men, this tradeoff is still something that needs to be 
considered. For example, reforms that are specifically based in aversive racism may not be able 
to fully address the biases that were faced by White drug users in Study 1. Moreover, the 
structure of courtrooms, which require their imperfect actors to make extremely complex 
decisions, may still be influenced by the values and perspectives of the actors within them. The 
question we must ask ourselves, then, may not be whether we can construct a justice system that 
reflects Gieng’s symbolic ideals, but whether we can begin to construct a justice system that 
better responds to our current social goals.  
As a result, our duty as jurors may not be to combat the biases of legal professionals by 
acting in perfectly objective egalitarian ways, but to instead combat legal discrimination by 
protecting those who need the help of their community. Presently, given the extreme violence 
faced by Black men within the justice system, it is perhaps necessary that we as a society begin 
to reform our justice system not so that it upholds an impossible egalitarian ideal, but so that it 
begins to protect this group even if this protection leads to the comparative disenfranchizement 
of some others. As was seen in both Study 1 and Study 2’s population, it is perhaps possible, 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
121 
even if we cannot strip ourselves of every influence of our societally imbued biases, to begin to 
limit the way we as jurors make biased decisions about Black people. We simply need to place 
the onus of our juridical decisions on ourselves.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the findings of both of these studies can begin to provide necessary 
mechanistic explanations for multiple juror decision making paradigms. Study 1, for the first 
time, explored the mechanistic underpinnings of aversive racism paradigms and in turn 
highlighted that a defendant’s secondary extralegal characteristics can in fact influence each of 
these mechanisms. And, although Study 2 mainly meant to replicate these findings, it instead 
managed to explain how a mock juror’s social dominance orientation could be related to the 
active process of moderating one’s final juridical decisions in order to appear less biased even 
when those biases are not specifically racist. In conclusion, both of these findings can possibly 
explain certain reasons why past juror decision making research has found such variable results.  
Furthermore, these findings have major implications for future research and for future 
juridical reforms. First, these findings provide direct evidence that aversive racism paradigms are 
better able to lead mock jurors to make biased decisions when they are asked to consider the 
possible opinions of their fellow jurors. This would indicate that, even if past research has not 
had their mock jurors consider these perspectives, any future research that hopes to comment on 
the naturalistic biases of jurors should adopt these group-based methodologies and consider the 
role of aversive racism paradigms.  
Finally, these findings begin to suggest that even if we were to implement some of the 
juridical reforms that have been implicated by past studies like this one, these reforms may never 
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achieve perfect egalitarianism. Given that these present studies’ mock jurors, in adopting more 
informational decision making modes and disregarding the biasing influences of others, started 
to act in more biased ways toward White defendants, a fundamental ethical shift is perhaps 
necessary within the field of psychological juror decision making research. Perhaps we as a field 
should not dedicate our efforts to discovering an entirely symbolic egalitarian justice system, but 
should instead dedicate our efforts to combatting the most egregious discriminatory patterns 
within our justice system, such as the intolerable treatment of Black men, especially Black drug 
users, that currently dominates the American Justice system. As was quoted at the start of this 
project, author Primo Levi one stated that countries are only considered civilized when their laws 
protect the most vulnerable among us. As a research field and as a society, it may be necessary 
for us to hear these sorts of ethical accounts and realign our goals so that we deprioritize the 
myth of perfect egalitarianism and instead begin to address the greatest points of 
disenfranchisement within our country.  
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Tables 
Factor Mean -  
Black Photo 
Mean -  
White Photo 
Z-Score -  
Black Photo 
Z-Score -  
White Photo  
Split Z-Score - 
Black Photo 
Split Z-Score - 
White Photo  
Age 27.86 30.4 -0.13 0.26 -0.29 0.47 
Attractiveness 3.57 3.26 1.26 0.86 1.81 0.49 
Trustworthiness 2.95 3.08 0.22 0.44 0.95 -0.38 
Threateningness 1.66 3.06 -0.7 1.74 -0.2 1.16 
Racial 
Prototypicality 
4.88 4.02 0.66 -0.22 -0.16 0.63 
 
Table 1. Defendant Photograph Norming Ratings for Relevant Factors. For these analyses, attractiveness 
(M=2.67, SD=0.68), trustworthiness (M=2.81, SD=0.62), and threateningness (M=2.06, SD=0.57) were rated on a 
scale of  1-7, whereas racial prototypicality (M=4.23, SD=0.99) was rated on a scale of 1-5. The only trait shown 
above that was not properly matched was threateningness. However, while studies have shown that attractiveness 
(Gunnell & Ceci, 2010), trustworthiness (Korva et al., 2013, Porter et al., 2010), and racial prototypicality (Osborne 
et al., 2016) can impact juror decision making, no studies have isolated facial threateningness as an independent 
factor capable of influencing juror decisions. Finally, matching was completed based on compiled Z-scores, not split 
Z-scores, in order to achieve the closest trait-based matching. Split Z-scores are included in this chart because there 
was a significant effect of race on trustworthiness t(184) = 12.013, p < 0.01, threateningness t(184) = 24.388, p 
<0.01, and racial prototypicality t(184) = 24.294, p < 0.01 such that Black photographs were rated less trustworthy, 
less threatening, and more racially prototypical than White photographs. As a result, split Z-scores were included in 
order to note that, even on traits that were significantly different, each selected photograph was still representative of 
their own racial group on possible confounding factors as well.  
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SDS 
Question 
Mean (SE) 
Black 
Mean (SE) 
White 
ME Race 
p-Value 
Mean (SE) 
NMI 
Mean (SE) 
MI 
Mean (SE) 
MID 
ME MH 
p-Value 
Interaction 
p-Value 
Black 61.13  
(3.57) 
66.3  
(3.48) 
0.3 72.17  
(4.03) 
64.78  
(4.21) 
54.2  
(4.68) 
0.02 **  0.97 
White 65.87  
(3.18) 
68.59  
(3.1) 
0.54 70.43  
(3.6) 
71.2  
(3.76) 
60.07  
(4.17) 
0.097 * 0.85 
Schizo- 
phrenic 
45.1 
(3.84) 
51.53  
(3.75) 
0.23 53.63  
(4.34) 
52.99  
(4.53) 
38.32  
(5.03) 
0.045 ** 0.84 
Hard 
Drugs 
23.52  
(3.68) 
32.28  
(3.57) 
0.09 * 29.63  
(4.17) 
27.68  
(4.32) 
26.4  
(4.79) 
0.86 0.91 
Latinx 51.65  
(3.61) 
65.15  
(3.16) 
0.01 ** 63.84  
(4.09) 
61.01  
(4.27) 
50.34  
(4.74) 
0.09 * 0.94 
Elderly 67.33  
(3.67) 
67.42  
(3.58) 
0.99 72.43  
(4.15) 
71.45  
(4.33) 
58.25  
(4.81) 
0.06 * 0.376 
Teens 59.41  
(3.64) 
56.97  
(3.55) 
0.63 63.94  
(4.12) 
61.02  
(4.3) 
49.6  
(4.77) 
0.07 * 0.9 
Soft 
Drugs 
42.65  
(4.23) 
51.74  
(4.13) 
0.13 50.84  
(4.79) 
50.9  
(5) 
39.85  
(5.55) 
0.25 0.99 
Poor 67.08  
(3.68) 
63.24 
(3.59) 
0.46 72.45  
(4.17) 
65.63  
(4.35) 
57.4  
(4.83) 
0.07 * 0.46 
Wealthy 46.54  
(3.63) 
45.71  
(3.54) 
0.87 51.84  
(4.1) 
49.33  
(4.28) 
37.21  
(4.75) 
0.06 0.84 
Men 63.88  
(3.23) 
65.51  
(3.15) 
0.72 72.46  
(3.66) 
65.8  
(3.82) 
55.82  
(4.24) 
0.02 ** 0.67 
Women 73.53  
(3.13) 
71.54  
(3.05) 
0.65 79.15  
(3.53) 
75.93  
(3.69) 
62.51  
(4.1) 
0.01 ** 0.61 
Compiled 671.91 
(28.19) 
705.97 
(27.3) 
0.39 759.16 
(32.05) 
717.7 
(33.04) 
589.96 
(36.69) 
0.003 ** 0.94 
 
Table 2. Responses to Isolated SDS Questions by Race and by Mental Health for Study 1. For this table, a (*) 
indicates significance at p < 0.1 and (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. For all isolated responses, mock jurors 
answered on a scale from 0-100, with 0 representing the maximum possible feelings of social distance. For the 
compiled responses, the combination of each individual scale resulted in a possible range of responses from 0-1200, 
with 0 still representing the maximum possible feelings of social distance. LSD post hoc tests revealed that, for all of 
these main effects of mental health, mock jurors in the MID conditions reported significantly or near significantly 
more feelings of social distance than mock jurors in either the MI or NMI conditions, except for the SDS question 
related to poor people, where mock jurors in the MID condition were only significantly different from mock jurors 
in the NMI conditions.   
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MRWP External 
Black 
External 
MI 
External 
Drug 
External 
Compiled 
Internal 
Black 
Internal 
MI 
Internal  
Drug 
Internal 
Compiled 
ME MH 0.09 * 0.31 0.03 ** 0.08 * 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.16 
ME Race 0.61 0.82 0.8 0.83 0.41 0.2 0.97 0.41 
Interaction 0.07 * 0.03 ** 0.06 * 0.04 ** 0.99 0.58 0.12 0.59 
 
Table 3. Significance of External and Internal MRWP Scales for Study 1. For this table, a (*) indicates 
significance at p < 0.1 and (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. LSD post hoc tests revealed that all significant 
interactions were due to mock jurors in the Black MID condition.  
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Fixation Mean (SE)  
Black 
Mean (SE) 
White 
ME Race 
p-value 
Mean (SE)  
NMI 
Mean (SE) 
MI 
Mean (SE) 
MID 
ME MH  
p-value 
Interaction 
p-Value 
Norm - Info 
Proportional 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
-0.1  
(0.05) 
0.17 -0.12  
(0.06) 
0.02  
(0.06) 
-0.06  
(0.07) 
0.27  0.89 
Norm - Info  
Raw Fixations 
-322.7 
(192.32) 
-218.75 
(198.82) 
0.71 -208.14 
(218.28) 
-106.23 
(240.44) 
-497.81 
(258.27) 
0.53 0.97 
Normative 
Proportional 
0.4  
(0.02) 
0.36  
(0.03) 
0.27 0.343  
(0.03) 
0.413  
(0.03) 
0.373  
(0.03) 
0.25 0.90 
Normative  
Raw Fixations 
1245.65 
(87.36) 
1354.46 
(90.31) 
0.39 1343.68 
(99.15) 
1357.86 
(109.22) 
1198.63 
(117.32) 
0.55 0.79 
Informational 
Proportional 
0.4 (0.03) 0.46 (0.03) 0.13 0.46  
(0.03) 
0.4  
(0.03) 
0.44  
(0.03) 
0.35 0.70 
Informational  
Raw Fixations 
1568.36 
(113.96) 
1573.21 
(117.81) 
0.98 1551.82 
(129.34) 
1464.09 
(142.47) 
1696.44 
(153.04) 
0.54 0.98 
Race 
Proportional 
0.02  
(0.002) 
0.01  
(0.003) 
0.02** 0.022 
(0.003) 
0.017 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
0.11 0.22 
Race 
Raw Fixations 
68.81  
(9.75) 
51.79 
(10.08) 
0.23 66.19 
(11.06) 
70.9  
(12.19) 
43.81 
(13.09) 
0.29 0.83 
Mental Health 
Proportional 
0.04  
(0.004) 
0.04  
(0.004) 
0.63 0.035 
(0.005) 
0.038 
(0.005) 
0.048 
(0.006) 
0.19 0.78 
Mental Health 
Raw Fixations 
129.47 
(15.19) 
149.96 
(15.7) 
0.36 139.02 
(17.24) 
135.06 
(18.98) 
145.06 
(20.39) 
0.94 0.35 
Drug Use 
Proportional 
0.02  
(0.003) 
0.02  
(0.003) 
0.44 0.015 
(0.004) 
0.022 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.004) 
0.20 0.73 
Drug Use 
Raw Fixations 
66.04 
(11.02) 
74.54  
(11.4) 
0.60 67.59 
(12.51) 
66.79 
(13.78) 
76.5  
(14.8) 
0.87 0.70 
Eye-Mouth  
Proportional 
0.63  
(0.05) 
0.57  
(0.05) 
0.39 0.6  
(0.06) 
0.58  
(0.06) 
0.63  
(0.07) 
0.87 0.77 
Eye-Mouth 
Raw Fixations 
326.11 
(28.51) 
370.21 
(29.47) 
0.29 369.66 
(32.35) 
309.94 
(35.64) 
365.86 
(38.28) 
0.42 0.96 
Eyes  
Proportional 
0.54  
(0.04) 
0.46  
(0.05) 
0.23 0.51  
(0.05) 
0.45  
(0.06) 
0.55  
(0.06) 
0.52 0.65 
Eyes 
Raw Fixations 
271.55 
(28.85) 
305.92 
(29.82) 
0.41 317.51 
(32.74) 
242.06 
(36.07) 
306.63 
(39.74) 
0.28 0.81 
Mouth 
Proportional 
0.09  
(0.02) 
0.11  
(0.02) 
0.47 0.09  
(0.02) 
0.13  
(0.02) 
0.08  
(0.03) 
0.32 0.15 
Mouth 
Raw Fixations 
54.08 
(10.32) 
64.29 
(10.67) 
0.50 51.44 
(11.71) 
67.88  
(12.9) 
58.25 
(13.86) 
0.64 0.30 
 
Table 4. Normative Influences on Fixation Durations for Study 2. For this table, a (**) indicates significance at 
p <0.05. For all proportional scores, values reflect the number of data points mock jurors spent fixated on each 
region’s associated AOI related to their overall number of data points collected during each stimuli’s presentation on 
the screen.  
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SDS 
Question 
Mean (SE) 
Black 
Mean (SE) 
White 
ME Race 
p-Value 
Mean (SE) 
NMI 
Mean (SE) 
MI 
Mean (SE) 
MID 
ME MH 
p-Value 
Interaction 
p-Value 
Black 74.88 
(4.3) 
71.71 
(4.61) 
0.62 75.95 
(5.06) 
71.94 
(5.28) 
72  
(5.99) 
0.83 0.13 
White 65.26 
(4.74) 
61.88 
(5.08) 
0.63 64.19 
(5.58) 
67.71 
(5.81) 
58.81 
(6.6) 
0.60 0.13 
Schizo- 
phrenic 
59.98 
(5.71) 
64.88 
(6.12) 
0.56 56.21 
(6.72) 
66.69 
(7.01) 
64.38 
(7.95) 
0.53 0.86 
Hard 
Drugs 
39.31 
(6.28) 
44.67 
(6.74) 
0.57 38.82 
(7.4) 
46.58 
(7.72) 
40.56 
(8.75) 
0.76 0.72 
Latinx 74.72 
(4.34) 
77.46 
(4.66) 
0.67 78.52 
(5.11) 
71.69 
(5.33) 
78.06 
(6.05) 
0.61 0.13 
Elderly 76.22 
(4.71) 
70.71 
(5.05) 
0.43 80.29 
(5.54) 
71.6 
(5.79) 
68.5 
(6.56) 
0.35 0.49 
Teens 66.55 
(4.7) 
66.25 
(5.04) 
0.97 68.47 
(5.53) 
67.6 
(5.78) 
63.13) 
(6.55) 
0.81 0.11 
Soft 
Drugs 
62.19 
(5.77) 
64.79 
(6.19) 
0.75 64.17 
(6.79) 
65.92 
(7.09) 
60.44 
(8.04) 
0.88 0.33 
Poor 73.68 
(4.42) 
77.13 
(4.74) 
0.60 75.5 
(5.21) 
76.65 
(5.43) 
74.06 
(6.16) 
0.95 0.96 
Wealthy 50.47 
(6.79) 
43.58 
(7.09) 
0.49 53.54 
(8.12) 
52.79 
(8.12) 
34.75 
(9.21) 
0.25 0.74 
Men 58.55  
(6) 
49.21 
(6.4) 
0.29 51.68 
(7.03) 
60.4 
(7.34) 
49.56 
(8.33) 
0.57 0.50 
Women 84.32 
(4.03) 
82.33 
(4.33) 
0.74 85.08 
(4.75) 
79.9 
(4.96) 
85  
(5.62) 
0.71 0.49 
Compiled 792.08 
(42.45) 
774.58 
(44.36) 
0.78 801.92 
(50.8) 
799.46 
(50.8) 
749.25 
(57.61) 
0.76 0.35 
 
Table 5. Responses to Isolated SDS Questions by Race and by Mental Health for Study 2. For all isolated 
responses, mock jurors answered on a scale from 0-100, with 0 representing the maximum possible feelings of social 
distance. For the compiled responses, the combination of each individual scale resulted in a possible range of 
responses from 0-1200, with 0 still representing the maximum possible feelings of social distance. Given the small 
sample size of this study, it may be notable that mock jurors’ responses on the isolated questions relating to Black 
people, White people, Latinx people, and teenagers did start to show some trends. In each of these cases, mock 
jurors who saw a White defendant sometimes began to show interactions. For the isolated SDS questions related to 
Black people, Latinx people, and teenagers, mock jurors whose defendant was White and had a history of non-drug-
related mental illness reported that they felt more socially distant from these groups. For the isolated SDS question 
related to White people, mock jurors whose defendant was White and had a history of drug-related mental illness 
alternatively reported that they felt less socially distant from this group. Nevertheless, none of these interactions 
were significant at even liberal levels.  
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MRWP Mean (SE) 
B-NMI 
Mean (SE) 
B-MI 
Mean (SE) 
B-MID 
Mean (SE) 
W-NMI 
Mean (SE) 
W-MI 
Mean (SE) 
W-MID 
ME Race 
p-Value 
ME MH 
p-Value 
Interaction 
p-Value 
External - 
Compiled 
46.57 
(6.19) 
54.17 
(6.69) 
57  
(5.79) 
59.88 
(5.8) 
44.5 
(5.8) 
40.5 
(8.19) 
0.39 0.69 0.07* 
External - 
Black 
17.57 
(2.84) 
19.67 
(3.07) 
21.38 
(2.66) 
21.25 
(2.66) 
15.25 
(2.67) 
16.75 
(2.76) 
0.47 0.78 0.28 
External - 
MI 
16.86 
(2.35) 
18.17 
(2.53) 
20.38 
(2.19) 
20.25 
(2.19) 
16.63 
(2.19) 
12.5 
(3.1) 
0.32 0.69 0.09* 
External - 
Drug 
13.14 
(1.96) 
16.33 
(2.12) 
15.25 
(1.84) 
18.38 
(1.84) 
12.63 
(1.84) 
11.25 
(2.6) 
0.63 0.49 0.04** 
Internal - 
Compiled 
78.43 
(5.51) 
85  
(6.52) 
80.71 
(5.51) 
88.5 
(5.15) 
91.38 
(5.15) 
95.5 
(7.29) 
0.04* 0.63 0.79 
Internal - 
Black 
29.86 
(1.44) 
31.5 
(1.55) 
31.75 
(1.35) 
31.5 
(1.35) 
33.38 
(1.35) 
33.25 
(1.9) 
0.18 0.37 0.99 
Internal - 
MI 
26.43 
(2.04) 
30  
(2.41) 
28.14 
(2.04) 
31.5 
(1.9) 
32.38 
(1.9) 
32.75 
(2.7) 
0.03** 0.55 0.8 
Internal - 
Drug 
22.14 
(2.72) 
24  
(2.93) 
21.25 
(2.54) 
25.5 
(2.54) 
25.63 
(2.54) 
29.5 
(3.5) 
0.07* 0.86 0.52 
 
Table 6. Responses to MRWP Scales by Condition for Study 2. For this table, a (*) indicates significance at p < 
0.1 and (**) indicates significance at p <0.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
139 
Figures 
A.
 
B.
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical and Proposed Mechanistic Aversive Racism Paradigms. While past research has operated 
on a simplified theoretical aversive racism paradigm (A), the present studies seek to test the mechanisms assumed 
by this theoretical paradigm through a proposed mechanistic paradigm (B). All proposed mechanisms are 
highlighted in blue.  
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A.
 
B.
 
C. 
 
 
Figure 2. AOIS. For the Black (A) and White (B) defendant photographs, eye regions are marked with purple and 
mouth regions are marked with pink. These regions were measured together to tabulate the eye-mouth region. For 
the legal brief (C), the normative factor regions are marked with yellow and the informational factor regions are 
marked with green. Other AOIs also include a pink race AOI, an orange mental health history AOI, and a blue drug 
use history AOI. As these AOIs overlap the AOI related to the defendant’s normative factors, the data for each of 
these overlapping AOIs was collected simultaneously. 
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Figure 3. Willingness to Communicate Explicit Bias for Study 1. All blue values represent Black conditions 
whereas all red values represent White conditions. All error bars represent ±1 standard error. A (*) indicates 
significance at p < 0.1 and a (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. For SDO responses (A), scores were computed 
on a scale from 16-112. For compiled SDS responses (B), scores were computed on a scale from 0-1200, and for the 
isolated SDS questions relating to mock jurors’ SDS responses to Black people (C), White people (D), people with 
schizophrenia (E), and people who use hard drugs (F), responses were computed on a scale from 0-100.   
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Figure 4. Average Responses to Each Isolated SDS Question for Study 1. For this graph, error bars mark ±1 
standard deviation from the mean. The y-axis on this graph represents the full range of possible responses.  
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Figure 5. Responses to Specific MRWP Scales for Study 1. All blue values represent Black conditions whereas all 
red values represent White conditions. A (*) indicates significance at p < 0.1 and (**) indicates significance at p 
<0.05. For all of these scales, including the External (A) and Internal (B) MRWP to Black people, External (C ) and 
Internal (D) MRWP to people with mental illness, and External (E) and Internal (F) MRWP to people who use hard 
drugs scales, scores were computed on a scale from 5-35.  
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Figure 6. Juridical Decisions for Study 1. All blue values represent Black conditions whereas all red values 
represent White conditions. All error bars represent ±1 standard error. A (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. For 
self-rated culpability decisions (A), self-rated sentencing decisions (B), other-rated culpability decisions (C), and 
other-rated sentencing decisions (D), the y-axis on these graphs represents the full range of possible responses.  
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Figure 7. Evidence for Negative and Positive Aversive Racism Factors from Study 1. A (*) indicates 
significance at p < 0.1 and (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. For each of isolated SDS question (A), responses 
were computed on a scale from 0-100, with a score of 0 representing the maximum possible feeling of social 
distance from these groups. For each External (B) and Internal (C) MRWP scale, scores were computed on a scale 
from 5-35.  
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A. 
 
B. 
 
C. 
 
 
Figure 8. A New Proposed Mechanistic Aversive Racism Paradigm. Following the results of Study 1, it is 
necessary to redesign the proposed mechanistic aversive racism paradigm (A). For other-rated decisions (B), the 
new paradigm would suggest that normative influences and willingness to communicate explicit biases precede the 
influence of a defendant’s race. For self-rated decisions (C), the present study failed to construct an aversive racism 
paradigm, as the influence of social motivations could not explain mock jurors’ final decisions.  
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Figure 9. Fixation Trends by Race in Study 2. All blue values represent Black conditions whereas all red values 
represent White conditions. All error bars represent ±1 standard error. A (**) indicates significance at p <0.05. For 
proportional fixation scores on the normative and informational AOIs (A) and the proportional fixation scores on the 
AOIs relating to manipulation factors (C), and the proportional fixation scores on the defendant’s photograph AOIs 
(E), the full possible range of scores was 0-1, with 1 indicating a greater proportional fixation. For raw fixation 
scores on the normative and informational AOIs (B), raw fixation scores on the AOIs relating to manipulation 
factors (D), and raw fixation scores on the defendant’s photograph AOIs (F), there was no set range of possible 
scores. However, most participants made about 3600 fixations on the legal brief and 600 fixations on the defendant’s 
photograph.  
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A.
 
B.
 
C. 
 
 
Figure 10. Average Responses to Each Explicit Bias Scale Across Studies. All error bars represent ±1 standard 
error. For the compiled SDS (A), responses were computed on a scale from 0-1200 with a score of 0 representing 
the maximum possible feeling of social distance, for the SDO (B), responses were computed on a scale from 16-112 
with a score of 112 representing the maximum possible feeling of social dominance, and for each of isolated SDS 
question (C), responses were computed on a scale from 0-100, with a score of 0 representing the maximum possible 
feeling of social distance from these groups.  
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Figure 11. Juridical Decisions in Study 2. All blue values represent Black conditions whereas all red values 
represent White conditions. All error bars represent ±1 standard error. For self-rated culpability decisions (A), self-
rated sentencing decisions (B), other-rated culpability decisions (C), and other-rated sentencing decisions (D), the y-
axis on these graphs represents the full range of possible responses.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Language Utilized in the Legal Brief 
 
PEOPLE v. BRANDT - Defense Intake Form 
Defendant Information: 
Full Legal Name: George Alexander Brandt    Date of Birth: August 26, 1985  
Address: 154 Juniper Street, Clifton Park, NY, 12065 
Race: DEPENDENT ON CONDITION   Nationality: US Citizen 
Marital Status: Single     Children: None 
Mental Health History: DEPENDENT ON CONDITION Arrest History: None 
Drug Use: DEPENDENT ON CONDITION 
Education: Graduated from Clifton High School (2002) 
Employer: Clifton Park Mechanic and Auto Repair   Time with Employer: 5 Months 
Date of Arrest: May 12, 2016    Time of Arrest: 6:49 PM EST 
Reason for Arrest: Possession of 8,000 dollars, stolen  
Charge:  Grand Larceny in the Third Degree (New York Penal Law 155.35, Grand Theft) 
 
Arrest Report Brief: On May 12,2016, George A. Brandt was arrested and charged with Grand Larceny in the Third 
Degree, a class D felony, for allegedly stealing approximately 8,000 U.S. dollars from his place of work, Clifton 
Park Mechanic and Auto Repair. Upon his arrest, the police discovered the money in Mr. Brandt’s car. When asked 
for a statement, Mr. Brandt claimed that he did not know who had put the money in his car. A witness told the 
arresting officer that they saw Mr. Brandt leave work early that day, and that he had seemed unusually agitated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
151 
Appendix B. Visual Stimuli 
A.
 
B.
 
C.
 
D.
 
(A) Photo of Stolen Money 
(B) Photo of Defendant’s Car 
(C) Mugshot of Defendant, White Conditions 
(D) Mugshot of Defendant, Black Conditions 
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Appendix C. Manipulation Check Questionnaire 
All questions in this survey will be measured with direct “Yes” or “No” responses. 
● “Is the defendant’s name Gary?” 
● “Is the defendant white?” 
● “Was the defendant charged with grand larceny?” 
● “Does the defendant work for a mechanic?” 
● “Does the defendant have children?” 
● “Does the defendant have a history of mental illness?” 
● “Was there a witness?” 
● “Did the defendant graduate from High School?” 
● “Is the defendant a drug user?” 
● “Is the defendant married?” 
● “Had the defendant been arrested before?” 
 
Appendix D. Social Distance Scale (adapted from Bogardus, 1933) 
 
All responses in this questionnaire were measured on a 100 point sliding scale from “cold” to “warm.” The order of 
these questions was randomized. 
 
● “How coldly or warmly do you feel toward the following social groups?”  
○ “Black People”  
○ “White People”  
○ “Latinx People”  
○ “Elderly People”  
○ “Teenagers”  
○ “Schizophrenic People”  
○ “Drug Users”  
○ “Poor People” 
○ “Wealthy People” 
○ “Men”  
○ “Women” 
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Appendix E. Social Dominance Orientation (Malle et al., 1994) 
 
All responses in this questionnaire were measured using a Likert scale from “strongly oppose” to “strongly agree.” 
The order of these questions was randomized and mixed with the questions from the Internal and External MRWPs. 
 
● “Some groups of people must be kept in their place” 
● “It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom” 
● “An ideal society requires some groups to be on the top and others to be on the bottom” 
● “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”  
● “Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top” (Reverse Coded) 
● “No one group should dominate society” (Reverse Coded) 
● “Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place” (Reverse Coded) 
● “Group dominance is a poor principle” (Reverse Coded) 
● “We should not push for group equality” 
● “We shouldn’t guarantee that every group has the same quality of life” 
● “It is unjust to try to make groups equal”  
● “Group equality should be our primary goal” (Reverse Coded) 
● “We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed” (Reverse Coded) 
● “We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups” (Reverse Coded) 
● “No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same chance in 
life” (Reverse Coded) 
● “Group equality should be out ideal” (Reverse Coded) 
 
 
Appendix F. Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale 
(adapted from Plant & Devine, 1998) 
 
All responses in this questionnaire was measured using a Likert scale from “strongly oppose” to “strongly agree.” 
This survey was adapted to measure biases toward people with mental illnesses or people who use recreational 
drugs. The order of these questions was randomized and mixed with the SDO questions.   
 
External MRWP - Black People 
● “Because of today’s politically correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.” 
● “I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.” 
● “If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.” 
● “I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.” 
● “ I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.” 
 
Internal MRWP - Black People 
● “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.” 
● “According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK.” (Reverse Coded) 
● “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.”  
● “Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.” 
● “Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.”  
 
External MRWP - People with Mental Illness 
● “Because of today’s politically correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward people with mental 
illnesses .” 
● “I try to hide any negative thoughts about people with mental illnesses  in order to avoid negative reactions 
from others.” 
● “If I acted prejudiced toward people with mental illnesses, I would be concerned that others would be angry 
with me.” 
● “I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward people with mental illnesses  in order to avoid disapproval from 
others.” 
● “ I try to act nonprejudiced toward people with mental illnesses because of pressure from others.” 
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Internal MRWP - People with Mental Illness 
● “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people with mental illnesses because it is personally 
important to me.” 
● “According to my personal values, using stereotypes about people with mental illnesses  is OK.” (Reverse 
Coded) 
● “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people with mental illnesses .”  
● “Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes aboutpeople with mental illnesses is 
wrong.” 
● “Being nonprejudiced toward people with mental illnesses is important to my self-concept.”  
 
External MRWP - People who use Hard Drugs 
● “Because of today’s politically correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward people who use 
“hard” drugs.” 
● “I try to hide any negative thoughts about people who use “hard” drugs in order to avoid negative reactions 
from others.” 
● “If I acted prejudiced toward people who use “hard” drugs, I would be concerned that others would be 
angry with me.” 
● “I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward people who use “hard” drugs in order to avoid disapproval from 
others.” 
● “ I try to act nonprejudiced toward people who use “hard” drugs because of pressure from others.” 
 
Internal MRWP - People who use Hard Drugs 
● “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward people who use “hard” drugs because it is personally 
important to me.” 
● “According to my personal values, using stereotypes about people who use “hard” drugs is OK.” (Reverse 
Coded) 
● “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people who use “hard” drugs.”  
● “Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about people who use “hard” drugs is 
wrong.” 
● “Being nonprejudiced toward people who use “hard” drugs is important to my self-concept.”  
 
Appendix G. Juridical Questionnaire (adapted from Granot et al., 2014) 
• “How innocent or guilty do you think the defendant is?” 
o Measured on an Innocent or Guilty scale with no midpoint (6/8 options) 
• “How innocent or guilty do you think other people will think the defendant is?” 
o Measured on an Innocent or Guilty scale with no midpoint (6/8 options) 
• “If this defendant was found guilty, what sentence would you advocate for?” 
o Measured using a sliding scale  
• “If this defendant was found guilty, what sentence do you think other people would advocate for?” 
o Measured using a sliding scale 
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Appendix H. Results with Manipulation Check Exclusions 
 For each of the following tables, the values highlighted in white represent the results with manipulation 
check exclusions considered, and the values to the right that are highlighted in gray represent the results without 
manipulation check exclusions considered. 
 
Conditional Effects on MC Recall Accuracy  
 F-Score p-
Value 
Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-
Value 
Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
ME of Race 0.032 0.859 <0.001 0.054 0.031 0.862 <0.001 0.053 
ME of MH 1.15 0.321 0.026 0.247 1.515 0.223 0.022 0.318 
Interactions 0.814 0.446 0.018 0.185 1.185 0.309 0.017 0.256 
 
Conditional Effects on Willingness to Communicate Explicit Bias 
 F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
SDO -  
ME of Race 
0.62 0.43 0.01 0.12 0.6 0.44 0.004 0.12 
SDO -  
ME of MH  
4.07 0.02** 0.09 0.71 3.86 0.02** 0.05 0.69 
SDO -  
Interactions 
0.74 0.48 0.02 0.17 2.2 0.12 0.03 0.44 
Comp. SDS -  
ME of Race 
0.74 0.39 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.87 <0.01 0.05 
Comp. SDS -  
ME of MH 
6.33 <0.01** 0.13 0.89 0.83 0.44 0.01 0.19 
SDS -  
Interactions 
0.07 0.94 <0.01 0.06 0.36 0.7 0.01 0.11 
SDS Black -  
ME of Race 
1.08 0.3 0.01 0.18 0.11 0.74 <0.01 0.06 
SDS Black -  
ME of MH 
4.24 0.02** 0.09 0.73 0.97 0.38 0.01 0.22 
SDS Black -  
Interactions 
0.03 0.97 <0.01 0.05 0.06 0.95 <0.01 0.06 
SDS White - 0.38 0.54 <0.01 0.09 0 0.99 <0.01 0.05 
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ME of Race 
SDS White - 
ME of MH 
2.39 0.097* 0.05 0.47 0.7 0.5 0.01 0.17 
SDS White - 
Interactions 
0.16 0.85 <0.01 0.07 0.13 0.88 <0.01 0.07 
SDS MI -  
ME of Race 
1.44 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.89 <0.01 0.05 
SDS MI -  
ME of MH 
3.21 0.05* 0.07 0.6 0.17 0.85 <0.01 0.08 
SDS MI -  
Interactions 
0.17 0.84 0.004 0.076 1.341 0.265 0.019 0.285 
SDS Drug -  
ME of Race 
2.924 0.091* 0.033 0.394 1.747 0.188 0.013 0.259 
SDS Drug -  
ME of MI 
0.134 0.875 0.003 0.07 1.262 0.286 0.018 0.271 
SDS Drug -  
Interactions 
0.089 0.914 0.002 0.063 0.555 0.576 0.008 0.14 
 
Condition on External MRWPs 
 F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
Compiled -  
ME of Race 
0.046 0.83 0.001 0.055 0.174 0.677 0.001 0.07 
Compiled -  
ME of MH  
2.549 0.084* 0.057 0.497 2.333 0.101 0.033 0.466 
Compiled -  
Interactions 
3.5 0.035** 0.076 0.639 3.251 0.042** 0.046 0.611 
Black-  
ME of Race 
0.26 0.611 0.003 0.08 0.064 0.801 <0.001 0.057 
Black -  
ME of MH 
2.524 0.086* 0.055 0.493 2.553 0.082* 0.036 0.503 
Black -  
Interactions 
2.727 0.071* 0.059 0.526 2.1 0.126 0.03 0.425 
MI -  
ME of Race 
0.053 0.819 0.001 0.056 0.185 0.668 0.001 0.071 
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MI -  
ME of MH 
1.184 0.311 0.027 0.253 1.845 0.162 0.026 0.379 
MI -  
Interactions 
3.648 0.03** 0.077 0.659 3.951 0.021** 0.054 0.702 
Drug - 
ME of Race 
0.068 0.795 0.001 0.058 0.95 0.331 0.007 0.162 
Drug - 
ME of MH 
3.531 0.034** 0.077 0.643 1.901 0.153 0.027 0.39 
Drug - 
Interactions 
3.011 0.055* 0.066 0.57 2.972 0.055* 0.042 0.57 
 
Condition on Intern MRWPs 
 F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
Compiled -  
ME of Race 
0.688 0.409 0.008 0.13 1.124 0.291 0.008 0.183 
Compiled -  
ME of MH  
1.896 0.156 0.043 0.384 1.069 0.346 0.016 0.234 
Compiled -  
Interactions 
0.538 0.586 0.012 0.136 1.42 0.245 0.021 0.3 
Black-  
ME of Race 
0.697 0.406 0.008 0.131 0.762 0.384 0.006 0.139 
Black -  
ME of MH 
1.416 0.248 0.032 0.296 0.739 0.48 0.011 0.173 
Black -  
Interactions 
0.004 0.996 <0.001 0.051 0.434 0.694 0.006 0.119 
MI -  
ME of Race 
1.702 0.196 0.019 0.252 1.742 0.189 0.013 0.259 
MI -  
ME of MH 
1.387 0.255 0.031 0.291 0.388 0.679 0.006 0.111 
MI -  
Interactions 
0.544 0.583 0.012 0.137 1.31 0.273 0.019 0.28 
Drug - 
ME of Race 
0.002 0.965 <0.001 0.05 0.133 0.716 0.001 0.065 
Drug - 
ME of MH 
1.142 0.324 0.026 0.245 1.056 0.351 0.015 0.232 
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Drug - 
Interactions 
2.179 0.119 0.048 0.434 1.59 0.208 0.023 0.332 
 
Self-Rated Culpability Decisions 
Effect F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
ME: Race  3.39 0.07* 0.04 0.45 2.93 0.09* 0.02 0.4 
ME: Mental 
Health  
3.36 0.04** 0.07 0.62 2.88 0.06* 0.04 0.56 
Interaction  2.45 0.09* 0.05 0.48 3.42 0.04** 0.05 0.63 
 
Self-Rated Sentencing Decisions 
Effect F-Score p-
Value 
Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
ME: Race  2.99 0.09* 0.03 0.4 0.42 0.52 0.003 0.1 
ME: Mental 
Health  
1.36 0.26 0.03 0.29 0.48 0.62 0.007 0.13 
Interaction  2.18 0.12 0.05 0.44 2.6 0.08* 0.04 0.51 
 
Other-Rated Culpability Decisions 
Effect F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-
Value 
Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
ME: Race  2 0.16 0.02 0.29 3.56 0.06* 0.03 0.47 
ME: Mental 
Health  
1.79 0.17 0.04 0.36 0.42 0.66 0.01 0.12 
Interaction  0.37 0.69 0.01 0.11 1.45 0.24 0.02 0.31 
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Other-Rated Sentencing Decisions 
Effect F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
F-Score p-Value Effect 
Size (ŋ2)  
Observed 
Power 
ME: Race  0.5 0.48 0.01 0.11 1.53 0.22 0.01 0.23 
ME: Mental 
Health  
1.42 0.25 0.03 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.01 0.17 
Interaction  5.32 0.01** 0.11 0.83 2.63 0.08* 0.04 0.52 
 
 
Appendix I. Language of Study 2 Recruitment Materials 
Looking at Socially Stigmatized Defendants 
 
Subject: Is He Innocent or Guilty? Participate in a Psychology Senior Project and Decide for Yourself! 
 
Body: Despite being presented with the same evidence, many jurors come to different conclusions about the 
innocence or guilt of a defendant in criminal court cases. For my Psychology Senior Project, I hope to learn more 
about why people might arrive at these different conclusions in these cases. In order to do so, I need your help! 
 
If you’ve always dreamt of experiencing jury duty in 30 minutes or less, please consider participating in an 
experiment that takes place in Bard’s psychology building, Preston Hall. As a participant, you will be asked to study 
the primary information about a non-violent criminal court case and then recall this information in order to make 
decisions about the defendant’s culpability. While this is taking place, your attention will be monitored using an eye 
tracker, which is a non-invasive technology that functions much like a digital camera. In exchange for your time, 
you will be entered for a chance to win a prize, and you will have access to snacks while you participate!  
 
To be eligible, you must: 
 
● Be 18-35 years of age 
● Have normal or corrected-to-normal vision (glasses and contacts are okay, although you may need to clean 
your glasses upon arrival - generic cleaning materials will be provided to you if necessary) 
● NOT have a diagnosed attention deficit disorder, learning disability, or neurological condition 
● Be willing to have your eye movements recorded by a non-invasive eye tracker 
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Appendix J. IRB Proposal 
 
Please enter the following information about yourself: 
Name Clarence Bronte 
Email bb6616@bard.edu 
Phone (484) 624-2181 
Your academic program:  Psychology 
Your status (faculty, grad, undergrad): Undergrad 
Name of your adviser or faculty sponsor: Thomas Cain 
Your adviser's or faculty sponsor's email address: tcain@bard.edu 
Today's date: Nov 07, 2017 
I have read the IRB's Categories of Review, and my proposal qualifies for a Expedited Review 
Do you have external funding for this research? No 
If so, state name of granting institution and the title of the project as it was submitted to that institution. 
N/A 
When do you plan to begin collecting data for this project? (begin date): Dec 01, 2017 
When do plan to end your data collection for this project? (end date): Mar 31, 2018 
What is the title of your project? 
Looking at Socially Stigmatized Defendants 
Describe your research question briefly (approximately 250 words or less): 
 
Research has shown that, when people make complex decisions, they tend to visually seek out information that reaffirms their 
preconceived beliefs (Pärnamets et al., 2015, Granot, 2014). Further, other research has shown that, when people interact with 
images of members of stigmatized groups, they tend to spend a significantly less time looking at this stigmatized target's eyes 
(Gobel et al., 2015). Considering these two findings, this study seeks to apply this research to legal decisions and ask, when a 
defendant is a member of a stigmatized group, do participants' gaze behaviors vary when studying information about the trial or 
when looking at images of the defendant in a way that reflects this social stigmatization? Further, this study seeks to investigate 
how these differential gaze behaviors may relate to participants' subsequent decisions regarding the culpability of this defendant. 
Finally, this study hopes to compare the dynamics of these biases to participants' own self-reported explicit biases (or lack 
thereof), such that we may identify that, in some cases, these implicit gaze biases supersede one’s explicit desire to be equitable 
when making legal decisions. This work may have implications for strategies to better mediate the impacts of these implicit 
biases on how we process incredibly important legal information or look at members of socially stigmatized groups. 
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Will your participants include individuals from specific populations (e.g., children, pregnant 
women, prisoners, or the cognitively impaired)? 
no 
If your participants will include individuals from specific populations, please specify the population(s) and briefly 
describe any special precautions you will use. 
N/A 
Briefly describe how you will recruit participants. (e.g., Who will approach participants? What is the source of the 
participants?)  
Participants (healthy adults with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who are free of any attention or learning disabilities that 
might prevent them from completing the experimental tasks) will be collected from Bard and the surrounding area. Participants 
will be between the ages of 18 and 35. Further, participants will be informed during recruitment that the experiment consists of a 
short legal decision making and memory task and that their gaze behaviors (ie, where they are looking on the screen) will be 
recorded during some of this task. With this information, recruitment will be targeted to participants who are comfortable 
participating in these tasks and having their gaze behaviors recorded by an eye tracker. Potential participants will be informed 
that the eye tracker (Tobii X2-60 compact) is a non-invasive technology that merely records a participant's focal point on a screen 
much like a digital camera would, and as a result it is not associated with any health risks. Given that the experiment requires the 
collection of this eye tracking data, recruitment will specifically appeal to participants that are comfortable with this form of 
recording. Further, participants will be informed that, if they wear glasses, they may have to clean their glasses at the start of the 
procedure using generic cleaning materials that will be provided to them. Finally, participants will be made aware of the fact that 
this study takes approximately 30 minutes to complete, and that they will be entered for a chance to win a prize in exchange for 
their time. Only participants who are comfortable with all of these aspects of the procedure will be invited to participate.  
Recruitment materials such as posters and flyers will provide potential participants with a brief description of the experimental 
procedure and direct them to my email (bb6616@bard.edu) for more complete information (for sample recruitment language, see 
Appendix A). I also plan to recruit participants in person at tables around the Bard area, where I plan to verbally provide potential 
participants with necessary information regarding eligibility and direct them to where they can sign up for an appointment. 
Appointments will be managed online through Google Forms, where participants will once again be provided all of the relevant 
information that is outlined above. This Google Form will be created such that only the experimenter is a collaborator and all of 
the responses the form collects will be kept private to the collaborator. As such, the form’s respondents, the study’s potential 
participants, will only be able to make responses and will be prohibited from seeing the forms’ associated summary charts or the 
text responses of other respondents. Participants will, at this time, be asked to confirm their eligibility and provide their email 
address for further correspondence after they have scheduled an appointment.  
Upon their arrival, participants will go through the informed consent process (see Appendix B) and be shown the room where the 
experiment will take place as well as any potential technologies that will be used during their trial. 
For compensation, all participants will be entered into a lottery for a chance to win Amazon gift cards (up to 50 dollars). They 
also be provided snacks (such as baked goods, candy, etc) during in-person recruitment, the experimental procedure, or 
debriefing to further compensate participation.  
For piloting purposes, some participants may be recruited to complete an entirely online version of this experiment. These 
participants will be provided with the same information as other participants (except for the information that details the use of the 
eye tracker, as these trials will not include this measure). These participants may be offered the same compensation as the 
primary study's participants (ie, a chance to win a gift card), or may be offered a small monetary compensation. These 
participants would be collected using snowball sampling or using an online recruitment site like Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
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Briefly describe the procedures you will be using to conduct your research. Include descriptions of what tasks your 
participants will be asked to do, and about how much time will be expected of each individual. NOTE: If you have 
supporting materials (recruitment posters, printed surveys, etc.) please email these documents separately as attachments 
to IRB@bard.edu. Name your attachments with your last name and a brief description (e.g., 
"WatsonConsentForm.doc").  
This experiments’ basic procedures are modeled after some potential experiences jurors may have when making legal decisions. 
These procedures are also loosely adapted from eye tracking studies like those completed by Philip Pärnamets and colleagues at 
Lund University, Yael Granot and colleagues at New York University, and Matthias S. Gobel at University College London.  
 
Pre-experimental Procedures: Before the experiment, participants will complete the informed consent process (detailed below) 
and will be provided with a detailed overview of the experimental space/mechanisms. They will be informed at this time that the 
remainder of the experiment will take place on a computer and will include the presentation of words and images relating to a 
non-violent criminal court case, as well as a series of questionnaires.  
 
Eye Tracking Procedures: Eye movements will be recorded during the following experimental procedures using a Tobii X2-60 
compact eye tracker. This eye tracker records eye movements while participants gaze naturally at a computer screen, allowing 
them to keep their glasses or contacts on during the procedure, make generally free head movements, and blink regularly. 
Collecting raw data points at 60 hz or approximately one raw data point per 3.3-33 ms, the Tobii X2-60 compact eye tracker 
operates by emitting an infrared beam toward a participant’s eyes and capturing the angle of the generated reflection off of the 
participant’s corneas and pupils using a high resolution camera. This infrared beam is harmless, as both the retinal and corneal 
irradiation it produces are well below the standards for safe use set by the United States (which are 10^-1W/cm^2) as well as the 
more conservative standards set by scientific literature (which are 10^-2W/cm^2). As a result, the use of this eye tracker is as safe 
and comfortable to use as any other computer camera which emits light in order to capture images. However, the data recorded 
by the eye tracker will not include any video or visual images of the participant themselves. Again, participants who wear 
corrective lenses will be able to keep their glasses or contacts on during the procedure, but some participants may need to clean 
their glasses before moving onto the main experimental procedures. They will be provided the materials to do so, which will 
consist of a safe, hypoallergenic generic glasses cleaner.  
 
At the start of the experimental procedure that utilize the eye tracker, participants will first familiarize themselves with the eye 
tracker through a brief calibration task. These tasks are simple and are not stressful, as they only require participants to look at 
various points on the computer screen when instructed to do so. These tasks are also incredibly short (less than one minute in 
duration), so despite the simplicity of this task, participants should not get bored.  
 
Following the completion of this calibration, participants will then proceed to the main eye tracking tasks. Each of these tasks 
consists of the presentation of text or photographs on the computer screen, during which the eye tracker will collect continuous 
data about where on the screen the participant is looking. Participants will be asked to study this information as it is presented, 
and will be informed that they may need to recall this information at a later point in the experiment. Sample stimuli can be found 
in the appendix of this proposal (see Appendix C). Despite the fact that these information reflect a criminal court case, none of 
these stimuli are particularly emotionally valent. As a result, reading these materials should not cause any unforeseen stress to 
participants. Further, these stimuli will be presented on the screen for a set duration between 10 and 60 seconds, so as to allow for 
a balance wherein participants are not made to feel anxious about how little time they have to study the materials nor are they 
made to feel bored about how much time they have to inspect the materials. 
 
Behavioral Questionnaires: Following the completion of these eye tracking procedures, participants will answer a series of 
questionnaires. These questionnaires will be presented to participants on Qualtrics and will be recorded with a random subject 
number, meaning that participants responses will be kept confidential. Participants will be reminded of this before completing 
these questionnaires so as to minimize any stress participants may have about the implications of any of their responses. 
 
Before the first questionnaire is presented to participants, a brief description of the role of a juror will be provided to participants 
so as to frame the relevance of these questionnaires. The first two questionnaires are modeled after those used by other 
researchers who focus on simulated legal decision making (Granot et al., 2014). Both questionnaires can be found in the appendix 
of this proposal (see Appendix D for sample questions). The questions in the first questionnaire (e.g. “Is the defendant’s name 
‘Gary?’” and “Is the defendant a drug user?”) merely serve as a manipulation check so as to ensure that participants were indeed 
studying the information provided to them by the legal brief. The second questionnaire, on the other hand, requires participants to 
make judgment about the defendant's culpability.  
 
Next, participants will complete a third questionnaire, which will combine questions from a number of commonly used explicit 
bias surveys and scales (see Appendix D for a complete sampling of the scales that may be used). Prior to the presentation of this 
questionnaires, a brief reminder that individual responses will be kept confidential and, due to the nature of Qualtrics' survey 
system, only the experimenter will have access to their responses. Further, they will be informed that their responses will only be 
recorded using a randomized subject number. These questions will then be presented as one questionnaire, wherein the questions 
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will be ordered randomly. While many of these questions consider potentially upsetting viewpoints (e.g. “According to my 
personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK”), each of these questionnaires originates from a peer reviewed 
study and has been used in numerous peer reviewed studies since their development that found that the content of these questions 
was not causing any harm to their participants. Furthermore, participants will be informed during debriefing that the purpose of 
this experiment is to investigate the nature of biases so that they may be combated. As such, any potential anxiety that may be 
produced due to the nature of these questions should be mitigated during debriefing.  
 
Finally, participants may complete a very short demographic questionnaire. This questionnaire will merely ask for participants’ 
gender, age, and race/ethnicity. The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect basic information about the participant that may be 
used for later analysis. This information will also be kept confidential.  
 
Debriefing: Following the completion of the experimental procedures, participants will be provided with a debriefing form that 
describes the hypothesis that is being tested and the logic of the experiment (i.e., how does the experiment test this hypothesis). 
The experimenter will answer any questions that the participant still has at this time. A sample debriefing statement can be found 
in the appendix (see Appendix F for sample language). Finally, participants will be asked to refrain from discussing the 
experiment with others so as to prevent them from sharing this information with other potential subjects. They will later be 
alerted of the date when this restriction no longer applies. 
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Approximately how many individuals do you expect to participate in your study? 150 
Please describe any risks and benefits your research may have for your participants. (For example, one study's risks 
might include minor emotional discomfort and eye strain. The same study's benefits might include satisfaction from 
contributing to scientific knowledge and greater self-awareness.)  
Risks: This study involves minimal risks for participants, and the development of this experiment will seek to reduce the potential 
discomfort some participants may feel. Some potential points of discomfort participants may encounter include eye strain, 
discomfort produced by the nature of the explicit questionnaires, general test-taking anxiety that might be brought about by 
having to recall information in a questionnaire, and the awareness that even unbiased people might implicitly demonstrate bias 
through their physiological behaviors. The eye strain involved in this study might originate from the necessity to stare at a 
computer for the duration of the study (less than 30 minutes), however many individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 do this on 
a daily basis. Furthermore, the eye tracker provides no more risks than the average light-based camera (as outlined above), so this 
should be the only point of eye-related discomfort. Finally, participants will only be asked to look intently for a brief period of 
time (ie, during the eye tracker tasks), and even during this phase, the eye tracker allows for generally free head movements and 
regular blinking so as not to make participants uncomfortable.  
 
The discomfort associated with the explicit questionnaires should be mitigated by the fact that participants will be reminded that 
their responses will be kept confidential. Further, participants who personally react to the presentation of the biases that these 
questionnaires describe should be calmed somewhat by the idea that this research specifically seeks to provide necessary insights 
that may help to combat the presence of these biases in our physiological behaviors. Further, the experimenter will work to 
answer any other questions about the source of these explicit bias questionnaires and how they have also been used by other 
similar studies to combat biases during the debriefing process if necessary. 
 
Additionally, as some participants may feel naturally uncomfortable when asked to study and recall the information that is 
presented to them, the design of this study seeks to mitigate this discomfort. For example, participants will be told from the point 
at which they are recruited for this study that the experiment incorporates these tasks, so participants should be aware of and 
ready for these tasks. Additionally, participants will be given ample time to respond to these questions, so they should not feel 
unnecessarily pressured. Finally, if needed, the experimenter will remind participants that correct answers are not necessary, and 
that these questions primarily seek to determine what information participants have remembered, and that not every participant is 
expected to remember every question.  
 
Finally, while participants may feel uncomfortable when informed that this research seeks to investigate how even individuals 
who do not believe in the stigmatization of others may embody physiological biases through gaze behaviors, this discomfort will 
be addressed in a few ways. First, during debriefing, participants will be reminded that, through awareness, people may begin to 
combat these biases. Many people are simply unaware of these manifestations and have not even started to learn to combat them. 
Second, the experimenter, during debriefing, will answer any further questions relating to the nature of these manifestations, 
including how other studies have shown that participants are able to subvert these biases when personally motivated to do so 
(Granot et al., 2014).  
 
Benefits: This study will provide a number of potential indirect benefits. All participants will be entered into a lottery for a 
chance to win a gift card as direct compensation. Further, snacks will be provided to any participants who want them. Participants 
may also benefit from the knowledge that they have provided necessary data that may be used to comment on the dynamics of 
gaze behavior and bias in legal decision making such that people may begin to reform the way that their behaviors perpetuate 
these biases. Additionally, they may benefit from knowing that these sorts of studies might have the capacity to help people learn 
to mediate these biases and limit the way they act to entrench stigmatization of marginalized peoples. Personally, they may 
benefit from being made aware of these biases so that they may begin to address how they themselves are replicating these 
biases. Finally, participants may benefit from knowing that they are supporting a Bard undergraduate in the completion of their 
senior project as well as the general Bard research community in their research pursuits. 
Have you prepared a consent form and emailed it as an attachment to IRB@bard.edu? 
Please note: you must submit all necessary consent forms before your proposal is considered 
complete. 
Yes 
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Please include here the verbal description of the consent process (how you will explain the consent form and the consent 
process to your participants): 
Before being introduced to the consent form, all participants will be given a tour of the experimental space (a room in Preston 
Hall that is commonly used for experiments). At this time, they will be introduced to the computer where they will complete the 
experimental procedure. At this time, they will be briefly shown the eye tracker and will be provided a short description of how it 
functions. The experimenter will then give them the opportunity to ask any questions relating to the experimental space or the 
technologies that will be utilized.  
 
Participants will then read the complete consent form such that they are thoroughly exposed to the information it details. They 
will be told generally that the study is interested in how attention relates to legal decision making. Further, participants will be 
reminded that they can ask any questions during the duration of the experiment, and that, before each new task, they will be 
provided with detailed instructions regarding what the task requires them to do.  
 
Before signing the consent form, all participants will be asked to briefly describe the experimental procedure, the potential risks 
and benefits the experiment may pose, and any other questions that may help the experimenter determine whether they have 
indeed read and understood the contents of the consent form. They will also, at this point, be reminded of the study's eligibility 
requirements. Finally, they will be reminded that, at the completion of the experiment, they will be fully debriefed to the 
complete hypotheses and logic of the experiment, at which point they will be able to ask any other detailed questions relating to 
the purpose of the experiment. Should they still consent to participate, having indicated an understanding of what their 
participation entails, they will be invited to sign the consent agreement.  
 
They will then, again, be reminded that they have the ability to withdraw this consent at any 
time, and that they may continue to ask any questions to the experimenter as they arise. Any participants who 
withdraw consent at any point during or after the experiment will have their data deleted. 
 
A modified consent form will be used for online pilot participants. The language of this form can be found in Appendix B. After 
participants have read this form, they will be asked to indicate that they are indeed 18 or older, that they have read and 
understood the consent form, and if they consent to participate. If they indicate that they consent, that they read the informed 
consent agreement, and that they are 18 or older, they will continue to the study. If they indicate that they do not consent, that 
they did not read the informed consent agreement, or that they are younger than 18, they will be dismissed from the experiment.   
If your project will require that you use only a verbal consent process (no written consent forms), please describe why this 
process is necessary, how verbal consent will be obtained, and any additional precautions you will take to ensure the 
confidentiality of your participants.  
N/A 
What procedures will you use to ensure that the information your participants provide will remain confidential? 
Prior to data collection, potential participants’ names and contact information will be kept private through Google Form’s one-
way private response collection option, where non-collaborators are prohibited from viewing the summary charts or text 
responses collected by the form. Once the raffle is complete and compensation has been finalized, all information will be erased 
from this Google Form to further ensure the security of their personal information. At the point of the experiment, all data will be 
collected and coded using only a randomly assigned subject number. The information collected by the eye tracker will be kept on 
a password protected computer within the laboratory space, which itself is kept locked. Further, any information collected by 
Qualtrics will not only be kept confidential due to the site's password protection, but will also only be coded using these 
randomly assigned subject numbers. Links between these subject numbers and the participant's personal information will not be 
incorporated into any of these previously mentioned records and will only be kept in a separate file under password protection 
that is accessible only by the primary investigator for use in the case that a participant wishes to withdraw from the study and 
have their data deleted at a later point in time. No hard copies of this information will be generated. No data identifying 
participants by name or contact information will be released to anyone other than the primary investigator. Signed consent forms 
will be stored separately from the study data in a locked space accessible only by the primary investigator. Any data collected 
that describes the participants' age, race/ethnicity, and gender may be used for scientific reporting, but will only be published or 
presented in an aggregate form that does not identify any individual participants and keeps their participation confidential. 
For pilot participants, their information will be kept confidential such that their personal information will never be kept in direct 
association with their experimental responses. If the experimental procedure takes place directly on Qualtrics, pilot participants 
will be provided a random number and a link to a second, entirely separate questionnaire following their completion of the study 
where they may submit this random number as well as their contact information if they wish to be included in the raffle. The 
information collected at this time will remain under the same password protection as any other Qualtrics data where it is only 
accessible by the experimenter, and will further remain separate from any experimental responses, the participant’s subject 
number, etc. Furthermore, if the piloting takes place on Amazon Mechanical Turk, the website will compensate participants on 
the basis of their MTurk account without ever needing to collect the participants’ personal information.  
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Will it be necessary to use deception with your participants at any time during this research? Please 
note: withholding details about the specifics of one's hypothesis does not constitute deception. 
However, misleading participants about the nature of the research question or about the nature of 
the task they will be completing does constitute deception. 
No 
If your project study includes deception, please describe here the process you will use, why the deception is necessary, and 
a full description of your debriefing procedures. 
N/A 
For projects not using deception, please include your debriefing statement. (This is information you provide to the 
participant at the end of your study to explain your research question more fully than you may have been able to do at the 
beginning of the study.) All studies must include a debriefing statement. Be sure to give participants the opportunity to 
ask any additional questions they may have about the study. 
N/A 
If you will be conducting interviews in a language other than English, will you conduct all of the 
interviews yourself, or will you have the assistance of a translator? 
Not applicable 
If you will be conducting interviews in a language other than English, please describe your competence or fluency in the 
other language(s) you will use. 
N/A 
If you will be using the assistance of a translator, that individual must also certify that he or she is 
familiar with human subject protocol and has completed the online training course. Please respond 
whether you have found an IRB-certified translator. 
Not applicable 
If you have not yet found a translator, do you agree that when you do find a translator, you will 
make sure that person will also agree to use standard protocol for the treatment of human subjects, 
and that the individual's training certificate will be submitted to the IRB records before you begin 
collecting data? 
Not applicable 
If your recruitment materials or consent forms will be presented in languages other than English, 
please translate these documents and email copies at attachments to IRB@bard.edu. I have 
submitted all of my translated materials 
Not applicable 
If you are using video recording, please email as an attachment a copy of the video consent form 
you will use to IRB@bard.edu(e.g., "WatersVideoConsent.doc"). I have submitted a copy of my 
video consent form. 
Not applicable 
If you are a graduate or undergraduate student, has your adviser seen and approved your 
application? 
Yes 
 
IRB Appendix A: Sample recruitment text (included elsewhere in the Appendices)  
IRB Appendix B: Consent form  
IRB Appendix C: Example stimuli (included elsewhere in the Appendices) 
IRB Appendix D: Questionnaires (included elsewhere in the Appendices) 
IRB Appendix E: Debriefing form  
IRB Appendix F: NIH Human Participant Protection Education Certificates  
IRB Appendix G: European Conformity (CE) Documentation for Tobii X2 60 Eye Tracker 
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B. INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT (Full Version) 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study designed as part of a Bard College Senior Project in the Department of 
Psychology. This study seeks to investigate the nature of attention and memory in legal settings.  
 
Please take time to thoroughly read through this form as it will describe any potential risks and benefits of this study. 
After you have been properly informed, you have the right to choose whether you wish to participate by either 
signing or not signing this form. You also should be aware that you have the ability to end your participation in this 
study at any point in time.  
 
Background: In this study, we seek to learn how different people process information that may be used in criminal 
court cases. We hope to use this data to comment on why jurors might come to different conclusions regarding the 
facts of a case. This will be investigated through a decision making and memory task, and your attention will be 
monitored with an eye tracker. 
 
What You Will Do in this Study: In this study, you will be asked to read and view information and evidence that 
would likely be included in a criminal court case. As you process this information, your gaze (ie, where your eyes 
are looking) will be monitored by an eye tracker in order to ensure that you are indeed focusing on the information 
that is provided. Following this task, you will be asked to recall the facts of the case and will be asked to answer a 
series of questions regarding the innocence or guilt of the defendant. This task will take a total of 15 minutes and 
will require an additional 10 minutes to fill out questionnaires. The experimenter will be present in the room for the 
duration of this experiment, and as such will be available to answer any questions you may have.  
 
Should you decide to end your participation early, whether out of discomfort or otherwise, you are encouraged to let 
your experimenter know. The information we have gathered in that time will be omitted from the study, and you will 
still have a chance to receive any compensation that this study may provide. 
 
Risks and Benefits: There are no health risks associated with this study. The task that you will perform is not 
extensively challenging, and the information that will be presented to you, while it is associated with a criminal 
court case, is not violent or disturbing in nature. The study is relatively short, and the pacing is designed so as to 
prevent any possible boredom or stress that may arise. We do not plan to overwhelm you with information, but 
rather to give you ample time to process the information that is presented to you. Additionally, the technology that is 
utilized in this study (a Tobii X2-60 Eye Tracker) is not dangerous, and functions much like a computer camera. 
Finally, all of the information collected by the eye tracker and provided to us by you in later questionnaires will 
remain confidential.  
 
While this study may not provide you with any direct benefits, you will be entered for the chance to win an Amazon 
gift card. Further, this study will provide crucial information necessary in understanding human attention and 
decision making. Finally, you will directly assist in the completion of a Senior Project, and in doing so you will 
support an undergraduate student as they attempt to better understand experimental design and the collection of 
behavioral data.  
 
Compensation: For your participation, you will be entered for a chance to win an Amazon gift card, and will be 
able to have any of the snacks offered as further compensation for your time.  
 
Your Rights as a Participant: Participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary, meaning that you may 
withdraw from this experiment at any time without penalty. If you choose to withdraw, you will still have the chance 
to receive any compensation. In the case that you do choose to withdraw, feel free to inform your experimenter that 
you no longer wish to participate.  
 
The experimenter will tell you more about the experiment, including a full review of its hypothesis, at the 
completion of this session. In the case that you have further questions regarding this study, you may ask them at any 
point during the session or email the principal investigator, Clarence Brontë (bb6616@bard.edu).  
 
Confidentiality: Your data and any responses you may provide will be coded so that your responses are not linked 
to your identifiable personal information. Your responses will not be shared with any other participants, and your 
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final data will be recorded and presented such that it cannot be traced back to you. Only the primary investigator and 
their advisor will have access to the direct responses you provide, and those responses will be filed under an 
anonymous subject number.  
 
 
Results of this study may be used in the principal investigator’s senior project at Bard College, which will be 
permanently and publicly available in the Bard College library and online through the Bard College 
DigitalCommons. This information may also be used in the potential publication or presentation of findings that may 
come from this project. In these cases, your results will be presented in aggregate with the results of other 
participants and will not be linked to any identifiable information. If you have any other questions about your rights 
as a participant, please ask your experimenter or contact the Bard College Institutional Review Board at 
irb@bard.edu.  
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT: 
“The purpose of this study, procedures to be followed, and the risks and benefits have been explained to me. I 
have been given an opportunity to ask questions, and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I 
have been told whom to contact if I have additional questions. I have read this consent form and agree to be 
in this study, with the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.” 
 
By signing below, I agree with the above statement of consent and further certify that I am at least 18 years of age.  
 
___________________________________     _______________ 
Participant Signature        Date 
 
___________________________________ 
Participant Name (Printed) 
 
___________________________________ 
Experimenter Signature   
 
B. INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT (MTurk Version) 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study that has been created as part of a Bard College Senior Project in the 
Department of Psychology. This study seeks to investigate the nature of attention and memory in legal settings. 
  
Please take time to thoroughly read through this form, as it will describe any potential risks and benefits of this 
study. After you have been properly informed, you have the right to choose whether you wish to participate by 
answering the questions below. You also should be aware that you have the ability to end your participation in this 
study at any point in time. 
  
Background: In this pilot study, we seek to learn how different people process information that may be used in 
criminal court cases. We hope to use this data to comment on why jurors might come to different conclusions 
regarding the facts of a case. This will be investigated through a decision making and memory task. 
  
What You Will Do in this Study: In this study, you will be asked to read and view information and evidence that 
would likely be included in a criminal court case. Following this task, you will be asked to recall the facts of the 
case and will be asked to answer a series of questions regarding the innocence or guilt of the defendant. This task 
will take a total of 15 minutes and will require an additional 10 minutes to fill out questionnaires. 
  
Risks and Benefits: There are no health risks associated with this study. The task that you will perform is not 
extensively challenging, and the information that will be presented to you, while it is associated with a criminal 
court case, is not violent or disturbing in nature. The study is relatively short. We do not plan to overwhelm you with 
information, and you may proceed through the following questions at a pace that you find comfortable. Finally, all 
of the information provided to us by you will remain confidential. 
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As a direct benefit, you will be provided with monetary compensation via MTurk for your completion of this study. 
Your participation in this study will provide crucial information necessary to develop a study that seeks to 
understand human attention and decision making, and your responses will assist in the completion of a Senior 
Project. In doing so, you may benefit from knowing that you are supporting undergraduate students as they attempt 
to better understand experimental design and the collection of behavioral data. 
  
Compensation: For your participation, you will be provided with direct monetary compensation through MTurk. 
  
Your Rights as a Participant: Participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary, meaning that you may withdraw 
from this experiment at any time without penalty. 
  
You will be provided with more information about the experiment, including a full review of its hypothesis, at the 
completion of this session. In the case that you have further questions regarding this study, you may email the 
principal investigator, Clarence Brontë (bb6616@bard.edu). 
  
Confidentiality: Your data and any responses you may provide will be coded so that your responses are not linked to 
your identifiable personal information. Your responses will not be shared with any other participants, and your final 
data will be recorded and presented such that it cannot be traced back to you. Only the primary investigator and their 
advisor will have access to the direct responses you provide, and those responses will be filed under an anonymous 
subject number. 
  
Results of this pilot study may be used in the principal investigator’s senior project at Bard College, which will be 
permanently and publicly available in the Bard College library and online through the Bard College 
DigitalCommons. This information may also be used in the potential publication or presentation of findings that may 
come from this project. In these cases, your data will be presented in aggregate with the results of other participants 
and will not be linked to any identifiable information. If you have any other questions about your rights as a 
participant, please ask your experimenter or contact the Bard College Institutional Review Board at irb@bard.edu. 
  
STATEMENT OF CONSENT: 
“The purpose of this study, procedures to be followed, and the risks and benefits have been explained to me. I have 
been given an opportunity to ask questions, and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been 
told whom to contact if I have additional questions. I have read this consent form and agree to be in this study, with 
the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.” 
  
Consent Questions: 
● “Are you at least 18 years of age?” 
● “Do you feel like you have fully read and understood the contents of this informed consent agreement?” 
● “Do you agree with the above statement of consent?” 
 
 
E. DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
PLEASE KEEP THIS SHEET FOR YOUR RECORDS 
 
Study Title: Looking at Socially Stigmatized Defendants  
Principal Investigator: Clarence Brontë (bb6616@bard.edu) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. This study is designed to learn more about how biased gaze 
behaviors brought about by socially stigmatized information influence attentional patterns and subsequently impact 
legal decisions. This experiment seeks to investigate these trends by recording with an eye tracker where participants 
look on a screen and relating these recorded patterns to the later decisions participants make about the culpability of 
a defendant and to the self-reported explicit biases participants have about these socially stigmatized groups.  
 
Specifically, this research aims to complete this goal by presenting participants with information about a defendant. 
This information is varied such that, for some participants, the defendant may have been identified as a member of 
one or more stigmatized groups. In legal settings, defendants that are members of stigmatized groups (such as people 
of color, people who have mental illnesses, and people who are regular drug users), may be deemed more or less 
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culpable for the crimes that they were charged with due to the biases that people have about the groups these 
defendants represent. As a result, these individuals may receive harsher punishments than other less stigmatized 
individuals who were charged for the same crime. While some people are willing to openly admit to having these 
biases, other people either choose not to vocalize these biases or vehemently believe that they do not possess these 
biases at all. However, many individuals still reflect these biases in the way that they behave, act, or physically 
move. One such way that these biases might become manifested is through gaze behavior, or how people visually 
process information or people. In this experiment, we attempt to identify how people might embody biases toward 
these stigmatized individuals through how they look at them or information about them, even when they may not 
personally believe in the validity of these biases. By identifying these trends, we may begin to question why these 
biases are so pervasive in decision making, even when jurors actively seek to judge the case without bias. For 
example, even if a person believes that mental illness does not impact someone’s criminal culpability, the fact that 
they might have unknowingly used the knowledge that the defendant is mentally ill to change the way that they 
processed or prioritized other information about that defendant may lead them to make different decisions about that 
person’s behavior. By conducting this study, we hope to learn more about how these differential gaze behaviors 
operate such that people might utilize this information in order to combat the visual manifestation of these biases 
and be better able to make the unbiased legal decisions they hope to make.    
 
This decision required us to withhold information from you in order to avoid contaminating the results. Given that 
we are interested in how knowledge about the dynamics of these visual manifestations of bias may allow people to 
adapt the way they look at legal information or even how they look at the defendants themselves, any participant 
equipped with this knowledge might have preemptively attempted to adjust their gaze behaviors in some way. This 
would prevent us from being able to identify the exact dynamics of these gaze behaviors as they would naturally 
occur in people who, for the most part, are unequipped with this knowledge. As a result, we withheld this 
information from you so that your performance would not have been altered. Now that you are fully aware of the 
purpose of this study, please be aware that you are fully able to withdraw from this experiment at this time and 
remove your data from our final analysis.  
 
Thank you again for your participation! If you have any questions or concerns, you may ask your experimenter now 
or contact them at a later date at bb6616@bard.edu.  
 
Finally, we request that, if you know anyone who may be eligible to participate in this experiment, you do not 
discuss this experiment with them until after they have had the opportunity to participate. Again, prior knowledge of 
this experiment and its primary focus may invalidate the results. You will be emailed once we have stopped meeting 
with participants, at which time you may speak about this experiment freely. We greatly appreciate your 
cooperation. 
 
Bard Institutional Review Board 
irb@bard.edu 
 
Bard Counseling Center 
845-758-7433 
845-758-7777 
 
National Suicide Prevention Hotline  
1-800-273-8255 
Appendix G: Preteset Results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AVERIVE RACISM AND JURIDICAL DECISIONS 
 
171 
F. NIH HUMAN PARTICIPANT PROTECTION EDUCATION CERTIFICATE 
 
The following form details that Clarence Brontë (Legal Name: Brontë Baker-Blake, Bard College Registered Name: 
Clarence Baker-Blake) is certified to conduct human subjects research. 
 
 
G. CONFORMITY (CE) DOCUMENTATION FOR TOBII X2 60 EYE TRACKER 
 
This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules. Operation is subject to the following two conditions: (1) this 
device may not cause harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference received, including 
interference that may cause undesired operation.  
 
Modifications not expressly approved by Tobii could void the user’s authority to operate the equipment under FCC 
rules.  
This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class B digital device, pursuant to part 15 
of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against harmful interference in a 
residential installation. This equipment generates, uses and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed 
and used in accordance with the instructions, may cause harmful interference to radio communications.  
 
However, there is no guarantee that interference will not occur in a particular installation. If this equipment does 
cause harmful interference to radio or television reception, which can be determined by turning the equipment off 
and on, the user is encouraged to try to correct the interference by one or more of the following measures:  
• Reorient or relocate the receiving antenna.  
• Increase the separation between the equipment and receiver.  
• Connect the equipment into a wall outlet on a circuit different from that to which the receiver is connected.  
• Consult the dealer or experienced radio/TV technician for assistance. 
